

Local Democracy and Resilience in Ukraine: Learning from Communities' Crisis Response in War

Oleksandra Keudel, Valentyn Hatsko, Andrii Darkovich, Oksana Huss

KSE | Kyiv
School of
Economics



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Frontpage Photo: Local self-government leaders discuss opportunities and limitations of citizen engagement during the war at a research validation workshop in August 2024 in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Photo: KSE

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List of acronyms

LSG - Local Self-Government Bodies

CSO - Civil society organisation

RMA - Regional Military Administration

DMA - District Military Administration

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Executive summary

The research report explores the resilience of local self-governments (LSGs) in Ukraine during the Russian invasion, highlighting their crucial role in crisis response despite significant challenges. LSGs have adapted to wartime conditions by relocating operations, managing resource shortages, and engaging with citizens and stakeholders to meet critical needs such as infrastructure repair, IDP support, and community resilience building. The study examines how local democracy—through transparency, public participation, and accountability—facilitates these efforts, supporting collaborative crisis governance despite limitations imposed by martial law. It finds that while LSGs benefit from decentralization, they face coordination challenges with national authorities and resource constraints. The report underscores the significance of digital tools and physical community spaces in fostering resilience and suggests that policymakers enhance local democracy to strengthen societal resilience under crisis conditions. These insights contribute to the understanding of decentralized crisis response in conflict zones and inform strategies for building resilient governance systems.

Acknowledgements

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Preface



By Johan Lilja, Secretary General, Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy

The mission of the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD) is to contribute to poverty reduction by promoting local democracy. In order to fulfil this, we promote and encourage decentralised cooperation through municipal partnerships programme, add capacity-building through our training programmes, and invest in relevant research and creating research networks that support democratic policy development and implementation. ICLD connects research and practice by publishing key lessons learned from our programmes, initiating and funding relevant research, connecting academicians with practitioners, and organising workshops. *Local Democracy and Resilience in Ukraine: Learning from Communities' Crisis Response in War* is the 33rd report to be published in ICLDs Research Report series.

This report is part of our work with democratic resilience, – in which we examine the role of democracy as a pragmatic tool for resilience, and resilience of democracy itself. Together with the Swedish-Ukrainian municipal partnerships, we strive to strengthen the ability of democratic local governments to respond to shocks and protracted crises - and the ability of local democracy to persist in those adverse conditions.

There is no lack of adversity for today's democracy, and no lack of insecurity for people in today's world. This report shows local governments that view citizens not as mere recipients of services or clients, but as 'partners in the co-production of security and human rights. It gives an excellent account of how local democracy can enhance societal resilience. That is, by providing crucial support to the people in their

local context and in turn strengthening societal level resilience.

As such, the efforts of Ukrainian local governments during the full-scale Russian invasion bring insights to others in an increasingly instable and less secure world. Importantly, the study points to pre-existing practices of participation and co-governance of crisis preparedness, including in the planning stages, as crucial. In other words, there is no excuse not to start today. By means of local democracy, through participation, equity, transparency and accountability, the world can become a better place, locally and globally. The foreground question is: can local democracy build resilience at the societal level? The answer is yes.

Visby, Sweden


A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Johan Lilja', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Johan Lilja,
Secretary General, ICLD
October 2024

About the authors




Oleksandra Keudel is an Associate Professor at the Kyiv School of Economics. She studies democratic transformation and societal resilience in hybrid regimes, specializing in Ukraine's sub-national politics. She combines academic research with policy consulting on open government and public integrity for international organizations, such as the EU, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and IIEP-UNESCO. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin and has been a visiting researcher at Harvard University, George Washington University, NYU, and Södertörn University.



Andrii Darkovich is a Researcher and Local Governance Expert at the Center for Sociological Research, Decentralization, and Regional Development at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute. Andrii is a PhD student in Political Science at Kyiv School of Economics. His research focuses on state-society relations in Ukraine, including local democracy during the interstate war, mechanisms of trust in local government, predictors of cooperation between local self-governments and varied actors, hromadas resilience and local elections.



Valentyn Hatsko is a Data Analyst at the Center for Sociological Research on Decentralization and Regional Development at the KSE Institute. He is a PhD student in sociology at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Among his scientific interests are local governance studies, political trust and decentralization reform.



Dr Oksana Huss is a co-founder of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network. She worked as a researcher at the University of Bologna, Italy and a lecturer at the Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre, Ukraine. Her areas of expertise cover (anti-) corruption and social movements, as well as open government and digital technologies. Oksana obtained her doctoral degree at the Institute for Development and Peace in Germany and held several research fellowships in Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. She consulted international organizations, such as the Council of Europe, EU, OECD, UNESCO, and UNODC.

Introduction

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 created many crises, such as massive displacement and destroyed critical infrastructure. Despite the horrific human and material toll of the invasion, Ukraine maintains its statehood. It shows the capacity to respond to multiple war-related crises emerging as the war rages on.

Local self-government authorities (LSGs) – locally accountable local governments at the lowest administrative level (*hromada*, or community), have been instrumental in Ukraine's wartime resilience as they continued providing basic public goods and services while supporting the defence in an armed conflict (Romanova, 2022). LSGs have been instrumental in addressing the immediate humanitarian needs of affected populations, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other vulnerable groups. Their efforts encompassed the provision of shelter, food, and necessities. Furthermore, LSGs took significant steps to restore and maintain municipal infrastructure, ensuring the continuity of critical services such as water, electricity, and heating. They drill boreholes, restore old wells, and procure vital energy equipment like generators and boilers. Beyond immediate relief efforts, LSGs also focused on building long-term community resilience by establishing community support centers with access to electricity, mobile connection, and food, and emergency response plans (Brik & Murtazashvili, 2022; Rabinovych et al., 2023; Romanova, 2022).

This report presents the study's results on the crisis response mechanisms and practices of Ukrainian local authorities during the full-scale Russian invasion. The introductory section further proceeds with placing the study in the broader literature on the effectiveness and legitimacy of crisis management and sketches the scope conditions for operations of Ukrainian local authorities during the war before presenting the analytical framework and methodology of the study, rounding up with the report's structure.

Rationale and research questions of this study

The critical role of Ukrainian LSGs in maintaining resilience against overwhelming crises during the war

is puzzling, given the ongoing debates over the (dis) advantages of centralized and decentralized crisis management. Crisis response, focused on the end goal of security as a public good, often implies centralization of the state power in the name of efficiency. Indeed, there is evidence that multiple decision-making centres may compete for scarce resources and influence, slowing down crisis response due to a lack of coordination (Kuhn & Morlino, 2022; Schnabel & Hegele, 2021), so centralization seems a reasonable alternative. On the other hand, research on ecological disasters provides evidence that polycentric and multilayered institutions allow societies to respond more adaptively at appropriate levels “because of their ability to mobilise knowledge and resources across governance levels” (Lebel et al., 2006, p. 2). Centralized response, on the contrary, makes societies and states more vulnerable in a crisis: when there is a single decision-making point and if “centralized mechanisms of coordination and conflict resolution fail, so too does the system, as it will no longer operate in a coordinated manner.” (Alshamy et al., 2023, p. 8).

That LSGs, despite wartime and martial law limitations, remain key governing actors on the local level for tackling war-related civilian emergencies makes Ukraine a case of a decentralized crisis response. This fact also warrants a question: **what practices and mechanisms do Ukrainian LSGs use to sustain resilience under war-related crises (RQ1)?**

Our pilot study over the first year of the Russian full-scale invasion provided the first empirical cues about LSGs' response practices. LSGs reported that public engagement, co-production, and collaborative governance became the main mechanisms contributing to local problem-solving in Ukraine (Keudel & Huss, 2023).

Such a collaborative nature of crisis response in Ukraine is puzzling, considering the centralization trends observed in other crises. Indeed, “regressive securitisation,” has evolved since the Covid-19 crisis and has been boosted in Europe since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Diez, 2023). Democratic deficit (Alizada et al., 2021), i.e. limitations on

the democratic debate and exclusionary and marginalising policies to tackle the dissent, often accompanies a centralized crisis response. Considering our previous findings that participatory mechanisms may have compensated for restrictions by martial law, which halted traditional democratic tools of accountability and participation such as elections, protests, and transparency, another question is **what is the role of local democracy mechanisms – transparency, citizen participation, accountability and equity – in LSG response to war-related crises in Ukraine (RQ2)?**

This study, thus, illuminates the crisis resilience practices of LSGs in Ukraine and the specific relationship between local democracy and crisis resilience in an interstate conflict. It explores how components of local democracy - public participation and equity, transparency, and accountability and the framing conditions of the context - vertical coordination and digital technologies - play out in crisis response at the local level. The report will benefit policymakers interested in building societal resilience during a war.

Scope conditions for Ukrainian local authorities during the war and martial law

Ukraine's 2015-2020 decentralization reforms were widely recognized as one of the most successful post-Euromaidan initiatives. A significant outcome of the decentralization reform was the creation of conditions conducive to the democratization of governance in Ukraine and increasing public trust in local authorities (Arends et al., 2023).

The reforms created new administrative units – *hromadas* (communities, in Ukrainian) – with the right to self-government. Hromadas exercise this right via self-government authorities (LSGs) comprised of locally elected mayors and councillors who are mutually accountable and oversee the executive bodies. After the reforms, the LSGs have taken on increased responsibilities, including primary and secondary education, primary healthcare, utilities, and local economic and social development. These responsibilities have strengthened their ties to their hromadas. Terri-


torial consolidation has facilitated economies of scale, leading to greater public service efficiency, while the guaranteed share of national tax revenues has provided financial predictability (OECD, 2018). LSGs have also engaged in experiments with participatory democracy and collaborative governance (Aasland & Lyska, 2020; Keudel et al., 2024; Schmäing, 2023).

However, the Russian aggression and martial law altered some LSG competencies and resources. Specifically, the powers of military (formerly state) administrations have been expanded for crisis response, thus overlapping and sometimes overriding LSG competencies in territories of hostilities or those who had experienced Russian occupation (Darkovich & Hnyda, 2024). LSGs saw a redistribution of military and law-enforcement personnel's income tax (PIT) from local budgets to the state budget, undermining their revenues. (AUC, 2023) (Umland & Burkovskiy, 2023). Nevertheless, many LSGs assumed the responsibility for local crisis response during the Russian full-scale invasion, enhancing the country's resilience to the Russian invasion (Council of Europe, n.d.; Rabinovych et al., 2023). Their proactive engagement in civilian crisis management underscores the importance of decentralization reforms for Ukraine's statehood during foreign aggression.

An analytical framework for studying the role of local authorities during the war and their contribution to societal resilience

The analytical framework of this study is informed by the research on resilience in disasters and governance of complex policy problems, as well as previous research on Ukrainian LSGs' helpful resilience practices (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023b; Keudel & Huss, 2023; Rabinovych et al., 2023). It illuminates how local authorities contribute to societal resilience through collaborative crisis governance by adapting classic mechanisms of local democracy – transparency, citizen participation and accountability – for pragmatic purposes of preparedness and solving the war-related crisis. This section unpacks the analytical framework, starting with our resilience conceptualisation (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Visualization of the analytical framework



Source: Authors

Concept and measurement of resilience in this study

We **define resilience** as the capacity of local self-government (LSG) to cope with external stresses and crises triggered by the war (adapted from Adger, 2000) and provide public services despite external shocks and threats. The typical operationalization of resilience consists of three types of reactions to a crisis: (1) resistance, which means continuing the functioning without a significant change or disruption in the face of an external shock (Adger, 2000; Olsson et al., 2015); (2) adaptation, which means adjusting existing practices or developing new ones to continue functioning as intended in the face of an external shock (Amir & Kant, 2018); and (3) anticipation of future crises to develop response scenarios that account for “multiple futures” (Duchek, 2018; Fuerth, 2011).

In this study, we concentrate on two components of resilience, adaptation and preparedness, because of the change in the crisis context. As the Russian invasion continues over its third year, the war-triggered stresses acquire characteristics of a protracted crisis rather than a shock as it was in the first six months (Rabinovych et al., 2023). Thus, hromadas face long-term insecurity from the Russia-induced dangers to civilian infrastructure and the social repercussions of war, such as loss of lives within the community, mental health issues and internal displacement. In such conditions, war-related

crises are no longer shocks, i.e. short-term, previously unknown disruptions that entail resistance as an immediate response (Anholt & Boersma, 2018).

Thus, we capture the **adaptation** of LSGs. Since 2022, multiple surveys and studies provided evidence of the adaptability of Ukrainian local authorities: they often adjusted pre-war governance practices to serve wartime purposes to continue functioning. In 2024, however, adaptation is more challenging to capture as the war protracted and the memory of pre-war governance practices faded. Therefore, we asked our respondents about the forced relocation of an LSG as an adaptation practice. Relocation means local authorities from temporarily occupied territories re-assembled their operations in different regions of Ukraine to continue serving their residents. Relocation is necessary for LSGs in those municipalities that Russia occupied because LSG representatives are its first targets.

We measure **preparedness** for all types of *bromadas* as their ability to anticipate relatively known threats outside their control and take action to minimize the damage. Our measure of preparedness consists of the following components: action planning for emergencies, addressing scarcity of critical resources and potential damages to virtual infrastructure. These components are the results of the analysis of LSG resilience in 2022: emergency planning was helpful for

most surveyed municipalities in 2022; resource scarcity (food, medicine) and energy supply back-ups emerged to be the critical issues for civilian resistance, especially in case of a Russian occupation or siege; and virtual infrastructure is essential to the functioning of most of LSG services in Ukraine's digitized governance system (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023b; Rabinovych et al., 2023). Specifically, maintaining mobile communication is critical to decreasing chaos by providing official information and enabling connectivity for people-to-people support; data backup strategies and IT system vulnerability testing are essential in light of Russian cyberattacks. Data back-ups are also important regarding personal data registries, which are needed, among other things, to plan evacuations and allocate support to IDPs and other types of aid. To this end, we elaborated 26 indicators, operationalized them through relevant survey questions and then aggregated them in an integrative index¹ to assess the overall preparedness of LSGs.

Resilience, Local Democracy and Collaborative Crisis Governance

We started this study with the recognition that war-related crises are too extensive to be resolved by the governments alone and that engaging diverse stakeholders is a necessity (Stark & Taylor, 2014). Because of the intensity of Russian attacks, even seemingly technical issues like putting out a fire or dealing with electric power outages soon drain LSGs' resources. Then, they must rely on external support for fire trucks and generators. Yet, many other issues during the war become 'wicked problems' – those that have numerous diverging viewpoints and potentially involve conflicting values (Newman & Head, 2017, pp. 415–416), e.g. integration of internally displaced people, evacuation, community preparedness for food, electricity shortage or cyber-attacks, or infrastructure (re-)building.

Therefore, we include mechanisms of local democracy – transparency, citizen participation, and accountability in our theoretical framework (Figure 1 above). Besides *citizen* participation, complex problem-solving requires coordination and cooperation with other *non-state*

stakeholders, such as the private sector, who can contribute to the solutions with resources and knowledge. The concept of "collaborative governance" captures stakeholder partnerships to resolve society's problems (Bussu, 2019). In this logic of governance, citizens represent not only potential victims for protection, as mainstream theories of security imply, but also partners for the co-production of security. Business and civil society are not only government clients or watchdogs, respectively, but partners in the co-production of crisis response.

Trust is central to collaborative governance. On the one hand, it builds on transparency and predictability regarding government actions; on the other hand, it is a product of social accountability within collaborative governance arrangements, when actors can remind each other of the mutual commitments in the co-production process. Thus, against the limits on electoral accountability, collaborative governance, especially co-production as a deeper form of public-state partnership, offers the potential for alternative social forms of accountability (Torfing, 2012).

We operationalize local democracy and collaborative governance according to the "Civil Participation in Decision-making Processes" scale by the Council of Europe (Rosenzweigova et al., 2016), which we apply to war-related problems or crisis preparedness. Thus, we operationalize transparency as *informing* residents and other stakeholders about crisis solutions or actions in an emergency. We operationalize citizen and stakeholder participation as *consultation* and *dialogue* between the authorities and stakeholders. We operationalize co-production as a partnership between LSG and other stakeholders in implementing solutions. We operationalize accountability concerning war-related crises as an element of dialogue when LSGs admit to changing their policies following stakeholder feedback (Annex 6). Our framework accounts for equity as a normative objective of participatory interventions (Waddington et al., 2019, p. 35) by measuring how LSGs involve vulnerable social groups, such as internally displaced people (IDPs) and war veterans, in their collaborative crisis response.

1 The index consists of 26 items (Cronbach's alpha $\alpha = .84$). Included items and index description in Annex 3.

Conditions for Collaborative Crisis Governance

The ability of the local authorities to perform a stabilising function for the whole system of governance depends theoretically on the quality of **vertical intergovernmental coordination** (Murtazashvili, 2019, p. 55ff). To assess it, we will examine the availability of feedback loops between levels of authority, drawing on the literature dealing with policy-making complexity (Fuerth, 2011, p. 38). Rapid coordination along power vertical (local-regional-national levels of governance) ensures a complete picture of a problem – i.e., having differentiated information of what is happening in different parts of the country simultaneously, integrating this information into decision-making, and coordinating the work towards solutions. For example, budgetary planning and spending regulations must provide flexible ways to allocate resources according to the needs on the local level. Still, at the same time, they must consider priorities for expenditures at the national level.

Finally, **digital technologies** assist all mechanisms related to crisis resilience (Fischer et al., 2020). They are critical for fast communication and efficient coordination, which LSGs confirmed already in 2022 (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023b). Data in diverse forms can provide the basis for evidence-based foresight and strategic planning (Maffei et al., 2020). Digital platforms and social media are critical to building networks. E-democracy tools improve communication about the needs and preferences of citizens, while e-governance improves the provision of public services. All these functions of digital technologies are critical to responding to crises if appropriately managed while acknowledging the risks of cyber warfare.

Methodology

This report presents the findings of the survey of Ukrainian local self-government authorities (also referred to as 'local authorities' in this report), fielded between January 1st and March 12th in 2 waves. The survey was distributed via the All-Ukrainian Association of Amalgamated Territorial Communities (All-Ukrainian Association of ATCs), two NGOs cooperating with municipalities - People in Need and the National Platform for Resilience and Cohesion - and via the mailing list acquired by the researchers during the 2022 study by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (2023b).

The survey dataset consists of 181 responses, equivalent to 14% of municipalities under the control of the Ukrainian government (or 12.3% of all municipalities). We accounted only for one response per municipality; if a municipality responded more than once, we selected a higher-ranked official's entry (there were only nine such cases). Most responses (143 of 181) came via the All-Ukrainian Association of ATCs (Annex 1).


The survey questionnaire mirrors our analytical framework. First, we asked questions to measure LSG resilience: to measure adaptation, we asked about change in institutions and relocation of LSGs, and to measure preparedness, we asked questions about state of emergency planning, emergency informing, and readiness in case of critical resource scarcity and damage to virtual infrastructure. These questions build on the 2022 KSE survey for comparison (Rabinovych et al., 2023). Second, we surveyed LSGs about the purpose of their transparency and public participation initiatives during the war in general, the extent of stakeholder engagement in solving the most critical war-related problem they had faced in the past 12 months before the survey and the extent of stakeholder involvement in crisis response planning; these questions mainly were repeated for comparison with 2022 Congress' survey (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023b). Since Ukrainian LSGs reported challenges and negative consequences of public engagement even during relative peacetime, we repeated these questions for comparison (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023a, pp. 39–46). Third, we surveyed LSGs about their

perceptions of vertical coordination: the extent of perceived involvement in and influence on the decisions of the district, regional and central government; we repeated these questions from the 2022 Congress' survey (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023b). Finally, we included several questions on how LSGs use digital technologies for crisis notification.

The survey results reflect perceptions and practices of municipalities with 50,000 residents or less, rural and urban, as they comprise 89% of the sample. The remaining answers are almost equally distributed between medium and large cities. In terms of the security situations, most responding municipalities are located outside of the combat area, including liberated ones (67%), but a sizeable portion of the sample is in precarious conditions: under temporary occupation by Russia (14% of the sample)² or on the territory of hostilities (19%) (Table 1).

The **sample's regional variation is ample but** likely due to chance (Figure 2). For example, in Zaporizka oblast, 52% of hromadas filled out the survey, but in Khersonska – only 2% did so, even though both oblasts are severely affected by hostilities. In the northern Sum-ska and Chernihivska oblasts, 29% and 25% of LSGs responded, respectively, even though there are ongoing hostilities in the Sumska oblast and many hromadas still recovered from the temporary Russian occupation in Chernihivska oblast.

Figure 2. Number of surveyed LSGs by oblasts



Source: Authors

Engagement in the western oblasts varies, with Ivano-Frankivska at 13% and Chernivetska at 4%. The central macro-region shows moderate engagement, with rates hovering around 10% (Annex 2).

While this study is not longitudinal,³ we use analogous questions from the previous LSG surveys to compare the importance of different crisis responses and local democracy mechanisms in the various stages of war. There are small overlaps in the samples with the previous studies:

- The survey of 400+ municipalities within the “Research on Cohesion and Decentralization in Ukraine ReCoDe”, which was fielded to analyze predictors of local wartime resilience (Jan-22-Sept-23) (Rabinovych & Darkovich, 2022). Here, 76 respondents overlap (42% in the current sample).

Table 1 Security status, type and size of the participating LSGs

Status	Village (<50,000)	Small city (<50,000)	Medium city (50,000-100,000)	Large city (>100,000)	Total by status
Outside combat areas	76 (42%)	20 (11%)	7 (4%)	9 (5%)	112 (62%)
On the territory of hostilities	22 (12%)	10 (6%)	3 (2%)		35 (19%)
Temporarily occupied	19 (10%)	6 (3%)			25 (14%)
Liberated	5 (3%)	4 (2%)			9 (5%)
Total by type	122 (67%)	40 (22%)	10 (6%)	9 (5%)	181 (100%)

² In case of occupation, LSGs physically relocate to government-controlled territory but maintain the status of a temporarily occupied territory.

³ It proved impossible, despite our efforts, to run a longitudinal study as mobilising municipalities for response has become increasingly difficult. The reasons for inability to reach respondents are fatigue with increasing number of research among local authorities and their prioritization of more direct responsibilities against the backdrop of decreasing human capacities.

- Pilot survey on the needs and challenges of Ukrainian municipalities, covering 241 *bromadas* (Aug-Sept 2022) (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023b). Here, 37 respondents overlap (20% in the current sample).
- Baseline survey on the transparency and citizen participation practices of local authorities in Ukraine, covering 126 municipalities (June 2021) (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023a). Here, ten respondents overlap (5% in the current sample).

Our survey has several limitations, which we address below. First, we acknowledge the typical self-selection bias in online surveys. However, since we are interested in diverse crisis responses and local democracy tools, self-selection is less of a concern. It may even be beneficial, as it encourages input from municipalities that have actively addressed crises. We also sought to improve participation by working with survey distribution partners and the 2022 Congress survey respondents. Second, to address the issue of individual respondents representing complex governance units, we targeted LSG leaders with extensive operational knowledge, such as deputy mayors and department heads. Additionally, we validated our questions with the Head of the Think Tank at the All-Ukrainian Association of ATCs to enhance survey relevance.

Finally, we validated some of the conclusions of this report about the challenges and opportunities of local democracy at times of war in a participatory event for LSGs held in August 2024 at the Kyiv School of Economics.⁴ An event brought together 20 Ukrainian LSGs and several experts to discuss the challenges of public engagement at times of war, identified in this study, and co-develop practical solutions. Five LSGs were invited to present case studies that reflected those challenges, and the participants voted to select the most critical ones. Participants discussed these issues using the “World Café” format, focusing on possible solutions and identifying specific tools and strategies for improving civic participation in wartime. The event’s collaborative approach and diverse perspectives helped us validate

survey results and increase confidence in our recommendations. We developed a stand-alone, user-friendly brief in Ukrainian with elaborated solutions from this event.



Photo: KSE. Validation workshop with the local self-government leaders, Kyiv, Ukraine. August 2024

Structure of the report

This report is structured according to the theoretical framework and consists of the following sections. Section 2 presents the results of our measurement of LSGs’ resilience, operationalized as adaptation and resistance. Section 3 illuminates how LSGs use mechanisms of local democracy (transparency, citizen participation, and accountability tools) to address and prepare for war-related crises, followed by enablers of and challenges to citizen participation under war conditions. It shows that LSGs engage non-governmental stakeholders in crisis response but not in emergency response planning. This indicates that LSGs see the pragmatic value of citizen participation when a situation is acute, but the culture of collaborative crisis preparedness still needs to be developed. Section 4 reports on the LSGs’ perceptions of the quality of vertical coordination – with the Regional and District Military Administrations (RMA, DMA) and the central government, highlighting concerns about reduced possibilities of LSGs to shape national government decisions that affect them. Section 5 reports on the use of digital technologies for crisis response. Section 6 concludes the report with an overview of five lessons from the Ukrainian LSGs’ crisis response for the international peers and development cooperation actors.

⁴ Is it (Not) the Right Time? Opportunities and Challenges of Civic Participation at the Local Level During the War and the Role of Local Government”, in partnership with Cedos Analytical Center.

Manifestations of LSGs' Resilience and its Limitations

Resilience as adaptation: relocation of LSG operations

The survey results indicate that 17% of surveyed LSGs relocated. This means that, in case Russia occupied or was to occupy a hromada, LSGs did not seize operations but reassembled them in the government-controlled territory and physically moved their staff there. Some of these LSGs from Donetsk, Zaporizka and Mykolayivska *oblasts* later returned to their territories.

As an illustration of adaptation, relocated LSGs keep connected to their often dispersed communities in government-controlled and temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. To maintain contact with the residents, relocated LSGs reported using digital and remote tools, with most keeping social media pages (90%), followed by official websites (75%) and telephone hotlines (50%). Some mentioned Telegram. Among relocated LSGs, 70% reported compiling databases of resident contacts, indicating a data-driven policy approach (Figure 3).

At the same time, some LSGs also reported analogue solutions. Notably, more than half of LSGs reported establishing physical centres in alternate locations (55%), which requires reorientating all relevant governance processes in another area, possibly with


different staff and bundling different functions (Box 1). Besides, 20% of relocated LSGs reported using other means of communication to stay connected with residents, such as face-to-face interactions through organised community meetings, personal visits, telephone calls and other personal communication between relocated staff and those in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Box 1 Adaptation: Physical representations of occupied municipalities in other Ukrainian cities

Two large Ukrainian cities, temporarily occupied by Russia, Mariupol and Melitopol, developed an innovative adaptation approach to keep serving their internally displaced residents. The 18 representations of 'I am Mariupol' network and four offices of 'Melitopol here' across Ukraine provide a range of services from humanitarian aid, job and housing search to community building. Typically, they are managed and staffed by the displaced LSG officials and funded from the municipalities' own revenues. The latter accumulate thanks to continued tax allocation from employers who are still registered in those communities even if relocated (this is envisaged by the Ukrainian legislation).

Source: <https://www.mhelp.org.ua/en/projects/imariupol-support-centers>, https://biz.mlt.gov.ua/posts/?post_parent_id=50

Figure 3 Adaptation: means to sustain communication with residents among relocated LSGs



Source: Authors


Note: N = 20 (LSGs that have been relocated).

Question: From the list below, select the methods of communication that your local government uses with the residents of your community. Select all that apply.

Resilience as crisis preparedness

Most surveyed LSGs report moderate (index = 0.25-0.75, 73%) or high (index = 0.75-1.00, 24%) preparedness. LSGs in temporarily occupied hromadas show less preparedness than in other territories because they could not do anything related to material preparations as they had no access to their territories (Figure 4). The index reveals significantly higher preparedness of LSGs in urban and more populated than in rural and smaller (see Annex 3 for results of statistical tests).

Figure 4 Distribution of LSGs by 2024 Preparedness Index.




Note: 2022 Feb and 2022 Oct, survey within the framework of the Project "Support to the Decentralisation Reform in Ukraine" (U-LEAD with Europe): N = 131 (all LSGs except those that are temporarily occupied). 2024 March, ICLD survey: N = 156 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs). Data on 2022 Feb is retrospectively asked in 2022 Oct.

Compared to the 2022 Preparedness Index, most LSGs demonstrate moderate preparation (Figure 4). However, the 2024 Index is more specific and accounts for more detailed components than in 2022. For example, it asks for particular emergency goods separately rather than as one category as the 2022 Index has it (see Table 8 in Annex 3). Therefore, the 2022 figures likely inflate preparedness due to the differences in operationalization. Still, this data indicates that LSGs try to anticipate potential shortages and take action to respond. The following subsections unpack the elements of preparedness: planning response action in a crisis, addressing potential resource scarcity and damage to virtual infrastructure.

Planning for action and informing in case of emergency

Most surveyed LSGs (70%) reported having approved their crisis response plans, indicating the attempts to evaluate potential risks and responses beforehand. At the same time, this figure is much lower compared to 93% in October 2022 (Table 8 in Annex 3). There's a notable difference in preparedness between urban and rural LSGs, with 76% of urban LSGs having approved plans compared to 67% of rural LSGs. However, there is no significant variation in preparedness between LSGs located outside combat areas and those in the territory of hostilities (Figure 5).

Figure 5 Emergency action planning: formal plans vs action practice



Source: Authors

Note: N urban = 59, N rural = 122, N outside combat areas = 112, N on the territory of hostilities = 35, N temporarily occupied = 25, N liberated = 9, N total = 181. Question: 1. Have crisis response plans been approved? 2. Has the community practised an action plan in a crisis situation? Options: yes, no

Conversely, most LSGs, exceeding 80% across the board, report **having practised actions to take in crises** within the year ahead of the survey. This is more than the respondents who reported approving formal response plans (documents typically required by the government). Moreover, this is also more than in 2022: only 54% of surveyed LSGs reported having algorithms for emergency actions, which we interpret as similar to practice (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023a, p. 21). Practising crisis actions is more prevalent in urban hromadas, where 93% of LSGs have executed such plans, in contrast to 84% in rural areas.

Thus, there is a **disproportion between the number of respondents reporting practising actual response actions and having crisis response plans**, as well as fewer hromadas in 2024 report approving crisis response plans than in 2022. This is in line with previous findings that many preparations take place informally (Darkovich & Hnyda, 2024), while formally adopted plans may not always be helpful: for example, in 2022, almost a quarter found such plans as helping insignificantly or not helping at all to tackle war-related crises (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023a, p. 22).

Crisis response plans, especially in wartime uncertainty conditions, must be updated regularly to make them actionable. Of the LSGs with approved response plans, 74% have updated these plans in the past year (Figure 24 in Annex 5). There is a difference between urban and rural LSGs in terms of updating crisis response plans. Urban hromadas are more proactive in updating, with 80% having revised their plans, compared to 71% of rural ones. LSGs in non-combat areas also show higher rates of updates at 78%, in contrast to only 56% of LSGs in conflict areas updating their plans, indicating, predictably, at lower capacity of LSGs in more precarious security conditions. Notably, 39% of all LSGs who updated their crisis response plans cited strategic risk assessments as motivating the updates, reflecting a capacity for anticipating potential threats. Actual crisis experiences prompt 35% of LSGs to revise their plans,

highlighting the learning capacity necessary for preparedness in an uncertain environment of war (Figure 25 in Annex 5).


Finally, nearly all respondents (99%) reported having the technology to alert residents in an emergency, which slightly improved compared to 2022: 86% reported having tested crisis alert means for residents (Table 8 in Annex 3). While the respondents rely heavily on digital technology for crisis informing (Figure 6), a significant proportion of LSGs resort to traditional alert systems such as sirens (60%). Besides, 36% of LSG respondents use telephonic notifications, and 22% use vehicle-mounted loudspeakers. A marginal 13% of LSGs leverage local television channels or radio stations for alerts, a practice predominantly observed in larger urban centres with the necessary broadcasting infrastructure. Rural LSGs also mentioned specific notification methods, such as through networks of 'starostas'⁵ and administrative staff using personal networks of contacts. Additionally, designated community individuals, police officers, and members of initiative groups played roles in spreading information. Traditional methods like church bells were mentioned.

Addressing scarcity of critical resources

On average, 60% of surveyed LSGs reported having established reserves of critical resources: technical and drinking water (62%), medicine (60%), and food (53%) (Table 2). Compared to 87% in 2022, when we asked about these items together, the preparedness looks lower, but it rather illustrates the importance of a more nuanced measurement to capture readiness with critical goods (see Table 8 in Annex 3 for comparison of indexes). However, a divergence between urban and rural areas is evident in the accumulation of water and medicine stocks: while most cities boast reserves of water (73%) and medicine (71%), only around half of villages possess such reserves (57% and 55% respectively). Thus, although cities demonstrate better preparedness regarding water and medicine stocks, urban and rural areas encounter challenges in stocking food.

⁵ Starosta is an elected village representative who liaises between LSG and village residents; it is an official position with duties established both by the national laws and the regulations of a particular hromada council (Read more: <https://decentralization.ua/en/starosta>).

Figure 6 Notification methods in crisis



Source: Authors

Note: N = 181. Question: What technologies are used in your community to alert the public in crisis situations?

Interestingly, security status does not significantly impact stockpiling levels, although regions experiencing hostilities exhibit higher food reserves, contrasting sharply with limited stocks in occupied areas.

Table 2 Stocks of essential goods preparation

	<div> <div>< 51</div> <div>51–60</div> <div>60–66</div> <div>66–78</div> <div>≥ 78</div> </div>			
	Water	Food	Medicine	
Urban	73	58	71	
Rural	57	51	55	
Outside combat areas	67	57	69	
On the territory of hostilities	71	69	66	
Temporarily occupied	20	12	16	
Liberated	78	56	56	
Total	62	53	60	

Source: Authors

Note: N city = 59, N village = 122, N possible hostilities = 35, N safe = 112, N occupied = 25, N liberated = 9, N total = 181. Question: 1. Are there stocks of essential goods, such as technical and drinking water? 2. Have you formed stocks of essential goods - food? 3. Are there stocks of essential goods - medical supplies?

Most surveyed LSGs have implemented contingency plans with backup power supplies for their premises and municipal healthcare and educational institutions (Table 3), which has slightly improved compared to 2022 (see Table 8 in Annex 3 for a comparison of indexes). However, a noticeable disparity exists between urban and rural LSGs,

particularly evident in the provision of backup power for municipal social protection institutions and water supply companies, where rural areas face more challenges. Comparatively, while cities and villages demonstrate similar preparedness levels for energy supply in social protection institutions, villages encounter greater difficulties concerning water supply companies. Notably, the most pronounced contrast between urban and rural areas is in the readiness of heat supply companies, with figures showing 75% preparedness in cities versus 38% in villages. The most concerning aspect pertains to reserves for citizens, with only 43% reporting readiness.

Table 3 Backup Power Supply Readiness

	<div> <div>< 38</div> <div>38–54</div> <div>54–78.8</div> <div>78.8–89.4</div> <div>89.4–95.2</div> <div>≥ 95.2</div> </div>				
	Urban	Rural	Outside combat areas	On the territory of hostilities	Total
for LSGs	98	94	100	97	96
for citizens	54	38	46	51	43
for municipal educational institutions	93	89	99	94	90
for municipal healthcare institutions	97	87	96	94	90
for municipal social protection institutions	80	76	88	83	77
for heat supply companies	75	38	56	54	50
for water supply companies	95	66	80	86	76

Source: Authors

Note: N city = 59, N village = 122, N possible hostilities = 35, N safe = 112, N occupied = 25, N liberated = 9, N total = 181. Question: Do you have backup power supplies for...? Options: yes, no

Addressing potential damage to virtual infrastructure

Data indicates that 50% of surveyed LSGs have implemented measures to **sustain mobile communication** in an emergency, with more urban LSGs doing this compared to rural ones (Figure 7). These measures are, for example, back-up energy generation for mobile network repeaters. Yet, if a telecommunication operator is attacked centrally, as happened to Ukraine's largest operator, Kyivstar,⁶ in December 2023), such measures have little effect.

Our findings suggest an alarming situation with data back-up, with survey response data indicating that among respondents, most municipalities have **not done a complete data back-up for at least two years** between the surveys (Figure 7). Indeed, we find that while 57% of LSGs have only partially backed up their critical data, a mere 12% report full backup in the last 12 months. Coupled with the findings of the 2022 survey, which showed that only 43% of respondents reported a full backup of their community data, there is a significant lag for most municipalities (Table 8 in Annex 3).


that municipalities that have experienced occupation have learned the importance of data back-up and invest in it consciously.

Finally, the survey identifies a gap in testing **IT systems for vulnerabilities**, with only 23% of LSGs undertaking such measures (Figure 7). Urban municipalities are more proactive, with 39% conducting tests, compared to 16% in rural areas. LSGs outside of combat areas have a higher tendency to prepare their IT systems (28%) compared to those in areas with ongoing hostilities (20%). Considering the massive datafication and digitalization of governance in Ukraine, the lack of vulnerability testing warrants special attention to support local resilience.

Summary

Ukrainian LSGs surveyed for this study demonstrate a capability for adaptation to adverse circumstances, such as relocation of LSGs to unoccupied territories to continue supporting their dispersed communities. Here, they innovated by creating relocated offices that employ relocated municipal employees and cater to the needs of displaced community residents.

Figure 7 Addressing potential damage to virtual infrastructure



Note: N urban = 59, N rural = 122, N outside combat areas = 112, N on the territory of hostilities = 35, N temporarily occupied = 25, N liberated = 9, N total = 181. Question: 1. Does your local government have measures in place to support mobile communications in your community during emergencies? 2. Has the community's data (critical information) been backed up in the last 12 months? 3. Has a vulnerability test been conducted on the IT systems used by the local government in the last 12 months? Options: yes, no, partly (for q. 2)

Urban municipalities demonstrate a higher data backup rate (81%) than their rural counterparts (63%). Liberated LSGs show a higher propensity for data backup, albeit from a smaller sample size. From qualitative reports, however, we can conclude

Preparedness of the surveyed Ukrainian LSGs varies, depending on whether it covers stockpiling of foods and materials, digital preparedness or overall planning, and between rural and urban *bromadas*. Crisis planning often occurs informally, and despite most respondents reporting having formal crisis response plans, such plans may be detached from actual preparatory training. Food and materials stockpiling is available in most municipalities, but as in 2022, data back-ups and digital readiness are available in few, typically urban municipalities. This is a serious vulnerability considering the reliance on digital technology for crisis communication in *hromadas*.

⁶ <https://forbes.ua/news/khakeri-perebuvali-v-sistemi-kiivstar-z-travnja-2023-roku-sbu-04012024-18307>


Local Democracy and Collaborative Governance for Resilience: practices and scope conditions

Extent and purpose of public engagement under war conditions

Most surveyed LSGs (71%), including temporarily occupied ones (64%), and those in the territory of hostilities (69%) report having had **initiatives to inform and/or engage citizens or businesses** in their hromadas in the past year (Figure 8). This number is


slightly less but comparable to the 2022 survey (78%) (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023b, p. 24). The extent of reporting such initiatives varied between urban and rural municipalities: 90% of urban LSGs undertake such initiatives, compared to only 62% of rural LSGs. Notably, liberated areas saw a higher engagement rate at 78% compared to *bromadas* in the area of hostilities or occupied ones.

Figure 8 Informing and engaging initiatives in the last 12 months



Note: N urban = 59, N rural = 122, N outside combat areas = 112, N on the territory of hostilities = 35, N temporarily occupied = 25, N liberated = 9, N total = 181. Question: In the last 12 months, have there been any initiatives to inform and/or engage citizens or businesses in your community? Options: yes; no

Figure 9 The purpose of war-time public informing and engagement initiatives by LSGs, compared to 2022



Note: N = 129 (LSGs that have any initiatives to inform and/or engage citizens or businesses) Question: What was the purpose of LSG in your community introducing initiatives on informing and/or engaging citizens or businesses in the last 20 months? Mark what the primary or secondary purpose was or was irrelevant. The figure shows only "primary" responses. See Annex 3 and 4 for details.

Among those LSGs who report informing and engagement initiatives, their primary focus has been towards more pragmatic purposes associated with resource mobilization in 2024, continuing a trend we noted in 2022 compared to 2021 (Figure 9). In 2024, more than 80% of respondents reported focusing on attracting resources (88%, +2p.p.) and meeting the needs of vulnerable social groups (88%, albeit -3p.p.). At the same time, coordination of supply and demand for help, such as for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and internally displaced persons (IDPs), remains on the agenda of most respondents in 2024 despite a slight decrease (85%, -6p.p.). On the other hand, actual coordination of volunteers on the operational level saw the most significant drop in 2024 vs 2022 (61%, -20p.p.). This is possibly due to the professionalization of volunteers, so their organisations establish their own communication channels with beneficiaries, skipping LSG coordination.

Despite a slight reduction, many hromadas focus on strengthening community cohesion (86%, -2p.p.). This indicates a strong community focus on practical and immediate aid during emergencies.

The purposes selected by 70-80% of LSGs signify a strategic emphasis on **inclusivity**, which is critical for maintaining legitimacy during crises. Thus, almost 80% of respondents with information and engagement initiatives selected engaging stakeholders directly in problem-solving (76%, +2.2p.p. vs 2022) and **including diverse opinions** (78%, +13p.p. vs 2022). This underscores a growing acknowledgement of incorporating various perspectives in decision-making processes.

Abstract governance purposes, in contrast, were the least frequently reported or experienced a noticeable decline: only 64% of LSGs marked reducing emotional stress, combating corruption, and reducing information chaos as primary purposes of their information and public engagement initiatives. The reduction of emotional pressure and fear has seen the most significant drop, plummeting from 85% to just 64%. Simultaneously, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of respondents selecting increasing community trust in LSGs during the crisis, from 87% to 76% (-11p.p.), and this is

happening in the context of a general decline in trust in local authorities from the side of civil society in Ukraine (Hatsko & Darkovich, 2024). The relatively lower focus on these aspects might suggest operational challenges in consistently addressing governance challenges beyond immediate survival needs using public engagement.

These results reflect shifting priorities and needs within communities during wartime. As wartime uncertainty reduces the planning horizon while the war depletes the economic base and human resources, immediate needs naturally come before (perceived) long-term considerations. At the same time, LSGs continue realizing the pragmatic value of public participation as a source of knowledge and resources, which opens pathways for the inclusion of diverse opinions in local decision-making, providing for a democratic character of local decision-making even under war conditions.

Stakeholder engagement in actual crisis response

Over the past year, 81% of surveyed LSGs report actively involving the public or businesses in addressing critical issues, maintaining the level from 2022, where 78% of LSGs cooperated with non-governmental stakeholders.

The primary critical problem where LSGs reported public engagement has been the integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs), with 34% of the total sample reporting it. Yet, we saw a slight variation in the relevance of participatory response to IDP integration depending on the type of hromada and its security conditions, with rural LSGs and LSGs from temporarily occupied hromadas selecting it the most (Figure 10).

LSGs would rely on IDP initiatives or initiatives and NGOs that support them as information facilitators to adjust their IDP programs to their needs. This often happens at the initiative of the non-governmental actors, but LSGs were sometimes proactive (Huss & Keudel, 2023). The focus on collaborative response to the needs of IDPs remained the same as in 2022 (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023a, p. 25).

Figure 10 Critical problems to solve which LSG have involved non-governmental stakeholders

Category	Urban	Rural	Outside Combat Areas	On the Territory of Hostilities	Temporarily Occupied	Liberated	Total
IDP Integration (employment, school)	27%	37%	34%	26%	48%	22%	34%
Organization of civilian security and defense	20%	21%	29%	9%	4%	22%	21%
Providing residents with food and personal items	19%	16%	10%	29%	24%	33%	17%
Ensuring the functioning of critical infrastructure	14%	6%	8%	17%	0%	0%	8%
Other	3%	1%	1%	3%	4%	0%	2%
None	17%	20%	19%	17%	20%	22%	19%

Note: N urban = 59, N rural = 122, N outside combat areas = 112, N on the territory of hostilities = 35, N temporarily occupied = 25, N liberated = 9, N total = 181. Question: Recall one of the critical issues in which you have engaged the public or business over the past 12 months. What was the issue? Options: Organising civilian security and defence (e.g., arranging shelters, emergency training); Providing residents with food and basic necessities; Ensuring the functioning of critical infrastructure (e.g., heating, water, electricity); Integration of IDPs (e.g., employment, humanitarian assistance, housing, mental health); Did not involve the public in critical issues; Other problems. Select one.

Some municipalities saw internally displaced people and enterprises as a source of economic growth and cultural revival, which prompted a more collaborative stance on meeting their needs (Box 2).

Box 2 Social and economic integration of internally displaced people and enterprises

In Kosiv community (Ivano-Frankivsk region), LSG provided space in a municipally-owned former textile production site to a relocated rug manufacturer Vandra Rugs from Kakhovka: while the enterprise resumed its operations, it also cooperates with the local textile education provider for internships, thus, creating new job opportunities. The company developed and pays taxes locally.

Source: <https://report.if.ua/statti/vrya-tovani-ta-vilni-yak-u-kosovi-zanedbanyj-kyly-movyj-ceh-stav-centrom-kultury-i-pidpryem-nyctva/>

Organization of civilian security and defence was the next critical problem, with 21% of surveyed LSGs reporting public engagement to solve it. There was no variation between urban and rural hromadas, but regarding security conditions, the problem was most relevant for LSGs outside combat areas (29%). The third critical problem to which LSGs gave participatory response was meeting immediate needs like food and personal items: 17% of the sample selected it. However, for liberated hromadas and those in the areas with ongoing hostilities, this issue was actually the top priority for public engagement, as cited by 33% and 29% of surveyed LSGs, respectively. This variation indicates that LSGs understand their local contexts very well, including the urgency of needs and the capacity of their communities to contribute to solutions.

In this study, we also asked LSGs to report on what stakeholder groups they engaged in each possible dimension of public participation for crisis response.⁷ The resulting Involvement Index shows that urban LSGs and more populous communities tend to engage more diverse stakeholder groups in more dimensions of public involvement for crisis response, likely

⁷ We rely on the typology of participatory dimensions by the Council of Europe (Rosenzweigova et al., 2016). See operationalization in Table 5 of the Annex 4.

indicating the intertwined characteristics of cities, with higher capacity to govern coordination and more varied social capital (see Annex 7 for Involvement Index operationalization and analysis). Below, we discuss the changes in public engagement compared to the 2022 LSG survey (Figure 11).


Like in 2022, LSGs who involve the public in problem-solving continue appreciating the practical value of partnership with stakeholders in implementing solutions for war-related problems. There is even an increase in engagement of IDPs and experts, indicating the appreciation of a more nuanced knowledge, whether the everyday knowledge of IDPs or the professional knowledge of experts. At the same time, there was a decrease in the number of LSGs that reported engaging NGOs to implement or coordinate problem-solving, while the figure for entrepreneurs remained quite the same. These figures further illustrate the pragmatic, resource-oriented stance of LSGs who prioritize co-production with businesses who have more resources than NGOs. At the same time, NGOs can serve as facilitators of such cooperation (Box 3).

Box 3 Co-production of economic development with business and civil society: a case of pragmatic multi-stakeholder cooperation

Tulchynska hromada (Vinnytska oblast) highlighted its participation in an agro-tourist cluster, “By the ways of the Trypilian Foremother”, as a case of cooperation with local business and civil society. The cluster, which will unite 20 municipalities in Cherkasy, Vinnytsia and Kirovohrad regions and establish a joint management company, is an NGO ‘Regional Development Agency of the Tavrian Association of Territorial Communities’ initiative. The cluster capitalizes on the common cultural heritage that spans these three regions, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Romania, which are examples of international multi-stakeholder cooperation. Remarkably, the NGO itself is a relocated organization from Nova Kakhovka (Kherson region), temporarily occupied by Russia.

Source: <https://www.arr.ks.ua/pro-nas/>, <https://i-vin.info/news/na-tridennyi-turistichnyi-forum-na-vinn-ichchini-priyihali-predstavniki-z-moldovi-7120.html>

Figure 11 Stakeholder engagement in solving critical problems by the dimension of citizen participation



Source: Authors

Note: N = 127 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs that engaged the public or business in critical issues over the past 12 months). Question: Regarding the problem you identified in the previous question, which stakeholders were involved, and how did they participate in solving the problem?

Outlined numbers show a change that is greater than +/- 5 p.p. in 2024 compared to 2022.

Similarly, **dialogue** with stakeholders continues at roughly the same levels as in 2022, but there was a change in prioritized stakeholders. The number of LSGs indicating IDPs in the dialogue activities increased, and so did the number of LSGs reporting an exchange of views with residents. At the same time, we observe shifting roles of entrepreneurs and NGOs: while fewer LSGs report accounting for NGOs' feedback in influencing their decisions, they still report exchanging views with them at the same level. Conversely, while notably fewer LSGs report systematically exchanging views with entrepreneurs on possible solutions, despite a small decline (-5p.p.), roughly the same number report accounting for their feedback.

We interpret these findings as follows: due to regulatory pressures and their proactivity, NGOs generally manage to participate in the exchange of views with the LSGs, but the latter do not necessarily regard their feedback as influential. With entrepreneurs, the situation is opposite: by nature of their activities, entrepreneurs do not necessarily strive to participate in problem-solving, but when they do give feedback, it becomes important against their relative resourcefulness.

Surveyed LSGs reported **consultation** at about the same level as in 2022, with residents likely becoming more vocal as more LSGs (+17p.p.) reported that residents drew their attention to the need to consult with them on a problem. More LSGs also reported involving IDPs in consultations.

Finally, **informing** levels remained similar as in 2022, with a significant increase (+22p.p.) in LSGs reporting efforts to provide information to IDPs - predictably, as meeting the needs of IDPs was also the most mentioned war-related problem. However, there was a slight increase in shares of LSGs who reported informing experts and a slight decrease among those who provided information to entrepreneurs.


These findings indicate another shift in prioritised stakeholder groups for engagement in crisis response. While in 2022, we recorded significant growth in engagement of entrepreneurs at all levels, this year **IDPs marked the most significant rise in engagement across all activities**, notably in proactively providing information and engaging in regular discussions (+21 p.p. and 14

p.p., respectively). **Entrepreneurs**, however, experienced comparative decline (within 5p.p.) in all types of participatory activities, with a notable drop of 14 p.p. in regular exchanges with the LSG, indicating a trend towards disengagement. **NGOs** also displayed a downward trend in their involvement, particularly in influencing decisions and participating in the implementation process, with decreases of 6 p.p. and 9 p.p., respectively. **Experts** maintained a stable level of engagement across various activities, with a modest increase in partnership-related activity (+9p.p.). **Residents** increased their involvement in drawing LSG's attention for consultations (+17 p.p.) and participating in discussions with LSG (+16 p.p.) compared to the 2022 survey, while other categories remained roughly the same. Finally, we also asked about the engagement of war **veterans** in war-related problem-solving. Although we do not have a comparison to 2022, given that indicated problems are not the immediate concern of this social group, the 10-15% of LSGs indicating informing or consulting with them is telling. It underscores that LSGs recognize this social group's importance and needs, reflecting a trend toward localizing veteran policies.

Stakeholder engagement in planning crisis response

The data on crisis response planning indicates a relatively limited engagement with civil society and the business sector in crisis preparation within hromadas (Figure 12) and in updating crisis response plans (Figure 25 in Annex 5). The lower share of LSGs that met with public organisations, activists, volunteers, and entrepreneurs is a missed opportunity. Since these actors help in actual crises, their input could also be helpful in preparation.

Overall, the surveyed LSGs reveal a strong tendency to collaborate predominantly with state emergency and administrative bodies in preparing for crises (Figure 12). The State Emergency Service of Ukraine is the most common point of contact. Meetings with district military administrations and local government representatives like starostas also feature prominently, highlighting involvement at both local and subregional levels. Medical institutions and communal services are equally prioritised.

Figure 12 Stakeholders LSGs engaged in crisis response planning

Note: N total = 181. Question: In the past 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in the community? Multiple stakeholders could be selected.


One LSG has met with their local body of self-organisation of the population (the representative body of citizens, created to address specific issues of local importance) and associations of co-owners of an apartment building.

While it is positive that LSGs coordinate internally and with other government levels to plan their emergency responses, it would benefit LSGs to

enhance horizontal cooperation for crisis preparedness within hromadas. Since non-governmental actors often bring unique perspectives, resources, and community connections in solving crises (see section 3.2), coordination with them at the planning stage could potentially strengthen community resilience and response capabilities.

Enablers of public engagement: physical and discursive community spaces

Physical and discursive spaces have been consistently found important for mobilizing social capital, which is necessary for public engagement (Bosman & Dolley, 2019). Indeed, our survey analysis shows a small correlation between stakeholder involvement in crisis response and the functioning of different physical and discursive spaces in the community—the more spaces available, the more stakeholders are involved in war-related problem-solving. Furthermore, this relationship is even stronger for LSGs that have involved the public or businesses in addressing the integration of IDPs (Figure 13).

Figure 13 Availability of community spaces and stakeholder engagement in war-related problem-solving

Note: The figure shows a scatter plot of the Spaces Index against the Involvement Index with Category-wise Trend Lines (IDP Integration - Spearman's $\rho = 0.40$ ($p = <0.01$); Other - Spearman's $\rho = 0.24$ ($p = <0.05$)). N = 127 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs that engaged the public or business in critical issues over the past 12 months). The Involvement Index reflects the diversity of involved stakeholders in the multiplicity of participatory dimensions (See Annex 7); the Spaces Index demonstrates the number of community spaces selected by LSG respondents (see Annex 9).

Notwithstanding the importance of spaces, the kind of spaces that work for communities is highly contextual. The survey results indicate that no single space is universally available across territorial communities, and hromadas usually combine two or three types of community spaces, as indicated by the largest share of LSG respondents, 40% (Table 4).

Table 4 Number of community spaces by hromada type


Level	Zero	Few	Some	Many
Urban	2%	12%	37%	49%
Rural	22%	25%	41%	11%
Outside Combat Areas	18%	19%	40%	23%
On the Territory of Hostilities	6%	29%	26%	40%
Temporarily Occupied	16%	28%	52%	4%
Liberated	22%	0%	56%	22%
Total	15%	21%	40%	24%

Note: The table reports the share of respondents according to clustering in four groups based on the number of community space types they reported (the Spaces Index, see Annex 9). A hromada is clustered to 'Zero' category if its LSG reported no community spaces or institutions. 'Few' clusters those hromadas who reported one community space or institution. 'Some' refers to hromadas with two and three spaces selected. 'Many' refers to hromadas whose LSGs selected four to eight spaces. N urban = 59, N rural = 122, N outside combat areas = 112, N on the territory of hostilities = 35, N temporarily occupied = 25, N liberated = 9, N total = 181. Question: Do any of the following spaces or institutions function in the community? Multiple spaces could be selected.

On average, urban and larger communities are likely to have more community spaces or institutions, possibly reflecting higher demand and better infrastructure or higher levels of investment, than rural ones: the largest share of urban LSG respondents, 49%, reported four to eight spaces and the largest share of rural LSG respondents (41%) reported two to three spaces. Dramatically, 40% of LSG respondents from hromadas on the territory of hostilities report four to eight spaces and a half of those from temporarily occupied hromadas – two to three spaces. This reflects that Russia attacked urban areas that had been making participatory progress before the full-scale invasion.

The most commonly reported facility is a humanitarian hub, found in 53% of surveyed LSGs (Figure 14). Other spaces are present in less than half of surveyed LSGs, with IDP councils at 44%, youth centres at 40%, IDP support centres at 33%, and volunteer hubs at 26%. Open spaces for public organisations or initiatives are less common at 20%, adult education centres at 11%, and business support centres at the most scarce, appearing in only 9% of LSGs. Notably, 13% of LSGs reported not having any of these facilities. In the 'other' category LSGs mentioned spaces for veterans and people with disabilities.

Figure 14 Community spaces



Source: Authors

Note: N total = 181. Question: Do any of the following spaces or institutions function in the community? Multiple spaces could be selected.

Some of these spaces appeared following the adaptation of pre-invasion facilities to new functions, while others were developed directly in response to war-related challenges (Box 4).

Box 4 Physical space for community engagement in crisis response

A non-profit municipal enterprise, VCENTRI HUB, was established in March 2020 in Kyiv as a platform for civil society engagement. With the onset of the full-scale invasion, the hub adapted to current needs and became a multi-purpose institution with several branches in different city districts that provides a coordination platform for logistical hubs, a space for socialization and social integration (it hosts book clubs, embroidery and macrame clubs, dance classes, board game evenings, youth and children activities); and consultation and support for vulnerable population groups, including mental health support and IDP counselling in all hubs in Kyiv. Funded by the Kyiv city budget, the enterprise collaborates with various donor organizations, such as Caritas, the British Embassy in Ukraine, UNICEF, IREX, and ISAR Ednannia.

While many of these places depend on the needs or demands of the users, open spaces for public organisations and initiatives are relatively useful tools to create such a demand where it does not exist yet. Experienced urban NGOs may facilitate such spaces for hromadas to mobilize demand for public engagement (Box 5).

Box 5 How an NGO facilitates public engagement through community centres in small hromadas

A Ukrainian NGO, "Cedos", supported ten Ukrainian hromadas in developing inclusive community centres. These ten communities, selected from 311 applications in an open competition by a specialized jury, received a grant of UAH 1,000,000, expert mentoring and participated in online seminars on sustainability, accessibility, and veteran relations. Additionally, Cedos documented the process of creating the centres and collected local knowledge from the participating hromadas.

Good practices for integrating internally displaced persons (IDPs) into communities often extend beyond the adaptation of institutionalized physical centres or formal institutions. Discursive spaces, such as IDP Councils that channel IDP needs to the governing bodies, are equally important. IDP Councils are consultative bodies to hromada, district, and regional elected councils (Box 6).

Box 6 IDP Councils: discursive spaces for IDPs' community integration

IDP Councils allow different stakeholders to coordinate when implementing policies for supporting rights and integration opportunities for IDPs, including channelling IDPs' needs to governmental actors at relevant governance levels. These bring up to the policy actors the problems that IDPs face, such as document restoration, benefits access, integration, psychological assistance, and employment. They also support LSGs in developing adaptation and integration policies for IDPs. IDP Councils is an example of international diffusion of a good practice by a CSO initiative: In 2019, IREX's partner Stabilization Support Services (SSS) introduced IDP Councils, inspired by similar structures in Colombia, to pilot and institutionalize local support for IDPs in two hromadas, followed by another 23 hromadas in subsequent years. After the Russian invasion in 2022 and the mass displacement it caused, IDP Councils re-emerged on local and national agendas. IDP Councils are now a priority in the Ukrainian 2025 IDP State Strategy, with a government resolution recommending their creation nationwide. By December 2023, over 750 IDP Councils existed across various governance levels (see the [interactive map](#)).

Challenges and unintended consequences of public engagement


Challenges

Most LSG respondents report facing challenges when implementing public informing and engagement initiatives, yet most reported overcoming them, even if it was difficult. LSGs' most common hard-to-overcome challenges can be grouped into four types: the challenges related to the design of initiatives and different stakeholder attitudes to them, financial and legal ones (Annex 10).

Interestingly, the hierarchy of challenges changed little compared to relative peace times, but we observe that some challenges are hard to overcome for a larger share of LSGs.

Regarding stakeholder attitudes, ensuring active citizen participation was a hard-to-overcome challenge for 40% of respondents, the highest of all options. Moreover, the share of LSGs for whom it was hard to ensure active citizen participation grew from 11% in 2021 to 40% in 2024, the largest growth category. Indeed, participants in the validation session highlighted “low activity levels among residents, NGOs, and entrepreneurs” as one of the

Figure 15 Challenges of public informing and engagement initiatives at times of war.



Source: Authors

Note: N = 129 (LSG with any initiatives to inform and/or engage citizens or businesses in the past 12 months). Question: In the initiative mentioned above, to inform or engage citizens that you have implemented. What challenges did you have to overcome during the implementation process? Options: hard to overcome; easy to overcome; the challenge was not overcome; not relevant. The figure shows “hard to overcome” and “easy to overcome” responses.

Highlighted are ‘hard to overcome’ challenges for 30% and more respondents.

top-four most significant challenges. LSG representatives at the validation session observed in their hromadas that people become more focused on survival, and the link between this purpose and citizen participation is far from clear. This is a challenge that participatory governance increasingly faces worldwide, also in peaceful settings: citizens have little incentive to participate if it cannot provide evidence of improving people's lives.⁸

In terms of design, **ensuring constructive dialogue and inclusivity of participation was a challenge hard to overcome for about a third of respondents** (30% and 36%, respectively). Indeed, LSG representatives at the validation session collectively rated "difficulty engaging specific groups and distrust from businesses and the opposition towards local governments" as one of the top-four challenges. A fifth of respondents also found it hard to design the flow and rules for participatory initiatives: these are quite often related to the perceived fairness and inclusivity of participation. The war exacerbated the challenge of ensuring constructive dialogue: a share of those who found it hard to overcome grew by ten p.p. from 20% in 2021 to 30% in 2024. The challenge of inclusivity was hard to overcome during the war for about the same share of respondents: 36% in 2024 vs 40% in 2021. At the same time, these two challenges were already at the top of the list of challenges in 2021, suggesting a longer trend. That LSGs openly admit these challenges is a window of opportunity to improve participatory processes, as this recognition signals openness to change.

About a third found it hard to withstand **external interest group pressure**. Examples of pressures include non-constructive communication campaigns from political opposition questioning the legitimacy of local authority or attempts to instrumentalize participatory process in the interest of dishonest entrepreneurs; especially in public consultations over (re)construction, risks of such pressures increase. LSG participants in the validation session selected "the politicization of hromada participation" as one of the top four challenges. The war also exacerbated this challenge: the

share of LSGs reporting hardship to withstand external interest group pressure grew from 21% in 2021 to 32% in 2024. This indicates an increasing challenge to democratic accountability that LSGs also recognize and will likely be open to external efforts to preclude the erosion of democratic accountability.

Financial challenges are a serious issue, especially finding **funding for software**: Only for 34.1% of LSGs, it's easy to overcome; also, for 34.1%, it's hard to overcome, and 11.6% did not overcome it. Compared to 2021, this is a decline in the share of respondents from 43% in 2021. We do not have compelling evidence to explain this change. Still, it possibly comes from the fact that LSGs use legacy systems obtained before 2022 and rely on international technical cooperation and volunteers for some software. At the same time, less capable LSGs avoid introducing new tools that require software investments, as about a fifth of respondents in 2024 considered software-related challenges irrelevant to their participatory initiatives. Besides, it was hard for a fifth of respondents to **find funding for a responsible employee**. Remarkably, such challenges did not emerge from the discussion in the validation session with LSGs.

The lack of a **national legislative framework** was hard to overcome and could not be overcome by nearly 40% of the respondents, yet 37% reported it being easy to overcome.

Some of the named challenges provide additional evidence for LSG adaptability. For example, LSG representatives selected "security risks due to war" among the top four challenges at the validation session. Yet, when asked about it in the survey, LSGs show substantial adaptability. Although **most (85%)** find it challenging to find a secure space for gatherings, **68% reported it being easy to overcome** and about 13% as irrelevant. This means that while most adapted their spaces to meet security concerns, for some, adaptation meant going online. Similarly, almost all respondents (91%) experienced the **challenge of informing citizens** about an initiative, but also most

⁸ The authors thanks Prof. Amalinda Savirani and Prof. Gilbert Siame for bringing up this particular issues at the ICLD Local Democracy Academy.

(81%) found it easy to overcome, corroborating other findings in this report that LSGs set up functional information channels for outward communication.

Finally, ensuring council deputies' support for initiatives dropped as a challenge from the top 2nd to the 7th, from 90% to 82%, while the distribution of hard and easy-to-overcome responses remained the same. This change likely reflects a reduction in the role of councils in some municipalities, especially if local military administrations were introduced (Darkovich & Hnyda, 2024).

Unintended consequences

Surveyed LSGs **indicate increased strain on public officials' emotional well-being and mental health as unintended consequences** of public engagement. More than half of respondents indicated emotional stress due to the spread of rumours (65% of surveyed LSGs) and an overload of responsible employees (56%). Additionally, the overload category marks a significant (+32p.p.) increase compared to the times of relative peace, when 33% of respondents selected it (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023a, p. 46). These strains on human capacity are especially acute for LSGs in the areas of hostilities and liberated municipalities (Table 5). This data indicates the overall high toll in mental health that Ukrainians are paying in the war but also underscores the vulnerability of public officials with duties for engaging with communities.

Excessive politicisation of community issues and the deepening of community divisions are reported by 26% and 23% of LSGs, respectively. Regarding territory type, urban LSGs (39%) report excessive politicisation more frequently than rural ones. When analysed by the security conditions, politicisation is most reported by LSGs outside the combat zones (32% surveyed LSGs outside combat zones). The reporting of deepening divisions does not vary much between rural and urban hromadas. However, there is a difference in security conditions: the highest reporting rate of this consequence (40%) was among hromadas in areas of hostilities. Interestingly, the proportion of LSGs reporting deep-

ening of community divisions after public engagement initiatives decreased compared to relatively peaceful times when it was 36% (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023a, p. 36). These dynamics likely indicate some share of social cohesion in municipalities, which public engagement in decision-making can somewhat counterintuitively undermine both when hostilities are close and when they are further away. The paradox may reveal a mismatch between public and LSGs' expectations about what is appropriate to be discussed in specific contexts, calling for more (not less) dialogical formats to search for consensus around what policy issues are worth attention during the war before discussing each such issue.

Additionally, 25% of surveyed LSGs report **violations of strategic long-term plans**. When analysed by security status, the largest share of those reporting this problem (40%) was in areas of hostilities.

New security risks related to citizen engagement, such as the danger of announcing the place upfront and gathering in-person in a compact place due to increased risk of Russian shelling, are especially relevant for LSGs in precarious security situations: among all those who reported this risk, LSGs in areas of hostilities and temporarily occupied areas had higher reporting shares of this risk, 35% and 36%, respectively, than hromadas in the rest of security situations. Their responses underscore the complex security challenges that accompany public engagement during wartime.

Interestingly, the share of LSGs reporting **misuse of participatory processes by interest groups for defending private interest** decreased from 31% in 2021 to 11% in 2024. This might reflect shifts in the composition of local elites, where many lost economic base for their influence due to damage to production facilities and material assets, internal migration or immigration and other war-related issues.

Summary

Ukrainian LSGs continue engaging various stakeholders in solving war-related crises in 2024. Moreover, we find that communities that engage a broad stakeholder range not only by communicating one-way but also through dialogue and partnership are slightly more likely to be better prepared for war-related challenges.

Pragmatic, resource-oriented cooperation with non-governmental stakeholders remains a priority and remains relatively widespread among the respondents. Yet, the pool of stakeholders involved in collaborative problem-solving changed. Whereas in 2022, entrepreneurs became critical LSG partners, in 2024, **IDPs marked the most significant rise in engagement**, notably in proactively providing information and engaging in regular discussions. **On the other hand, entrepreneurs** experienced a notable drop in regular exchanges with the LSG, indicating a trend towards

disengagement. **NGOs** also displayed a downward trend in their involvement.

The availability of community spaces is an important indicator of LSGs' engagement with more diverse groups beyond pure information-sharing. This becomes even more important when considering public engagement for IDP integration.

At the same time, we also find that sustaining collaborative relations between local authorities and their communities becomes more challenging as the war progresses. The out-migration and war-time exhaustion of civil society and LSG personnel make arranging active and inclusive participation more difficult, and the protracted state of emergency features risks of local political conflicts and pressures from interest groups. On the bright side, less LSGs report misuse of participatory processes for private interest, suggesting that communities self-regulate to ensure democratic accountability despite attempts to undermine it.

Table 5 Unintended consequences of public engagement in wartime conditions

Challenge	Urban	Rural	Outside Combat Areas	On the Territory of Hostilities	Temporarily Occupied	Liberated	Total
Emotional stress through the spread of rumors	65%	65%	59%	80%	57%	100%	65%
Overload of responsible employees	59%	54%	51%	75%	43%	83%	56%
Excessive politicization of community issues	39%	16%	32%	20%	14%	0%	26%
Violation of strategic long-term plans	20%	29%	20%	40%	36%	0%	25%
Deepening the division of the community due to too diverse public positions	26%	21%	20%	40%	14%	17%	23%
Emergence of new security risks associated with citizen engagement	26%	14%	13%	35%	36%	0%	19%
Slowing down the decision-making process	24%	13%	20%	15%	7%	17%	17%
Inefficient allocation of resources due to conflicting priorities	15%	19%	17%	25%	7%	17%	17%
Interest groups have used the engagement process to advocate for private rather than public interests	15%	8%	10%	20%	0%	17%	11%
Difficulties in maintaining public safety and order	11%	8%	4%	15%	14%	33%	9%
Deterioration of relations between local authorities and public initiatives	9%	5%	9%	5%	0%	0%	6%
None	7%	6%	9%	0%	7%	0%	6%

Note: LSG that engaged the public or business in critical issues over the past 12 months or had any initiatives to inform and/or engage citizens or businesses. N urban = 46, N rural = 63, N outside combat areas = 69, N on the territory of hostilities = 20, N temporarily occupied = 14, N liberated = 6, N total = 109. Question: What negative phenomena or trends have you observed in connection to citizen engagement in times of war? Check all that apply.

Vertical coordination

Intergovernmental information exchange is (for now) sufficient

In 2024, three-quarters of surveyed LSGs reported sufficient information exchange with Regional Military Administrations (RMA) and District Military Administrations (DMA), and only slightly more than a half reported this for central authorities. This data shows a remarkable reduction in response shares for RMAs, from 88% to 79% (-11p.p.), and central authorities, from 74% to 55% (-19p.p.). Only DMAs saw a slight increase towards 83% from 75% in 2022.


Indeed, other research (Yashchuk & Nesterenko, 2024a) finds that the LSGs' interaction with RMAs and DMAs is closer than that with central authorities. Such interaction concerns exchanging information about humanitarian aid, additional funding, training, and data collection. The exchange also occurs around coordinating and tackling security challenges. Indeed, in this survey, we find that when LSGs update their crisis response plans, they are most likely (47%) to do so in response to orders of higher-level authorities, typically RMAs (Figure 25 in Annex 5). It is worth noting that the survey illuminates potentially

a growing role of District Military Administration (DMAs) as information partners for LSGs. More LSG respondents in this survey find information exchange with DMAs sufficient than with Regional Military Administrations (RMAs), and this share grew compared to 2022. These findings are surprising, because a study of vertical coordination in 2023 found that many LSGs doubted the utility of DMAs, complaining about their duplication of responsibilities of RMAs, while RMAs characterized the DMAs as a structure that does not “correspond to their powers” and asserted that it “requires reform.” (Darkovich & Hnyda, 2024)

LSG and central authorities: lacking coordination and influence


In the third year of the full-scale Russian invasion, responses indicate a weakening in the collaborative culture of intergovernmental coordination, potentially undermining Ukraine's long-term resilience (Figure 17). Thus, a share of LSGs who disagree, fully or partially, that LSG and central authorities coordinate on strategic decisions grew from 28% to 52%. This change notes a reduction of those who agree with this statement as a share

Figure 16 Information exchange between LSGs and DMAs, RMAs and central authorities



Note: N = 156 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs) Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Choose one: 1-fully disagree, 5 —fully agree, don't know.

Figure 17 LSGs' interaction with central authorities



Note: N = 156 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs) Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Choose one: 1-fully disagree, 5 —fully agree, don't know

of those undecided remained the same. The share of LSGs who express the view that they lack influence over the decisions of central authorities also increased, from 50% in 2022 to 60% in 2024.


Besides, about the same share of respondents as in 2022 disagreed that the **bureaucratic hurdles** along the power vertical reduced, indicating that administrative processes may not have become more streamlined (Figure 17).

Considering reports that procedures in intergovernmental coordination are cumbersome for LSGs against the backdrop of reducing human potential in municipalities, this is worrying (Yashchuk & Nesterenko, 2024b, p. 42).

However decreasing, a share of municipalities still **agree** that **LSGs and central authorities coordinate on**

strategic issues and that **LSGs can influence central authorities**. An overwhelming majority of those who perceive the opportunity for influence (92%) selected local government associations as an effective means to sway the decisions of central authorities. A smaller number of surveyed LSGs, who believe to be able to influence the central authorities' decisions, report that public statements from the heads of ATCs (mayors) (68%) and private communications with central government officials (50%) have the potential to shape central government decisions (Figure 18). Additionally, collective appeals endorsed by local councils were cited by two LSGs as another method of influence, suggesting this approach might be more widely used than reported, as it was not listed among the predefined response options.

Figure 18 How LSGs influence the decisions of central authorities.



Note: N = 72 (LSGs that said they can influence decisions of central authorities) Question: How can local governments influence the decisions of the central government? Check all that apply.

Central authorities' decisions and LSG powers


Compared to 2022, in 2024, there is more ambiguity in LSGs' responses to the statement that implied an **unjustified attack on LSG powers** (Figure 19): a share of those who agreed the attack is the case increased from 26% to 36%, but there is a large proportion (39%) who neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement. There was also a significant drop in the share of those who disagreed with the statement, from 40% in 2022 to 24% in 2024. These changes echo other findings that LSGs perceive a reduction in their agency and autonomy, linked to a continued shift towards strengthening of state vertical in Ukraine that war conditions cannot consistently justify (Darkovich & Hnyda, 2024, pp. 36–38; Yashchuk & Nesterenko, 2024b).

At the same time, **attitudes towards restrictions affecting the exercise of LSG powers** have remained consistent since 2022 (Figure 19). A relative majority of 46% still believe that budgetary constraints imposed on LSGs during wartime are unwarranted, and 60% maintain that restricting access to registers hampers local authority

capabilities. Interestingly, however, there was a notable reduction (-10p.p.) in the share of those LSGs who 'fully' disagree that budgetary restrictions are justified in the conditions of war. This may illustrate an overall societal debate about the appropriateness of non-military spending.


Although indirectly, access to data for decision-making and the availability of open data is linked to the exercise of LSG powers, as LSGs can use them for data-driven policy-making (Figure 20). Interestingly, the share of respondents agreeing that **closure of open data is justified** in conditions of war slightly reduced from 77% in 2022 to 67% in 2024, whereby 6% fully disagree in 2024 vs none in 2022. This data likely captures societal debates over open data accessibility and a shift (however small) among LSGs towards more data opening in response to public demands for accountability (Onyshchenko et al., 2024). The survey also captures an almost equal distribution of those who agree and disagree that LSGs have access to data to compare with other communities, reflecting different levels of availability of different data types. No comparable item was used in 2022.

Figure 19 Intergovernmental relations and LSG powers



Note: N = 156 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs) Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Choose one: 1-fully disagree, 5 —fully agree, don't know.

Figure 20 Data accessibility and bureaucratic shifts in wartime governance



Note: N = 156 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs) Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Choose one: 1-fully disagree, 5 —fully agree, don't know.

Summary

Vertical coordination between Ukrainian LSGs and central and regional authorities bears both centralizing and countervailing tendencies. On the one hand, there are centralization tendencies caused by the protracted war and martial law. On the other hand, feedback loops and communication channels counteract centralization, thus representing the leverage for democratic governance amid the war. LSGs find communication with the higher levels of authority satisfactory, but compared to 2022, more respondents perceived a lack of coordination and influence over strategic decisions of central authorities. Respondents view LSG associations almost universally as an influence tool, followed by public and non-public individual appeals by mayors.

Digital Technologies

Tools for crisis notification

Most surveyed respondents rely on digital technology for emergency communication with residents. Indeed, they indicated social networking platforms as a prevalent method for **crisis notification**, with 77% of LSGs engaging their citizens through messages delivered via community channels on platforms such as Viber and Telegram. Besides, 58% of respondents used community websites to disseminate critical information.

Some LSGs use more innovative tools, such as chatbots, a practical communication channel on a mobile phone between community residents, service providers, and local authorities that can promptly inform residents or receive information from them on emergencies and much more (Box 7).

Box 7 Digital solution for emergency informing: Sumy 15-80 city chatbot

The Sumy 15-80 city chatbot is available on Viber and Telegram messenger platforms and is accessible to users 24/7. Sumy residents can use it to receive notifications about planned and emergency works on housing and communal services at a specific user's address, submit a request about a problematic situation and track its implementation within 48 hours. Residents can also evaluate service providers, find out the contacts of their councillor, the location of the nearest shelter, track the movement of public transport and much more background information on utilities, social services, healthcare and education institutions, sports, etc. Over six months since the launch, more than 6.1 thousand users have registered.

More information: <https://smr.gov.ua/uk/zvorotnij-zv-yazok/https-smr-gov-ua-uk-zvorotnij-zv-yazok-528-miskyi-chat-bot-sumy-15-80-html.html>

Managing technology


LSG respondents demonstrate a proactive and self-sufficient approach to integrating technology solutions (Figure 21). On the one hand, they mostly adapt existing technology for war-related purposes or continue using solutions they developed in 2022-23, which is a reasonable approach considering resource constraints. On the other hand, slightly over 40% of LSG respondents have already created or were creating new applications at the time of the survey, with 27% of respondents indicating their own development and 11% doing so in partnerships. Preference for one's own development rather than a collaborative one, reflects a possible preference for quicker, internally managed solutions over collaborative efforts that might require more coordination. A small fraction is still in the development process, mostly on their own, suggesting ongoing but limited engagement in creating new technological tools to address wartime challenges.

Summary

This data underscores a strategic pivot towards digital and electronic communication platforms for crisis management. This, in turn, provides for agility and speed in public informing, which is critical under high uncertainty. More broadly, digital tools have been critical elements of Ukraine's societal resilience (Zaremba et al., 2024), and LSGs demonstrate their embeddedness in society when using such tools for crisis notification.

However, the heavy reliance on digital platforms for crisis communication poses a risk of deepening the digital divide, potentially leaving behind those without access to the internet or digital skills, especially among socially underprivileged or elderly groups. Maintaining a mix of digital and traditional communication methods, like sirens and community radios, is vital to ensure everyone receives critical information during emergencies.

Figure 21 Creation of an IT tool to address the challenges of war



Note: N total = 181. Question: Has your community created an IT tool to address the challenges of war in the last 12 months (e.g., website, crowdsourcing/idea collection platform, algorithm, etc.)? Select all that apply.

Conclusions and lessons from Ukraine: Local democracy and resilience during war

This study illuminates the value of local democracy for resilience as evidenced by Ukrainian local authorities' and communities' response to war-related crises caused by the Russian full-scale invasion. Our analysis shows a small but significant correlation between LSG emergency preparedness (a component of resilience) and the involvement of non-governmental stakeholders in LSGs' crisis response (Figure 22).

Considering our findings about the links between local democracy and resilience in Ukraine during the war, we can derive the following lessons for the local authorities abroad and development cooperation actors.


Lesson 1. Local communities can be partners of the state in solving war-related crises, illustrating that decentralization is not an obstacle to resilience. Yet, decentralized crisis response requires multi-level coordination.

Ukraine's capacity to respond to the crises caused by Russia's war at the local level – despite valid critique of its limitations – challenges the basic assumption

of centralized crisis management. On the contrary, communities can find local, context-specific solutions, thus helping the state's overall efforts and reducing the burden on central authorities to manage local repercussions of war-related crises. Having capable local units to respond to war-related crises makes the state more flexible and reduces vulnerability compared to systems with a single decision-making centre (Alshamy et al., 2023; Lebel et al., 2006).

At the same time, for societal resilience, states should find a balance between a centralized defence policy and decentralized civilian crisis management. The case of Ukraine shows that searching for this delicate balance in war is an incomplete process with constant readjustment. On the one hand, vertical coordination between Ukrainian LSGs and central and regional authorities bears centralization tendencies caused by the protracted war and martial law. On the other hand, it also has feedback loops and communication channels that counteract centralization, such as the associations of local authorities, thus representing the leverages for democratic governance amid the war.

Figure 22 Relationship between LSG emergency preparedness and citizen involvement in crisis response



Note: The figure shows the scatter plot of the Preparedness Index against the Involvement Index with the line of Best Fit (Spearman's rho = 0.16 (p = 0.05)). N = 156 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs)

Lesson 2. Local democracy mechanisms can be adapted to ensure collaborative crisis response, which allows authorities to mobilize additional resources and legitimacy in crises.

Indeed, this study shows that perhaps more intuitively than strategically, Ukrainian local public officials used democratic practices to respond to the ensuing war-related crises. Local authorities in Ukraine often adapted pre-existing information tools to notify residents in emergencies. They used (informal) consultation mechanisms to seek input from resource-rich and vulnerable groups and elements of collaborative governance, like joined elaboration of specific solutions between LSGs, businesses, and civil society actors to respond to war-related crises. This was especially the case for the crisis of internal displacement. LSGs use digital technology (bots, social media pages, and messengers) to enable fast information exchange and stakeholder coordination.

Lesson 3. Pre-existing participatory practices help the public and authorities develop necessary practical skills that can be adapted during the war for crisis response, thus underscoring the practical value of local democracy.

LSGs' practical knowledge of informing and engaging residents in collaborative initiatives from the pre-2022 period became helpful for survival. Moreover, we find that hromadas, which have more physical and discursive spaces for public engagement, perform slightly better in terms of crisis preparedness. We found that much of public engagement was an adaptation of pre-existing practices, which had been a part of Ukraine's post-Maidan social transformation since 2014 when tools of local democracy – especially transparency and citizen participation – were becoming a standard public expectation in state-society relations on the local level, and many LSGs responded to it positively.

Lesson 4. The protracted war and pre-existing structural conditions can limit the capacity of communities to respond to war-related crises

collaboratively, thus undermining their resilience.

We find that, on average, communities in rural areas are less prepared to cope with war-related crises than urban ones. As the war progresses, sustaining collaborative relations between LSGs and their communities becomes more challenging. The out-migration and war-time exhaustion of civil society and LSG personnel make arranging active and inclusive participation more difficult. At the same time, a protracted state of emergency bears risks of local political conflicts and pressure from interest groups that can undermine LSGs' accountability to residents.

Lesson 5. If security conditions permit civilian life in communities, international donors should aim to support the ability of local public officials and non-governmental stakeholders to cooperate in crisis response. This is necessary for more contextual and legitimate responses.

Based on the experience of Ukrainian communities, there are at least three leverage points. First, international actors should support the work of facilitators – people and organisations who structure dialogue professionally – and so can help smoothen intra-community tensions and, thus, open pathways to collaboration. These will differ for each context, so efforts should be made to identify them. Second, building skills of local officials for stakeholder communication is necessary. Still, donors should think creatively about engaging new groups as communicators (e.g. youth groups and NGOs) because local authorities will likely be stretched to their capacity if they function and respond to crises during the war. Creating or developing community spaces will be helpful to identify and engage new groups.

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Annexes

Annex 1 Survey responses by distribution channel

	Number of responses (excl. duplicates, incl. overlap)
Association of Amalgamated Territorial Communities	143
People in Need	22
Mailing list	15
Resilience Platform	5

Annex 2 Share of surveyed LSGs by oblasts vs all LSGs in Oblast.

Region	Oblast	Number of LSGs in survey	Number of LSGs in oblast	Share of surveyed LSGs
West	Ivano-Frankivsk	8	62	13
	Lviv	7	73	10
	Rivne	7	64	11
	Ternopil	4	55	7
	Volyn	3	54	6
	Zakarpattia	3	64	5
	Chernivtsi	2	52	4
South	Odesa	12	91	13
	Mykolaiv	8	52	15
	Kherson	1	49	2
North	Sumy	15	51	29
	Chernihiv	14	57	25
	Kyiv Oblast	8	69	12
	Zhytomyr	5	66	8
East	Zaporizhzhia	35	67	52
	Dnipropetrovsk	9	86	10
	Kharkiv	7	56	12
	Donetsk	3	46	7
	Luhansk	2	26	8
Center	Cherkasy	7	66	11
	Poltava	7	60	12
	Khmelnyskyi	6	60	10
	Vinnytsia	5	63	8
	Kirovohrad	3	49	6

Annex 3 LSG preparedness: operationalization, comparison metrics between 2024 and 2022 LSG surveys, variation for hromada type and security conditions

Table 6 2024 Preparedness Index Components

	Items (yes/no response or 0/1 on selected item option)
1	Are there stocks of essential goods, such as technical and drinking water?
2	Are there stocks of essential foodstuffs?
3	Are there stocks of essential goods such as medical supplies?
4	What technologies are used in your community to alert the population in crisis situations? vehicle loudspeakers (horns)
6	What technologies are used in your community to alert the population in crisis situations? sirens
7	What technologies are used in your community to alert the population in crisis situations? local TV or radio station
8	What technologies are used in your community to alert the population in crisis situations? community social media posts
9	What technologies are used in your community to alert the population in crisis situations? Community website
10	Is there a backup power supply for local governments?
11	Are there backup power supplies for community starostas?
12	Are there backup power supplies for municipal educational institutions?
13	Are there backup power supplies for municipal healthcare facilities?
14	Are there backup power supplies for municipal social protection institutions?
15	Are there backup power sources for heat supply companies?
16	Are there backup power supplies for water supply companies?
17	Have crisis response plans been updated after approval in the last 12 months?
18	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? Regional Military Administration
19	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? State Emergency Service
20	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? Starostas
21	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? heads of subordinate utility companies
22	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? a representative of civil-military defence
23	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? police
24	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? a representative of medical institutions
25	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? NGOs, activists and volunteers
25	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? entrepreneurs
26	Has the community's data (critical information) been backed up in the last 12 months?

Cronbach's alpha $\alpha = .84$

Table 7 2022 Preparedness Index Components

	Items (yes/no response)
1	Stocks of essential goods (water, food, medical supplies) have been formed
2	Means of warning the population are checked
3	Stockpiles of essential goods (fuel) have been formed
4	Emergency response plan updated or approved
5	Meeting held with heads of utility companies to discuss actions to be taken in case of an invasion
6	Meeting held with starostas on actions to be taken in case of invasion
7	A special plan for evacuation of the population in case of a threat of armed conflict has been drawn up
8	Full centralised backup of community data (critical information, such as infrastructure data) has been carried out
9	Establishment of a (volunteer) territorial community defense has begun
10	Response/action plan in case of full-scale invasion agreed with RSA representatives
11	Response/action plan in case of full-scale invasion agreed with representatives of other communities
12	A list of addresses of shelters is published on social media or on the community website
13	A programme of national resistance on the community's territory is approved and developed by local authorities
14	A map of shelters is published on social media or on the community website

Source: Research on Cohesion and Decentralisation in Ukraine ReCoDe. We constructed an integrative index from preparation-related items to assess the overall preparedness of LSGs. The index consists of 25 items ($\alpha = .84$).

Table 8 Comparison of operationalization and results of the 2022 and 2024 Preparedness Index

	U-LEAD Resilience Study	as of Feb 2022	as of Oct 2022	ICLD Survey (w/o temporarily occupied LSGs)	%
1	Stocks of essential goods (water, food, medical supplies) have been formed	14	87	Are there stocks of essential goods, such as technical and drinking water?	69
				Are there stocks of essential goods, such as food?	60
				Are there stocks of essential goods - medical supplies?	67
2	The means of warning the public were checked	31	86	At least one method of notification has been selected: What technologies are used in your community to alert the public in crisis situations?	99
3	Stocks of essential goods (fuel) formed	20	82	Reserves are available for at least one institution: Are there backup power supplies for...?	100
4	Emergency response plan updated or approved	46	93	Has the community developed a crisis action plan?	88
				Have crisis response plans been approved?	69
				Have crisis response plans been updated after approval in the last 12 months?	51
5	A meeting was held with the heads of utility companies to discuss actions to be taken in the event of an invasion	17	91	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? - heads of subordinate utility companies	74

6	A meeting was held with starostas to discuss actions in the event of an invasion	17	92	In the last 12 months, which of the following organisations or individuals have you met with to discuss how to respond to a crisis in your community? - starostas	79
7	Full centralised backup of LSG's data (critical information, e.g. infrastructure data) has been completed	8	43	Has the LSG's data (critical information) been backed up in the last 12 months?	13

Source: 2022 Feb and 2022 Oct, a survey within the framework of the Project "Support to the Decentralisation Reform in Ukraine" (U-LEAD with Europe): N = 131 (all LSGs except those that are temporarily occupied). 2024 March, ICLD survey: N = 156 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs). Data on 2022 Feb is retrospectively asked in 2022 Oct.

Table 9 Descriptive statistics of 2024 Preparedness Index

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	n
Total	0.57	0.20	0.12	0.92	181
Urban	0.67	0.16	0.19	0.92	59
Rural	0.53	0.20	0.12	0.88	122
Outside combat areas	0.61	0.17	0.15	0.92	112
On the territory of hostilities	0.61	0.17	0.15	0.88	35
Temporarily occupied	0.34	0.16	0.12	0.62	25
Liberated	0.58	0.21	0.31	0.88	9
Large	0.73	0.10	0.54	0.92	19
Small	0.55	0.20	0.12	0.92	162

Table 10 Violin plots with results of Mann-Whitney test for 2024 Preparedness Index by community type




Table 11 Violin plots with results of Mann-Whitney test for 2024 Preparedness Index by community size





Figure 23 2024 Preparedness Index for temporarily occupied hromadas compared to total



Annex 4 Purpose for public informing and engagement initiatives at times of war in 2024 and 2022


	2024	2022	Change
Meet the needs of vulnerable social groups	88%	91%	-3%
Strengthen community cohesion	86%	88%	-2%
Attract external resources	85%	83%	2%
Coordinate supply & demand for help (e.g. for UAF, IDPs)	85%	92%	-7%
Inclusion of diverse opinions	78%	65%	13%
Increase community trust in LSG in the crisis	76%	87%	-11%
Engage direct stakeholders in problem-solving	76%	74%	2%
Lower emotional pressure and fear	64%	85%	-21%
Anti-corruption	64%	68%	-4%
Reduce information chaos / uncertainty	64%		
Coordinate volunteers	61%	82%	-20%

Note: N = 129 (LSG that have any initiatives to inform and/or engage citizens or businesses)

Question: What was the purpose with which LSG in your community introduced initiatives on informing and/or engaging citizens or businesses in the last 12 months? Mark what the primary or secondary purpose was or was irrelevant. The figure shows only "primary" responses.


Annex 5 State of planning for emergency action

Figure 24 Approval and update of crisis response plans



Note: 1. N total = 182. 2. N urban = 45, N rural = 82, N outside combat areas = 78, N on the territory of hostilities = 25, N temporarily occupied = 19, N liberated = 5, N total = 127. Questions: 1. Have crisis response plans been approved? 2. Have crisis response plans been updated since approval in the past 12 months?

Figure 25 Reasons to update crisis response plans



Note: N total = 127. Question: Why did your LSG in your hromada update its crisis response plan?

Annex 6 Stakeholder engagement in solving critical problems

Table 12 Change in stakeholder engagement by the level of citizen participation in comparison to the 2022 LSG survey

Analytical categories	Transparency	Citizen participation		Accountability		Co-production
CoE=>	Informing	Consulting	Dialogue		Partnership	
Survey	LSG proactively provided information on the issue to this stakeholder	This stakeholder actively drew the LSG attention to the need to consult with them on this issue	LSG at its own initiative collected proposals for a possible solution from this stakeholder	LSG and this stakeholder exchanged views on possible solutions systematically (more than two written or oral discussions)	This stakeholder's feedback significantly influenced the final decision	This stakeholder participated in the implementation of the decision as an executor or coordinator
Residents	6%	17%	6%	16%	2%	-5%
IDPs	21%	11%	9%	14%	8%	11%
Entrepreneurs	-7%	-4%	-5%	-14%	-4%	-5%
NGOs	2%	-4%	2%	-4%	-6%	-9%
Experts	6%	4%	4%	6%	6%	11%
None of these	4%	-1%	2%	-5%	4%	1%

Annex 7 Involvement Index: measuring stakeholder engagement in crisis management

We constructed an additive index by summing up all actors involved at each dimension of citizen participation, according to our operationalization of the participation dimensions by the Council of Europe (Table 13).

Table 13 Operationalization of participatory dimensions in the Involvement Index

Participation dimension	Operationalization in 2022 and 2024 LSG surveys
Informing	LSG proactively provided information on the issue to this stakeholder
Consultation	This stakeholder actively drew the LSG attention to the need to consult with them on this issue
	LSG at its own initiative collected proposals for a possible solution from this stakeholder
Dialogue	LSG and this stakeholder exchanged views on possible solutions systematically (more than two written or oral discussions)
	This stakeholder's feedback significantly influenced the final decision
Partnership	This stakeholder participated in the implementation of the decision as an executor or coordinator


LSGs could select all stakeholders as necessary from the list: residents, entrepreneurs, NGOs, IDPs, veterans, experts or none of these.

The index consists of 35 items ($\alpha = .87$). The option 'This stakeholder participated in the implementation of the decision as an executor or coordinator' was excluded from the index for the stakeholder 'residents' due to its negative and statistically insignificant correlation with the overall index.


Table 14 Descriptive statistics for the Involvement Index

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	n
Total	7.58	6.68	0	35	181
Urban	8.86	6.96	0	28	59
Rural	6.96	6.47	0	35	122
Outside combat areas	8.02	7.04	0	35	112
On the territory of hostilities	7.31	6.51	0	24	35
Temporarily occupied	6.20	5.58	0	22	25
Liberated	7.00	5.72	0	16	9
Large	10.11	8.10	0	26	19
Small	7.28	6.46	0	35	162

Figure 26 Violin plots with results of Mann-Whitney test for Involvement Index by community type Figure 26 Violin plots with results of Mann-Whitney test for Involvement Index by community type



Annex 8 Scatter Plot of Spaces Index against Involvement Index with Line of Best Fit



Note: N = 127 (LSGs outside combat areas, on the territory of hostilities and liberated LSGs that engaged the public or business in critical issues over the past 12 months). Spearman's rho = 0.16 (p < 0.05)

Annex 9 Spaces Index: calculation and descriptive statistics

We constructed an additive index of 8 items ($\alpha = .59$) based on LSG responses regarding the type of discursive or physical space available in their hromada (N total = 181). Each type of space or institution identified in a hromada was counted as one point, allowing each LSG to score from 0 to 8 points.

Question: Do any of the following spaces or institutions function in the community? Select all that apply: humanitarian headquarters, business support centre, adult education centre, volunteer hub, open space for public organizations or initiatives, youth centre, IDP Council, IDP support centre, none, other

Table 15 Descriptive statistics of Spaces Index

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	n
Total	2.34	1.76	0	8	181
Urban	3.58	1.84	0	8	59
Rural	1.75	1.36	0	5	122
Outside combat areas	2.40	1.91	0	8	112
On the territory of hostilities	2.63	1.57	0	5	35
Temporarily occupied	1.72	1.21	0	5	25
Liberated	2.22	1.48	0	4	9
Large	5.11	1.76	2	8	19
Small	2.02	1.45	0	6	162

Table 16 Violin plots with results of Mann-Whitney test for Spaces Index by community type






Table 17 Violin plots with results of Mann-Whitney test for Spaces Index by community size.



Annex 10 Challenges of public informing and engagement initiatives at times of war

	Easy to overcome	Hard to overcome	Irrelevant	The challenge was not overcome	Easy to overcome + Hard to overcome 2021
Informing citizens about the initiative	81	9	7	2	
Ensure constructive dialogue	60	30	5	5	95
Intra-LSG coordination	72	15	10	3	79
Designing the initiative	64	21	11	4	80
Ensure active citizen participation	46	40	4	11	79
No safe place for meetings	68	16	13	3	
Ensuring council deputies' support	65	17	12	5	90
Ensure inclusivity of participation	43	36	9	12	90
External interest group pressure	46	32	16	6	63
LSG employees' ICT capacity	57	19	18	7	73
LSG employees' lack of qualification in community communication	61	12	21	6	62
Opposition from implementers within the LSG	60	10	27	3	53
Find funding for a responsible employee	47	22	24	7	63
Find funds for software	34	34	20	12	81
No national legislative framework	37	25	26	12	46
Other	17	14	68	1	

Annex 11 Challenges to citizen participation initiatives in 2021



Source: (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023a, p. 43)

Annex 12 Vertical coordination by group

		Urban	Rural	Outside combat areas	On the territory of hostilities	Temporarily occupied	Liberated
Information sharing between our local government and central government is sufficiently coordinated	1 - I strongly disagree	9%	5%	15%	11%	16%	11%
	2	13%	15%	22%	34%	24%	11%
	3	25%	24%	21%	6%	24%	56%
	4	21%	18%	36%	40%	32%	22%
	5 - strongly agree	32%	38%	6%	9%	4%	NA
Information sharing between our local government and the regional military administration (RMA) is sufficiently coordinated	1 - I strongly disagree	2%	1%	29%	17%	28%	67%
	2	2%	2%	52%	54%	48%	33%
	3	11%	20%	1%	3%	4%	NA
	4	34%	25%	2%	3%	4%	NA
	5 - strongly agree	51%	51%	17%	23%	16%	NA
Information sharing between our local government and the district military administration is sufficiently coordinated	1 - I strongly disagree	4%	3%	30%	20%	24%	56%
	2	2%	2%	54%	57%	64%	44%
	3	11%	12%	2%	9%	8%	NA
	4	30%	29%	12%	14%	4%	NA
	5 - strongly agree	53%	54%	3%	NA	NA	NA
The local authorities of our community have the opportunity to influence the decisions of the central government	1 - I strongly disagree	25%	39%	30%	51%	36%	11%
	2	30%	23%	29%	14%	28%	33%
	3	34%	27%	31%	17%	24%	56%
	4	6%	7%	4%	14%	NA	NA
	5 - strongly agree	6%	4%	5%	3%	12%	NA
Local authorities of our community and central authorities coordinate strategic decision-making	1 - I strongly disagree	11%	30%	24%	26%	24%	11%
	2	30%	27%	25%	34%	20%	44%
	3	40%	17%	28%	11%	40%	33%
	4	9%	13%	13%	6%	4%	11%
	5 - strongly agree	9%	14%	10%	23%	12%	NA
Reduced level of bureaucratization in management decision-making in the power vertical over the past 12 months	1 - I strongly disagree	9%	30%	19%	37%	12%	22%
	2	42%	20%	29%	23%	32%	22%
	3	30%	32%	32%	29%	32%	33%
	4	17%	12%	15%	6%	20%	22%
	5 - strongly agree	2%	6%	4%	6%	4%	NA

LSG does not have access to data to compare community indicators with other communities	1 - I strongly disagree	13%	17%	13%	23%	8%	11%
	2	21%	14%	16%	11%	12%	33%
	3	32%	36%	35%	31%	44%	44%
	4	21%	13%	15%	17%	24%	11%
	5 - strongly agree	13%	21%	21%	17%	12%	NA
In times of war, the closure of open data is justified	1 - I strongly disagree	4%	7%	5%	6%	NA	22%
	2	4%	8%	23%	20%	12%	11%
	3	25%	20%	23%	14%	20%	11%
	4	21%	20%	45%	46%	64%	56%
	5 - strongly agree	47%	45%	4%	14%	4%	NA
Closing access to registers limits the ability of local authorities to exercise their powers	1 - I strongly disagree	6%	8%	6%	20%	12%	11%
	2	13%	8%	29%	9%	48%	22%
	3	25%	23%	29%	9%	12%	44%
	4	28%	23%	30%	51%	28%	22%
	5 - strongly agree	28%	38%	6%	11%	NA	NA
In times of war, budgetary restrictions for local governments are justified	1 - I strongly disagree	21%	22%	25%	17%	12%	33%
	2	30%	20%	38%	20%	44%	44%
	3	30%	36%	12%	6%	12%	22%
	4	13%	10%	16%	46%	8%	NA
	5 - strongly agree	6%	12%	10%	11%	24%	NA
Unreasonable restrictions on the powers of local authorities are taking place in the context of war	1 - I strongly disagree	11%	13%	10%	20%	4%	11%
	2	11%	13%	13%	11%	20%	11%
	3	42%	38%	39%	34%	32%	56%
	4	19%	24%	27%	9%	24%	22%
	5 - strongly agree	17%	13%	12%	26%	20%	NA

Annex 13 Emergency notification methods in crisis by hromada type.

	Total	Urban	Rural	Outside combat areas	On the territory of hostilities	Temporarily occupied	Liberated
messages in community social networks	77%	81%	75%	71%	89%	80%	89%
system of automatic notification of the population ("sirens")	60%	86%	47%	72%	66%	4%	33%
community website	58%	58%	58%	51%	66%	72%	78%
telephone notifications	36%	29%	39%	43%	23%	24%	33%
vehicle loudspeakers (horns)	22%	31%	17%	29%	9%	8%	11%
local TV channel or radio station	12%	31%	3%	15%	11%	0%	11%
other	10%	8%	11%	11%	6%	12%	22%
none of the above	2%	2%	2%	1%	0%	12%	0%



THE GLOBAL GOALS

For Sustainable Development