ICLD Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy

2023 | RESEARCH REPORT NO 27

Morality policies and the prospect for inclusive citizenship in decentralized Indonesia: A study of West Java

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Frontpage Photo: Image from associated video policy brief. See https://youtu.be/oOkofRc2Suo?si=TI8iK4X6xHV8H893.

ISBN: 978-91-86725-61-7

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Abstract

This study examines the making of exclusionary morality policies and how those policies have affected the lives of faith-based and gender-based minority groups in West Java, Indonesia. Combining policy review, in-depth case studies, and survey, we identify distinct patterns of exclusion, which are top-down for faith-based minorities and bottom-up for sexual/gender minorities. Around 121 exclusionary morality policies may contribute to such exclusion and these policies were adopted via three pathways of policy-making, i.e., government-led, party-led, and religious group-led policy-making processes. However, regardless of the pathways, our research also suggests that exclusionary morality policies are more likely to get adopted where decentralization has been followed with an alignment of interest between politicians who need to secure the support of the majority, conservative religious groups seeking access to policy-making, and voters who prefer to cast their votes for candidates of the same ethnicity and gender.

Preface

By Johan Lilja, Secretary General, Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy

The mission of the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD) is to contribute to poverty reduction by promoting local democracy. In order to fulfil this, we promote and encourage decentralised cooperation through municipal partnerships programme; adding capacity-building through our international training programmes; and investing in relevant research and creating important research networks. ICLD documents and publishes key lessons learned from our ongoing activities, initiates and funds relevant research, engages in scholarly networks, connects relevant researchers with practitioners, and organises conferences and workshops. We also maintain a publications series. 'The politics of morality policies and the prospect for inclusive citizenship in decentralized Indonesia', for short, is the 27th report to be published in ICLD's Research Reports series.

It addresses an important and timely question: How to work for equal rights where democracy is on the decline? Decentralisation can protect against anti-democratic winds blowing at the national level, but here we are shown that it can also be what enables exclusionary policymaking. By demonstrating how notions of morality is leveraged through different pathways to justify discriminatory politics, the authors identify ways to promote an equitable democracy based on the rights of the marginalised rather than the will of the majority.

My genuine opinion is, to fight poverty and reach the ambitious goals set out by Agenda 2030, change must be anchored at the local level by means of equity, participation, transparency, and accountability – and leave no one behind. At ICLD we will continue to support local governments to address complex questions through data-driven, community-based change. I hope that this research will inspire and inform local policymakers, civil society and academics to go the extra mile for an equitable society and making the world a better place for all.

Visby, Sweden

Johan Lilja,

Secretary General, ICLD
June 2023

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Introduction

After two decades of transitioning to democracy, Indonesia eventually experiences democratic stagnation with an illiberal tendency. Since 2014, Indonesia has been labeled as "partially free" by the Freedom House and "flawed democracy" by the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Democracy Index due to its failure in protecting civil liberties. The country also scored 0.38 in the 2019 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Egalitarian Democracy Index, which applied an interval score from 0 (low) to 1 (high) to measure the extent of protection of individual rights and freedoms; equal distribution of resources; and equal access to power across social groups. Warburton and Aspinall (2019) went even further by attributing the "regressing" situation of Indonesian democracy to the intensifying acts of intolerance, discrimination, and persecution towards minorities.

Previous research discovers that many acts of exclusion and discrimination against minorities still occur in various areas in Indonesia, especially in West Java—the most populated province in the country. Between 2007 and 2019, West Java witnessed the most violations against freedom of religion with as many as 2,400 reported incidents involving around 3,177 violations (Madrim, 2019). The province's poor performance in protecting the civil liberties of its citizens was also reflected in its score for the civil liberties component of the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI, *Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia*). In 2019, West Java only scored 65.16 for IDI, which was lower than the national average (BPS, 2020). Meanwhile, SETARA Institute's Index on Tolerant Cities discovered that as many as five out of nine cities in West Java scored below the national average in 2018 due to the existence of exclusionary local policies. Some of these policies **are "morality policies" that use moral arguments to target both faith-based minorities and the LGBTQI+ communities, thus making these communities more vulnerable as they are seen as inimical to the social and cultural "order."**

Table 1. SETARA Institute's Index on Tolerant Cities for West Java

2018			2017			2015		
Cities	Rank	Score	Cities	Rank	Score	Cities	Rank	Score
Bekasi	6	5.89	Cirebon	30	5.4	Cirebon*	48	2.47
Sukabumi	20	5.43	Bekasi	53	5.1	Cimahi*	68	3.47
Cirebon	27	5.34	Sukabumi*	68	4.7	Banjar*	84	4.00
Banjar	42	4.88	Banjar*	72	4.6	Tasikmalaya*	85	4.00
Tasikmalaya*	59	4.60	Tasikmalaya*	75	4.6	Sukabumi*	88	4.05
Cimahi*	63	4.54	Cimahi*	77	4.5	Bandung*	89	4.16
Bandung*	69	4.41	Bandung*	83	4.1	Depok*	91	4.26
Bogor*	88	3.53	Depok*	90	3.3	Bekasi*	93	4.68
Depok*	89	3.49	Bogor*	92	3.1	Bogor*	94	5.21
National Average		4.80	National Average		4.97	National Average		2.73

Note: *) below the national average, SETARA Institute used different scoring in 2015, which was an interval from 1 (tolerant) to 7 (intolerant). Whereas in 2017 and 2018, the interval was from 1 (intolerant) to 7 (tolerant).

What causes the exclusion of minorities? At the attitudinal level, the exclusion of minority groups is generally preceded and justified by a specific set of "enemy" constructions that lead to the dehumanization of those groups (Galtung, 1969). The specific identity construction then gets translated into social institutions and state policies, which regulate the way society lives. Research on LGBTIQ communities in Indonesia, for example, attributes the intolerance, discrimination, and persecution against LGBTIQ people in the country to the presence of a homonegativity attitude, which is predominantly influenced by age and educational status (Manalastas, et al., 2017; Rusyidi & Kamrujjaman, 2018). According to Davies (2018), homonegativity rhetoric that managed to enter the daily vernacular of Indonesian society after the country's transition to democracy may have created a permissive environment for harassment and violence on the basis of someone's sexual identity. Meanwhile, the label "infidels" is central in the identity construction of faith-based minorities as the enemy of the people. However, some literature believes that the trend of labeling religious minorities as "infidels" is only as recent as the renewed interest in Islamic conservatism in post-reform Indonesia. This literature argues that religious conservatism shapes the public discourse on morality, thus affecting the way non-Sunni Muslim, non-Muslim believers, and LGBTIQ people are treated (Wieringa, 2015; Arivia & Gina, 2016; Platt, Davies & Bennett, 2018). The strong presence of conservative Islamic organizations that often engage in vigilante acts, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI, *Front Pembela Islam*), is also used as an indicator to measure increasing conservatism in Indonesia (Crouch, 2012; Davies, 2018; Sorensen, 2018).

At the structural level, decentralization is often seen as the facilitating factor of morality policies that discriminate against minorities (Crouch, 2009; Buehler, 2016). Decentralization transfers policy-making authority to local governments and goes with it is the power to adopt policies that only listen to those who are "electorally significant." Some of these laws can be very discriminative. For example, Regulation No. 12/2019 in Kabupaten[1] Tasikmalaya in West Java, which places homosexuality in the same position as adultery and prostitution since they are seen as violating Islamic values (Arivia & Gina, 2016; Muthmainnah, 2016). Meanwhile, there are also other laws heavily affecting the daily life of minorities even though the laws themselves are not specifically addressed to these groups, such as Regulation No. 03/2005 on public order in Kota Bandung that provides a basis for the municipal government to perform disciplining measures on transgenders.

Although both arguments may sound convincing, each has its own limitations. Attributing the adoption of exclusionary policies against minorities only to attitudinal factors does not explain the existence of other Indonesian cities that have not adopted exclusionary policies despite facing a similar conservative rise. Blaming decentralization also cannot explain the fact that not all decentralized cities, districts, and provinces have adopted exclusionary policies. It is precisely this spatial variation that motivates us to focus on local policy processes to explain the adoption of exclusive morality policies. Our study falls at the intersection between policy formulation, citizenship, and democracy studies. Its emphasis on the formulation of exclusionary morality policies against minorities at the subnational level shows how value conflicts have been used as an instrument to sustain illiberal tendency in a decentralized setting, thus impeding not only the minorities' opportunity to be fully recognized as equal citizens, but also the country's transition to democracy. Practically, understanding how exclusionary policies have been "made" at the subnational level may eventually allow us to better map any chance for advancing a more inclusive and egalitarian democracy in Indonesia.

1 In Indonesia, kota or municipality and kabupaten or district are administrative units under provinces.

Theoretical framework

As stated above, what makes exclusionary policies against minorities — particularly the faith-based and the gender-based minority groups in Indonesia unique is the tendency among local governments to frame these policies as pertaining to morality. Previous literature on the topic tends to categorize policies concerning abortion, capital punishment, gambling, gay rights, or pornography as morality policies (Haider-Markel, 1999; Meier, 1999; Mooney, 1999). However, recent studies on morality policies have started to expand their understanding of morality policies to include any policy attempting to regulate "threats" to core values, "not because the values are core" but more likely because "those who frame the issue place adherence to specific moral principles above other considerations" (Mucciaroni, 2011, pp. 191). This is why morality policies also constitute a mechanism of moral validation as they "deal with values that are accepted by the state and values that are defined by the state as perverse" (Gusfeld in Meier, 1999, pp. 681). Consequently, the state's acceptance of a certain set of values will enhance the status of some groups as recognized and respected citizens, while reducing and excluding others, especially the minorities who are seen as unfit to the majority's "standard of morality."

Given morality policies' central position in the exclusion of minorities in Indonesia, it is imperative for this research to examine under what conditions local governments would have more incentives to adopt exclusionary morality policies. Scholars of morality policies have argued that morality policies are often technically simpler since it has to do more with a debate around a moral principle, therefore engaging in morality policy-making does not require politicians to have a specific and technical set of knowledge (Haider-Markel, 1999). Morality policies also tend to be more salient to the public because they are related to conflicts over core values (Mooney, 1999). Consequently, morality policy-making may produce a higher-than-normal level of citizen participation (Carmines & Stimson, 1980; Gormley, 1986), which can be further shaped by religious affiliation and public opinion (Fairbanks, 1977; Berry & Berry, 1990; Nice, 1992; Mooney & Lee, 2000) as well as saliency, partisanship, and party competition (Meier, 1999; Mucciaroni, 2011; Taylor, et al., 2012; Engeli, Green-Pedersen & Larsen, 2013; Cravens, 2015). Cravens even argues that deeply held religious beliefs combined with strong partisanship and party competition, are the factors that may sustain morality policies. Since morality policy aims at regulating societal standards, any initiative to adopt morality policies could easily incite strong responses from the public and politicians alike, who often reduce the policy-making processes into a question of establishing what is normatively right or wrong (Cravens, 2015). Low informational barriers may also increase issue saliency (Lax & Phillips, 2009, pp. 370). When high issue salience is combined with partisanship, debates surrounding morality policies can be heated easily since the public will associate certain political parties with particular policy preferences (Cravens, 2015).

Research questions

Our research aims at contributing to the above theoretical conversation about morality policies by inductively examining:

- How do the local governments in West Java "make" morality policies?
- Why did some local governments in West Java decide to adopt exclusionary morality policies, while others have not done so despite the presence of minority groups in their jurisdiction?

We speculate that exclusionary policies are more likely to be present in cities and districts where there are strong partisanship, vigorous electoral competition, and active voters with exclusionary values against minorities.

Research significance and novelty

As stated earlier, previous studies tend to focus on either attitudinal or structural factors as the sufficient variable for the formulation of exclusionary morality policies. This tendency overlooks other factors that may jointly explain the adoption of morality policies. Such analysis is important as it would help us to identify the logic behind the formulation and adoption of morality policies, and how such a logic affects (or is in itself an effect of) existing exclusionary practices.

We adopt a holistic approach in understanding morality policy-making because we contend that exclusionary practices tend to be present in the following four dimensions:



Figure 1. Dimensions of exclusion/inclusion

Exclusionary and discriminatory morality policies only belong to one of the four dimensions above, yet we must take existing exclusionary practices in the other three dimensions into account to understand why and how those policies were formulated.

By placing exclusionary policy-making in its broader socio-political and economic contexts, this research also builds a "bridge" between the attitudinal and structural explanations about exclusionary morality policies. Incorporating these two aspects — the structural/institutional and the attitudinal/behavioral is necessary to get a comprehensive understanding of the current state of democratic regression in the country.

Relevance to local democracy

Since the reform in 1998, democratization in Indonesia has "expanded" to the local level due to decentralization and direct local elections. These democratic developments have granted greater authority for the local governments to formulate their own policies, including those that turned out to be exclusionary and discriminatory against minorities. Understanding the dynamics of local policy-making and how it affects inclusive citizenship at the subnational level may provide better insights about the quality of one of the largest democracies in the world. It also allows us to reflect about the extent to which democratic reform at the national level can (or cannot) affect political processes at the local level. Such a reflection is even more important in light of recent studies about "authoritarian enclave" at the subnational level (Gibson 2005; Benton, 2012), which is one of the possible "vestiges" of past authoritarian regime that survives democratization (Loxton, 2021) and therefore may challenge or even harm existing efforts to consolidate democracy.

Practically speaking, we can also use the findings of this research to advocate for inclusive policy-making practices at the local level. This means encouraging the local governments to meaningfully involve the minorities and their supporting civil society organizations in policy formulation processes, which is in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on Inclusive Cities (SDG 11), Gender Equality (SDG 5), and Peace and Justice (SDG 16). In the context of our research, West Java holds more importance because it is the most populated province with the highest number of eligible voters in Indonesia (KPU, 2018). Having the province as an advocacy target for inclusive policy-making practices may contribute to the current efforts to achieve more inclusive democracy at the local and, eventually, the national level.

Integrating the gender dimensions

We integrated gender dimensions in this research in at least three aspects. First, our research problematizes existing exclusionary and discriminatory morality policies against minorities, including gender-based minority groups such as women and the LGBTQI+ people. Second, we took inputs from and collaborated with members of Srikandi Pasundan—a transgender community in West Java as well as staffs of the Legal Aid Foundation (LBH, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum) and the Indonesian Family Planning Association (PKBI, *Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia*) in West Java during research design and data collection to ensure that this research was always informed by the perspective of the minorities. Third, we made sure that our team is gender-balanced by giving more opportunities not only for female faculty members and researchers, but also for female students to join our team.

Methodology

This research combined the following methods for data collection and analysis.

Policy review

We did a close-reading of 121 policies adopted between 2004 to 2019 by the government at the provincial, municipal, and district levels in West Java. Around 70% of those policies are local regulations (Perda, *Peraturan Daerah*), while the rest consist of executive decrees and orders issued by various government offices at the subnational level. We also examine the medium-term regional development plans (RPJMD, *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah*) to look for any exclusionary policy against minorities. We then categorized those policies into two groups: manifest and latent morality policies. Whereas manifest morality policies deal with issues in which "value conflicts constitute the standard mode of political decision-making…where values and beliefs are seen as an instrument of social and political power," latent morality policies are those containing certain regulatory elements which may not be related to any value conflict, yet can be "morally exploited" in certain conditions (Knill, 2013, pp. 312-313). Furthermore, we analyze the texts of the policies to explore: (1) the target and the scope of each policy; (2) the morality frames used in each policy, including in how the policies define minorities who are categorized as "morally defiant;" (3) disciplining measures that should be taken to deal with the "morally defiant;" and (4) policy enforcement measures, which includes any mention on the importance of involving non-state actors in enforcement. This analysis allowed us to discern potential patterns of exclusion and discrimination—the perpetrators, the victims, and the forms of exclusions, but also in which dimensions such exclusion and discrimination take place—at the state level, social institutions, interactions among community members, or even within the private lives of individuals and families.

Case studies

We used findings from the policy review for case selections. Two cities, Kota Bogor and Kota Tasikmalaya, have adopted the most exclusionary morality policies between 2009 and 2019, with less reported cases of violence against the minorities. However, the adjacent districts, Kabupaten Bogor and Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, interestingly adopted fewer exclusionary morality policies with more reported cases of violence against the minorities. Our reviews of the exclusionary morality policies in these cities and districts also show that the policies have been predominantly targeting four groups: the Ahmadiyya[2] communities, the LGBTQI+ people, the indigenous faith believers[3], and the religious minorities[4] which is why the case studies were focused on understanding the making of exclusionary policies against those groups.

Due to pandemic-related restrictions, we did phone or virtual interviews to collect the data for the case studies. We interviewed 63 informants between January and June 2021—30 from Kota and Kabupaten Bogor, 33 from Kota and Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and two hours. The interviews were semi-structured. We prepared a list of questions to explore the informants' knowledge and opinion of five themes: (1) the extent of exclusionary and discriminatory treatments against faith- and gender-based minorities in their cities or districts; (2) the presence, the formulation, and the implementation of existing morality policies in their cities or districts; (3) the actors involved in the formulation of existing morality policies in their cities or districts; (4) the extent to which the policies affect existing exclusionary and discriminatory treatments against faith- and gender-based minorities; and (5) existing strategies to advocate for the inclusion of faith- and gender-based minorities in their cities or districts.

The informants represent four groups: members of local faith- and gender-based minority groups, civil

2 The Ahmadiyya is an Islamic revival or messianic movement originating in Punjab, India during British colonialism, whose missionaries came to Indonesia in the 1920s. In many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia, the Ahmadis have been labelled as heretics and infidels, and thus subjected to persecution.
3 In Indonesia, there are many indigenous groups who still value and practice their own belief systems. These groups are commonly referred as *penghayat* or the believers. There are several *penghayat* communities in West Java, such as the Sunda Wiwitan, the Djawa Sunda, Buhun, and many more.
4 Indonesia officially acknowledges Islamism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. According to the latest national census in 2018, around 87 percent of Indonesians are Muslim, so the term religious minorities refer to those who do not profess Islamism.

society activists at the local and national levels who have been advocating for minority rights, leaders or members of local religious-based mass organizations, and policy makers who are mostly bureaucrats from local government offices or members of local House of Representatives. We used two approaches to select the informants. First, we traced the formulation of each policy to find those who held key positions around the time the policies were adopted. It is important to note that some policies were adopted fifteen years ago. Thus, in the case we cannot find those who "witnessed" the adoption of the exclusionary morality policies, we shifted to the second approach by interviewing informants who have substantial knowledge on the implementation of the exclusionary morality policies.

Survey

The survey complements the other methods as it aims at examining the level of tolerance at the individual level, including the association between someone's level of tolerance and his or her voting preference. We used a multistage sampling method, which combined purposive selection of cities (*kota*), districts (*kabupaten*), and subdistricts (*kecamatan*) and random selection of villages (*kelurahan* or *desa*)[5] and individuals. In the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya, we selected the largest and the smallest subdistricts, followed by a random sample of villages and individuals. Based on our sample size calculation[6], we surveyed a total of 400 respondents between 18 and 64 years old who live in 8 *desa* and 17 *kelurahan* in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya.

We generated a measure of tolerance as a primary outcome, which is adapted from the World Values Survey questionnaire (Haerpfer et al, 2022) and other similar measures (Ben-nun Bloom & Bagno-moldavsky, 2015; Crawford, Mallinas, & Furman, 2015; Hamed Hosseini & Saha, 2018). This measure consists of 18 items representing social tolerance and 21 items representing political tolerance. Each item has a four-response scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Level of tolerance was estimated using the combined scores of social and political tolerances that were transformed into a standardized z-score, for which a higher score is associated with a higher level of tolerance. Estimates from the Cronbach's alpha test suggest that the measure has a good internal consistency for both types of tolerance and as a total score.

A priori selections of variables were used as predictor of tolerance including age, education, gender, marital status, primary activity in the past month, and residential area—i.e., urban or rural (Ben-nun Bloom & Bagno-moldavsky, 2015; Jackman, 2016; Shaver, Troughton, Sibley & Bulbulia, 2016; Sarigil, 2018); satisfaction with current financial condition (Ravallion & Lokshin, 2001), and affiliations with religious organization or political party (Fossati & Warburton, 2018; Mujani, 2019). We also used voting preference as a secondary outcome, which is defined as respondent's' in-group preference for choosing candidates during elections (Panggabean, 2017; McRae & Robet, 2019).

To gain understanding of relations between level of tolerance and social or political attitudes, we run a series of multivariate regression models to estimate (1) predictors of tolerance, and (2) associations of tolerance and voting preference.

5 In Indonesia, subdistricts or *kecamatan* are administrative units under cities (*kota*) and districts (*kabupaten*). Each subdistrict consists of several villages (*kelurahan* or *desa*).
6 We estimated the sample size based on the total number of our target population, i.e., individuals who are between 18 and 64 years old and live in villages in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya, with confidence level at 95%, margin of error at 5% and response distribution at 50%.

Exclusionary morality policies against minorities in West Java

Two important indexes on tolerance in Indonesia, the Tolerant City Index (Laporan Indeks Kota Toleran) by Setara Institute and the Right to Freedom of Religion Index (Indeks Kebebasan Agama) by Wahid Institute, have placed West Java as one of the provinces with a relatively high level of intolerance towards minority groups, mainly due to the presence of numerous exclusionary policies against minorities. Research by Buehler and Muhtada (2016) on shari'a-inspired local regulations also listed West Java as a province with the most shari'a-inspired local regulations, and some of them tend to be exclusionary against minorities. Our tracing and close-readings of 121 local policies adopted between 2004 and 2019 in West Java shows two important findings. First, out of 117 policies that were adopted by the government at the municipal and district levels, 59 policies can be classified as manifest morality policies, while 58 policies are latent morality policies. This indicates that the local governments have engaged in the practice of using morality and value conflicts explicitly to make rulings against the minorities in West Java. Second, as previously stated, the policies tend to "target" four minority groups, which are the Ahmadiyya communities, the LGBTQI+ communities, the indigenous faith believers, and members of religious minorities—particularly when it comes to their right to establish houses of worship. The following subsections elaborate on the experience of exclusions and discriminations that those groups have endured, including how such experiences influence and be influenced by the presence of exclusionary morality policies.

State-driven discrimination against the Ahmadis

Rejections against the Ahmadiyya were present soon after the group "arrived" in Indonesia in 1925. According to Hicks (2014), the two biggest Muslim organizations in the country—the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah have accused the Ahmadiyya heretical since 1927 and 1938. During the New Order, anti-Ahmadiyya violence occurred at least three times in 1969, 1976, and 1981 (Hicks, 2014). Although most Ahmadiyya communities managed to live side by side with the non-Ahmadis, there was a formal statement of rejection by the national government. However, after the decentralization in 1999, there were more cases of exclusions, discriminations, and persecutions against the Ahmadis, including in West Java.

Photo 1. Hundreds of people destroyed an Ahmadiyya mosque in the district of Tasikmalaya in 2013.
Source: ANTARA/Feri Purnama

Both the national and local governments in West Java have adopted at least 43 exclusionary policies against the Ahmadiyya since 1965. Yet a sharp increase in violence against the group occurred after the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*) issued an Islamic ruling (*fatwa*) No. 11/MUNAS/VII/MUI/15/2005 on the Ahmadiyya declaring the group's teaching as heretical (Budiwanti, 2009), which was followed by a ban on any activity by the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Jama'at (JAI, *Jemaah Ahmadiyyah Indonesia*). The *fatwa* may have no legal power, yet it still has a significant role in normatively supporting the adoption of exclusionary policies against the Ahmadiyya. During the term of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), the *fatwa* gained more legitimacy as it was referred in a 2008 joint ministerial decree (popularly known as SKB Tiga Menteri) on the Ahmadiyya (McCoy, 2013), which again bolster more exclusions, discriminations, and persecutions against the group. In West Java, anti-Ahmadiyya violence worsened after the provincial government issued an executive order on the prohibition of Ahmadiyya congregations in 2011. Similar regulations at the municipal and district levels followed suit, such as the executive order issued by the head of District Bekasi No. 11/2011.

The SKB Tiga Menteri and both the 2011 executive order by the governor of West Java and the head of District Bekasi refer to Ahmadiyya as "a religious idea that deviates from the main teaching of Islam." The SKB Tiga Menteri even states that special measures must be taken in order to ensure that the presence of Ahmadiyya congregations would not "cause unrests in the society's religious life or disturb the peace and order of the social life." These statements practically frame the followers of Ahmadiyya as violators of both the laws and the normative values held by the Muslim majority in Indonesia, which then justified exclusionary and discriminatory actions against the Ahmadis by the state and the society in the name of social disturbance and unrest prevention. These actions have ranged from sealing their mosques, removing their organization's signage, preventing them from obtaining permits to build mosques, as well as prohibiting them from disseminating their teachings and using any attribute related to their teachings. According to the Wahid Institute, at least 141 cases of anti-Ahmadiyya violence happened between 2008 and 2015 in 21 out of 27 cities and districts in West Java, with most cases occurred in the district of Tasikmalaya (20 cases) and Cianjur (19 cases). That being said, it can be argued that the patterns of exclusion against the Ahmadis occurred in a top-down manner, in which national policies (macro-objective) has "inspired" renewed exclusions, discriminations, and violence at the societal level (micro-objective) and the communal-relational (micro-subjective) level.

The indigenous faith believers: discriminated despite recent recognition

Similar with the Ahmadi, exclusionary and discriminatory treatments against the indigenous faith believers in Indonesia began with the Blasphemy Law No.1/PNPS1965 that categorized the indigenous faith systems as non-religion. This ruling was strengthened by the adoption of TAP IV/MPR/1978 that prohibiting those categorized as non-religion to form a new religion. Although the 1978 ruling has been revoked, the categorization of indigenous faith systems as non-religion has resulted in various exclusions and discriminations against the indigenous faith believers after Indonesia's transition to democracy in 1998.

Photo 2. An indigenous faith believer shows his new ID Card, which is a requirement to access national health service.
Source: ANTARA/Andi Firdaus

In Indonesia, residents aged 17 and older must hold an ID card that indicates their religion. It has been argued that it is important to have a "religion column" in ID cards for administrative purposes. However, the Law No. 23/2006 on Population Administration states that "residents whose religions have not been recognized as parts of the official religions based on the provisions of existing laws or residents who adheres to indigenous faith systems cannot put their religions or faith systems on their ID card, although they still deserve to be served and recorded in the population database." Some chose to claim on paper that they are professing one of the six official religions in order to be able to have ID cards (Abdulsalam, 2017) and many chose not to have ID cards. Without ID cards, these people were deprived of various forms of human rights. They could not access public services and government assistances, including those related to personal matters, such as marriages and burials. Although a judicial review by the Constitutional Court in 2017 ended administrative discrimination against the non-official religions and indigenous faith believers by giving them the freedom to leave the religion column on their ID cards blank, exclusionary and discriminatory practices against the indigenous faith believers are still very much present. For example, those who decide to leave the religion column in their ID cards empty often got different responses when looking for jobs or education opportunities (Ridhoi, 2017).

Exclusionary national policies against indigenous faith believers seem to inspire the adoption of similar policies at the subnational level. For example, the city of Bogor's mayoral order No. 4/2007 on building permits does not include procedures for building houses of worship for the indigenous faith believers. Similar policies are also present in other cities and districts in West Java. Such an administrative hurdle would make it extremely difficult for the indigenous faith believers to have their own houses of worship because the regulation has become a legal justification for intolerant local government to suspend any plan to build more houses of worship for the indigenous faith believers. For example, in July 2020, the government of Kuningan stated that "a permit problem" has forced them to stop the followers of Karuhun Urang Sunda Wiwitan from finishing the construction of a tomb for their elders (Jakarta Post, 2020). Such an administrative argument is often used by the Indonesian government to avoid giving permissions to faith-based minority groups to have their own houses of worship, thus preventing them to access one of their constitutionally protected human rights, which is the right to the freedom of religion. SETARA Institute calls such practices "the bureaucratization of discrimination and intolerance" (Amindoni 2020), in which the government deliberately uses administrative requirements or other bureaucratic procedures as a legal instrument to impede the right of faith-based minorities to express their belief.

Legal and social hurdles against the establishment of churches

The discrimination experienced by religious minorities, especially the Christian communities, in West Java is mostly related to the difficulties that they must endure in obtaining permits to build churches, which is rooted in a joint ministerial decree No. 1/BER/MDN-MAG/1969 on the Protocols for Government Apparatuses in Ensuring the Orderly Implementation of Religious Practices (popularly known as SKB Dua Menteri). Although the decree does not mention anything about the establishment of houses of worship, it was passed to regulate the non-Muslims' religious activities as a response to problems related to inter-religious relation in the 1960s, which was marked by the escalation of conflicts between Muslims and Christians that resulted in the destruction, closure, and even burning of churches by the Muslims out of fear of Christian proselytization (Kustini, 2019).

Photo 3. Followers of GKI Taman Yasmin and HKBP Filadelfia held Christmas mass in front of the Presidential Palace in 2015 in protest of the closure of their churches.

Source: VOA/Fathiyah

The same conflict patterns occurred around the time of the democratic transition in the 1990s and 2000s. Socio-political and economic instabilities caused the re-emergence of horizontal conflicts, including between the Muslims and the Christians. Many Christian churches were destroyed, and those who did the attacks cited the joint ministerial decree to legitimize their actions (Ali-Fauzi, 2011). Many argued that the government must revise or even revoke the joint ministerial decree, but some conservative Muslim groups wanted just the opposite: raising the legal status of the joint ministerial decree into a national law. The national government responded to such tension by issuing another joint ministerial decree No. 8 and No. 9/2006 on the Guidelines for the Regional Leaders in Maintaining Religious Harmony, Empowering the Subnational Forums on Religious Harmony, and Establishing Houses of Worship. This decree gives details on the requirements for the establishment of houses of worship, including the ways to obtain permits. The joint ministerial decree is often referred by governments at the provincial, municipal, or district levels to adopt regulations on building permits

that include requirements to obtain permits for the establishment of houses of worship, such as the city of Bogor's municipal regulation (Perwali) No. 7/2006 on protocols for granting building permits, which was amended by Perwali No. 4/2007 and Perwali No. 17/2010.

The above policies, especially the joint ministerial decree, has been referred in the decision of the Head of the Municipal Office for City Planning and Parks to suspend the permit for the Indonesian Christian Church (GKI, *Gereja Kristen Indonesia*) in Taman Yasmin, Bogor. GKI Taman Yasmin is not the only church in West Java whose permit has been suspended by the local government. The same "fate" was experienced the Filadelfia Congregation of Batak-Protestant Churches (HKBP Filadelfia) in the district of Bekasi (Wijaya, 2017). Their permits were suspended because they did not manage to get 60 signatures and copy of ID Cards from the residents of the neighborhoods where the churches were located. The signatures and ID Cards are used as a measurement of community "approval" for the construction of houses of worship, which is required by the joint ministerial decree. This would create a problem for religious minorities who want to establish their houses of worship in Muslim-dominated neighborhoods as in the case of GKI Taman Yasmin and HKBP Filadelfia. They often have to face rejections from the surrounding communities and the legal requirement for "community approval" only facilitates further exclusions and discriminations against them because Islamic conservative groups tend to use the policy as a justification to mobilize hatred and to launch attacks against the Christian minorities. In reference to the diagram of dimensions of social exclusion/inclusion above, it seems that the pattern of exclusions experienced by faith-based minorities in West Java—be it a sect within Islam as in the case of the Ahmadis, the "non-religion" as in the case of the indigenous faith believers, or the religious minorities as in the case of the Christians tend to be the same, in which the presence of exclusionary policies at the national and local level (macro-objective) plays a major part in inciting exclusionary and discriminatory acts at the societal (micro-objective) and communal (macro-subjective) levels.

Violence against sexual and gender minorities

Sexual and gender minorities in Indonesia have been facing discriminations, violence, and threats of violence both from the state and the society. A report by the Legal Aid Institute (LBH, *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum*) in July 2019 shows that West Java is a province with the most cases of violations against sexual and gender minorities, with 39 cases of discrimination against the LGBTQI+ people. According to the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM, *Komisi Nasional untuk Hak Asasi Manusia*), the "deviant sexual orientation" label has often been used as a justification for series of human rights violations against sexual and gender minorities.

Photo 4. The Greater Bandung Alliance for Student and Youth organized an anti-LGBTQI+ rally in 2016 in Bandung, the capital city of West Java.
Source: ANTARA/Novrian Arbi

Some Indonesian traditions are historically known for giving a respectful place for people with non-binary gender identities and sexual orientations. For example, in Makassar, South Sulawesi, a bissu or a person who has non-binary gender identity is considered as a figure with the highest spirituality, and thus is highly respected. According to the Human Rights Watch, hateful rhetoric and attacks against the LGBTQI+ people in Indonesia have been sporadic. However, anti-LGBTQI+ violence was increasing unprecedentedly in 2016 after several

national politicians and government officials put out anti-LGBTQI+ statements in response to the global campaigns for same-sex marriage. Since then, anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric grew into "a cascade of vitriol against LGBTQ Indonesians by state commissions, militant Islamists, and mainstream religious organizations" and even resulted in proposals to adopt harsher legal measures against the LGBTQI+ people (Human Rights Watch, 2016, pp. 1).

Attempts to criminalize the activities of the LGBTQI+ people and raids on their residences are some of the common forms of anti-LGBTQI+ violence done by the society in "collaboration" with various government apparatuses at the national and local levels. During electoral years, some politicians would include anti-LGBTQI+ messages in their campaign to attract votes from conservative voters and many would promise to adopt anti-LGBTQI+ regulations if they get elected. Interestingly, our policy review finds that there have not been many regulations explicitly targeting sexual and gender minorities in West Java. Many of the local regulations that negatively affect sexual and gender minorities tend to "hide" discriminations against them, especially the transgender communities, in passages about public order. So far, only the cities of Depok and Bogor have adopted an explicit exclusionary regulation against sexual and gender minorities, casting them as sexually deviants whose behavior must be corrected to strengthen family resilience.

Negative stigma against the LGBTQI+ people has been present and nurtured among the conservative segments of the Indonesian society, which then can be easily provoked and mobilized by politicians for their electoral interests. When they do so, they tend to utilize a kind of policy narratives that frame the LGBTQI+ people as a threat to the religion, family resilience, and the society's moral order. For example, the head of Sukabumi District made a public statement in 2017 that his government does not tolerate the LGBTQI+ people because Sukabumi is a district with a religious vision. That being said, unlike the pattern of exclusion for faith-based minorities, it can be argued that the pattern of exclusions for sexual and gender minorities tend to occur in a bottom-up manner, from the communal (macro-subjective) and society (micro-objective) levels up to the state (macro-objective) level.

The formulation of exclusionary morality policies in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya

Any policy must start somewhere, which is the reason why this section focuses on unpacking the agenda-setting processes as well as the actors and the structure of interests underpinning the making of exclusionary morality policies in West Java. We particularly agree with George Tsebelis (1995) theorization on policy-making that both state and non-state agenda-setters will always have to encounter competing interests to make policies. Some of them may even come with the power to veto the proposed agenda. Furthermore, based on his idea on the interplay between agenda-setters and veto players during the problem identification, the agenda-setting, and the policy formulation stages[7], we manage to discover three pathways of exclusionary morality policy-making in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya: (1) government-led, (2) party-led, and (3) religious groups-led policy-making. Veto players exist in each of the pathways, but not all have effectively exercised their power to veto the proposed exclusionary policies.

Government-led policy-making

The first pathway involves the executive leaders at the sub-national level, who are directly elected through one-man-one-vote second-ballot system, using medium-term regional development plans (RPJMD, *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah*) as a vehicle where they can translate their visions and missions into exclusionary policies. It is very strategic for the executive leaders to use RPJMD as a way to carry exclusionary policies as the plans outline the budget and the activities that must be performed by other units within the local government.

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs' Regulation No. 86/2017 on the formulation of regional development plans, the regional development-planning agencies (Bappeda, *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah*) have the authority to coordinate the formulation of the initial draft of the RPJMD.

Table 2. Local policy-making pathways for exclusionary morality-based policies

Pathways	Agenda-setting mechanisms	Potential veto players	Example(s)
Government-led	Government programs and regulations	Everyday bureaucracies, the legislative body	Policies mentioned in regional development plans (RPJMD)
Party-led	Interest aggregation through public rallies, in combination with policy emulation	Executive government, party oppositions in the legislative body	Regulations on the sexually deviants (Perda P4S) in the city of Bogor or on social norms (Perda Tata Nilai) in the city of Tasikmalaya
Religious groups-led	Religious interpretation and pronouncement (fatwa), in combination with public rallies	Factions within religious groups	Anti-Ahmadiyya regulations

7 In the policy-making literature, policy-making is often considered as stages of decision-making processes. The first three stages refer to the making of the policy, i.e., the identification of problems and agenda-setting, the policy formulation, and the decision-making. Meanwhile, the other two stages are more about the implementation of the policy and its evaluation. For further elaboration, see Howlett and Giest (2013).

However, after the newly elected leader assumes office, Bappeda must synergize the draft with the elected leader's visions in a development-planning forum called Musrenbang (*Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan*), attended by various stakeholders, including representatives from local civil society organizations and academics. After receiving feedbacks from the Musrenbang processes, Bappeda will return the RPJMD to the executive leader, who will then submit the document to the local House of Representatives (DPRD, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*) for approval. It is only after receiving the DPRD's approval that the executive leader can issue a local government regulation (Perda, *Peraturan Daerah*) as the legal umbrella for the RPJMD implementation. Out of the four cities and districts that we examined in this research, only the city of Bogor's RPJMD for 2019-2024 that does not make a direct reference to Islamic values. The RPJMD of the city of Tasikmalaya (2017-2022) as well as of the districts of Tasikmalaya (2016-2021) and Bogor (2018-2023) use Islamic values and teachings as a normative foundation for their policy visions and missions, which can be seen as potentially exclusionary to the other non-majority faith groups.

There are two potential veto players in this pathway. First, check-and-balances responsibility may place the legislative body in a position of veto player since RPJMD requires the approval of DPRD to be legalized and implemented. Second, the everyday bureaucracy itself can also hold veto power because it is eventually the civil servants who have to translate the executive leader's policy visions into the existing key development performance indicators, which may not necessarily correspond with such visions. In addition, most of Indonesian bureaucracy is unaffected by the electoral cycle, which means that it may not be easy for some members of the bureaucracy to accommodate changes proposed by incoming elected executive leader. At the very day-to-day level, civil servants can even influence policy processes—and thus, acting as a "veto" player by inserting or deleting government programs so as to ensure that the implementation of certain policies will still support their own performance indicators.

However, our research suggests that the above veto players may not always use their power to block the adoption of exclusionary policies because of several reasons. First, check-and balance between the executive and the legislative bodies may be undermined by the need to maintain a winning alliance with the socio-politically dominant party. In the context of West Java, the socio-politically dominant party is Islamist-leaning parties, which tend to have more conservative or even intolerant stance against gender and faith-based minorities. In the city of Tasikmalaya as well as the districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya, nationalist parties only enjoy slight dominance in the legislative body. To maintain their political influence, the nationalist parties must forge alliance with the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*), which is a party that was formed out of four Islamist parties in the 1970s. In addition, all of the executive leaders in the city of Tasikmalaya as well as the districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya are from or had electoral supports from PPP. In contrast, PPP has not been dominant in the city of Bogor. A newer Islamist party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sosial*), has had the most seats in the legislative body, but their presence has been moderated by an alliance of nationalist parties. The Mayor of Bogor himself was elected with the support of an alliance of mostly nationalist parties. Such configuration may have been influential in moderating the urge to use Islamic teachings and values as a basis to insert an exclusionary policy vision and mission in the city's RPJMD.

Second, everyday bureaucracy most of the time cannot be an effective veto player against exclusionary policy initiatives because of their tendency to be what James Ferguson (1990) calls an *anti-politics machine*. Bureaucracy tends to depoliticize sensitive policy issues into mere technical problems, thus blinding itself from the potential exclusion and discrimination that may result from the implementation of a particular policy. For example, some of our interviews indicate that the ongoing exclusion and discrimination against gender minorities in West Java may be related to the national target of achieving zero new cases of HIV/AIDS by 2030 set by the national Ministry of Health. Labelling the LGBTQI+ communities as "the source of HIV/AIDS transmission" is therefore seen as an "easy" way to fulfill the said policy target. Government raids into the LGBTQI+ people's homes and quarters are also justified as one of the necessary ways to map and prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS.

Party-led policy-making

The second pathway involves one or more local political parties using at least one of the following mechanisms. First, policy emulation and diffusion. Here, the success of party branches in other districts or cities in pushing for a particular exclusionary policy is seen as worth emulating as a strategy to secure electoral supports from the majority, and thus to maintain the party's socio-political dominance. Exclusionary morality policies diffuse vertically and horizontally. In vertical diffusion, attempts to adopt exclusionary morality policies at the subnational level is a result of the local government and political parties' effort to implement particular national policies. For example, the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya have adopted local regulations (Perda, *Peraturan Daerah*) on HIV/AIDS prevention and countermeasures, which is a follow-up to similar regulation at the national level. However, the presence of such regulations is often used as a justification for the local commissions of HIV/AIDS prevention and countermeasures (KPA, *Komisi Penanggulangan HIV/AIDS Daerah*) to discriminate the LGBTQI+ communities, including to do raids in their communities in the name of HIV/AIDS prevention. We also find that local governments and political parties often take inspirations from other cities and districts, including when it comes to the adoption of exclusionary morality policies. This is what we call horizontal policy emulation and diffusion. For example, the city of Tasikmalaya introduced the Regulation on Social Norms (Perda Tata Nilai) in 2009, which is heavily based on Islamic teaching and values. From our interviews, we learned that the adoption of such regulation was inspired by the introduction of sharia law in the province of Aceh. The policy-makers at the time considered Perda Tata Nilai to be a crucial part of the city of Tasikmalaya's attempt to brand itself as the city of "Seribu Pesantren" or a Islamic boarding schools.

Second, public interest aggregation, in which the local political parties' attempts to push for the adoption of a particular exclusionary policy is framed as a response to the demands of the electorate that are usually expressed in public rallies or protest events. For example, in the city of Bogor, proposals to adopt a local regulation on the prevention and countermeasures of deviant sexual behaviors (Perda P4S) were initially made by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*) as a response to a rally involving several local Islamic figures in 2017 that warned the residents of the city on the danger of the LGBTQI+ people. Not only labelling the LGBTQI+ as sinners, the proponents of the regulation—which was passed in 2021 argue that Perda P4S is needed to control the transmission of HIV/AIDS among the LGBTQI+ people in the city of Bogor in order to avoid any disruption to the city's plan to be a family-friendly city.

Similar to the first pathway, in a democracy, the executive government or the oppositions in the legislative body theoretically would have the power to veto party-led initiatives to adopt exclusionary morality policies. However, there has been no strong oppositions from either the executive or the legislative body in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya that could exercise their veto power effectively. There are various reasons to this phenomenon. First, the salience of religious identity markers continues to uphold the socio-cultural and political dominance of Islamist-leaning parties, especially the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*). In the district of Bogor, PPP candidates have even been elected head of district since 2008. Such dominance has forced the other parties to forge an alliance with PPP to win the election, wiping out any possibility to establish a strong and healthy opposition in the executive and the legislative bodies. Second, the absence of counter-rallies by pro-inclusion civil society. In the case of Perda P4S in the city of Bogor, several pro-inclusion civil society organizations were invited to policy hearings, during which they raised objections against the regulation. However, the objections were mostly dismissed as the policymakers preferred to listen to the urges of pro-exclusion rallies. The absence of pro-inclusion counter-rallies made the pro-exclusion rallies appear to be the true "voice of the public" in need of a response.

Religious group-led policy-making

The third pathway features the role of religion-based organizations in agenda-setting, which goes beyond using rallies and protests to express their policy demands. Some religion-based organizations, especially the Indonesian

Ulema Council (MUI, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*) have the authority to issue Islamic legal rulings or pronouncements (fatwa). Although fatwa has no place in the Indonesian hierarchy of positive law and is not legally binding, it is often seen as the representation of the Muslim majority's opinion and therefore deserved to be considered by the policy-makers. For example, many anti-Ahmadiyya regulations at the national and subnational levels in Indonesia actually make reference to an MUI fatwa in 1980 stipulating that a branch within the Ahmadi communities, the Ahmadiyya Qadian, has diverted from Islamic teaching for believing in the existence of another prophet after Prophet Muhammad SAW.

In the district of Bogor, the local branch of MUI even maintained strong connections with the local government institutions, including the security apparatuses, thus allowing them to use fatwa more effectively to influence local policy-making. For example, following an attack on the Ahmadiyya community in the district of Bogor in 2005, the local branch of MUI issued a fatwa to respond to the incident at the request of the district-level leaders' forum (Muspida, *Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah*) in which the MUI has also been a part of. It was this fatwa that was then referred by the local House of Representatives' recommendation for the closure and banning of all Ahmadiyya-related activities in the district of Bogor. **Such a strong influence of fatwa on formal policy-making implies another form of policy modeling and diffusion between nonformal and formal institutions**, in which an MUI fatwa on certain issues can be easily translated into state regulations and policies.

Intriguingly, unlike the first and second pathways of exclusionary policy-making, it was hard to spot potential veto players for religious groups-led policy making, especially when the religious group in question manages to present itself as the "voice" of the Muslim majority. Both the executive leaders and political parties often find themselves reluctant to veto a call for exclusionary morality policies from religion-based organizations because it may harm their electoral supports. The most likely veto player for this pathway may come from within the religious groups themselves, especially when different factions come with contrasting stances on certain issues. For example, the local MUI in the city of Bogor has become more tolerant to non-Muslim religious events due to a change in the leadership of the organization.

It is indeed intuitive to expect that the ability to veto exclusionary calls from conservative religious groups should have come from more moderate religious groups or even other pro-inclusion civil society organizations. However, we discover that these organizations have not been making any significant move to publicly counter the exclusionary calls from their conservative counterparts. They have preferred the "soft approach" in advocating tolerance and inclusion by avoiding direct conflicts with the more conservative religious groups. Their activities tend to focus on empowerment activities for the minorities and much less on building collective countermovement due to funding limitations, which may impede their ability to be a powerful veto player against the third pathway.

The above pathways show where and how initiatives to adopt exclusionary morality policies come from and whether there is a potentially strong veto player for each pathway. In other words, the different pathways only show us who are the dominant agenda-setter. However, when the call for exclusionary morality policy has been made, it usually takes the alignment of interest between the executive government, the politicians in the legislative body, and the conservative religious groups to make and implement the actual exclusionary policy. The need to forge such an alignment is even more pressing after decentralization as local politicians are forced to fiercely competing against one another, while seeking to build winning alliance to secure the support of the majority voters. In addition, decentralization also opens opportunities for local religious organizations to compete for socio-political influence and relevance. It is when those interests align that partisanship politics is more likely to take place, which often results in the use of exclusionary morality policies as a strategy to appeal to the Muslim majority voters. Nonetheless, it takes intolerant voters to make such processes possible, which is why we also carried out the following survey to examine the level of tolerance among voters in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya, and to what extent their level of tolerance shapes their voting preference.

Communities' perception and attitude toward exclusionary morality policies: a quantitative assessment

The survey covers 400 respondents, with a proportional distribution in four areas—the cities of Bogor and Tasikmalaya, and the districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya. Table 3 shows the characteristics of the study participants. The median age is 35 years, with interquartile range (IQR) 22 and 48. A larger proportion of the sample is female, living in an urban area, currently working, and married. In terms of education, the median year of schooling is 11, with IQR 6 and 12, which is slightly higher than the national and provincial statistics.

We conducted the survey through face-to-face interview during the COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore had to adapt the questionnaire and the interviews. As a result, in terms of measuring the respondents' economic condition, a subjective measure seemed to be a more ideal option compared to the other monetary approaches, e.g., household expenditure that is commonly used in low- and middle-income countries but requires more detailed information and thus a longer time of interview. Instead, we asked the respondents to rate the financial condition of their household on a 10-scale, ranging from completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied. Distribution of the measure is skewed with a large number of respondents reported being on the left side of the economic distribution (median 5, IQR 2 and 7)[8].

Lower level of satisfaction with the household's financial condition might indicate the household's experience of economic decline due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Noerhidajati, et al., 2021). In terms of social and political activities, only about one-third of the sample reported having an affiliation with a religious organization or a political party. Moreover, only 25% of them know that the municipal or district government has policies restricting the minority groups' freedom of religion.

Table 3. Characteristics of the study participants (n=400)

Characteristics	Median (IQR)	Percent
Age	35 (22, 48)	
Male		46 %
Married		63 %
Working		61 %
Urban		68 %
Years of schooling	11 (6, 12)	
Satisfaction with the current financial condition (1 completely dissatisfied - 10 completely satisfied)	5 (2, 7)	
Ever affiliate with religious organization (yes=1)		34 %
Ever affiliate with political party (yes=1)		36 %
Knowledge that their city or district has policy that restricts religious liberty (yes=1)		25 %
Level of tolerance (z-score)		
- Social tolerance score	0.02 (-0.68, 0.72)	
- Political tolerance score	0.10 (-0.60, 0.66)	
- Total level of tolerance score	0.06 (-0.67, 0.72)	

8 We asked the respondents to rate their financial situation in three different years representing the period prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (2019), during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020), and at the current situation (between January to April 2021). In general, respondents reported being more satisfied with their financial situation in 2019 (median 6, IQR 5 and 8) in comparison to the situation in 2020 (median 4, IQR 2 and 6) and 2021 (median 5, IQR 2 and 7).

Our tolerance measure is generated from a total of 39 items, consisting 18 items related with social tolerance and 21 items related with political tolerance. Social tolerance is measured using three main attitudinal indicators towards the different others or the outgroups, which include (1) respect towards the outgroups' ways of life or life choices, (2) willingness to accept the outgroups as neighbors, and (3) acknowledgement to the out-groups' right to conduct economic activities. Meanwhile, political tolerance is measured using three main attitudinal indicators, including (1) acknowledgement to the outgroups' right to stand as a candidate at elections, (2) to be part of political organizations and (3) social organizations. To maintain contextuality, we use the findings from the policy review and the case studies to select the outgroups in question, which are people of a different religion and ethnicity, the followers of indigenous faiths (*penghayat*)[9], homosexuals as a proxy for the LGBTQI+ community, unmarried couples living together, and the followers of Ahmadiyya. These outgroups are not only known as those who simply have different values and beliefs, but whose very values and beliefs have not been approved by the society and thus have been seen as threats to society's own values and beliefs. In terms of political tolerance, we also include women to examine whether gender difference influences the provision of their social and political rights by the society. As seen in Table 3 above, scores for both tolerance measures are combined and then transformed into a standardized z-score with a mean of 0 and standard deviation (SD) of 1, where a higher score is associated with a higher level of tolerance. Our analysis suggests that the tolerance measure is reliable and has a good internal consistency.[10]

The median of the total score is 0.06 (IQR -0.67 and 0.72), indicating that the respondents who are representative of the voters in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya are only slightly tolerant. Meanwhile, the median for the social tolerance is lower than political tolerance (Table 1), but both are strongly correlated (r=0.83, p value=0.001) in a sense that higher social tolerance score usually correlates with higher political tolerance score.

Predictors of tolerance

Our first multivariate regression model examines the associations of selected covariates and tolerance level to identify the predictors of tolerance. Figure 2 below shows a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) to represent a graphical illustration of how the models were built in the analysis. We use the social, political and total tolerance scores as outcome variables and run three separate regression models by including all covariates in the analysis. Table 4 demonstrates that living in urban areas, years of schooling, and satisfaction with the current economic conditions are positively associated with social tolerance (Model 1) and total tolerance (Model 3), whereas age and years of schooling are positively associated with political tolerance (Model 2) controlling for other variables in the specified models.

The covariates include gender, age, education, marital status, primary activity in the past month, residential area (i.e., urban, rural), satisfaction with the current financial condition, as well as affiliations with religious organization and political party.

Figure 2. DAG representing associations of covariates and tolerance

9 In Indonesia, there are many traditional societies who still value and practice traditional or indigenous faiths (called as *penghayat*). In West Java, some of the *penghayat* groups are known as Sunda Wiwitan, Djawa Sunda, Buhun, Kejawen, and many more.
10 The coefficient of the Cronbach's alpha for the total score is 0.903. See Table X below for further details.

Table 4. Estimates from regression analyses indicating predictors of tolerance

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Social tolerance	Political tolerance	Total tolerance
	coef/se	coef/se	coef/se
Age	0.003	0.010**	0.006
	0.004	0.004	0.004
Male	0.115	0.115	0.120
	0.101	0.103	0.102
Married	-0.069	-0.115	-0.096
	0.114	0.116	0.115
Working	0.042	0.023	0.034
	0.106	0.107	0.106
Urban	0.322***	0.189	0.267**
	0.106	0.108	0.106
Years of schooling	0.071***	0.083***	0.081***
	0.017	0.018	0.017
Satisfaction economic condition	0.051***	0.030	0.042**
	0.019	0.019	0.019
Affiliate with religious organization	-0.157	-0.107	-0.138
	0.105	0.107	0.105
Affiliate with political party	-0.051	-0.057	-0.056
	0.109	0.111	0.110
Constant	-1.191***	-1.348***	-1.329***
	0.256	0.261	0.257
R^2	0.132	0.103	0.125
Number of observations	400	400	400

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Using the same regression models, the following Figure 3-5 provide a graphical illustration of the linear association between selected variables and tolerance score. As shown in Table 4, we find education is positively associated with tolerance score in both domains and the total score. For example, an additional one-year increase in years of schooling is associated with a 0.071 SD increase in social tolerance score. Estimates from the predictive margins show that respondents whose education level is 10 years or more tend to have more positive attitude about tolerance (Figure 3). Similarly, respondents' level of satisfaction with the current economic condition is shown to have a linear association with social tolerance (Figure 4), with an average of 0.051 SD increase in social tolerance score for every additional one level increase in satisfaction with economic condition. Moreover, a one-year increase in age is associated with a 0.010 SD increase in political tolerance score (Figure 5).



Figure 3. Predictive margins of the average social tolerance score by years of schooling



Figure 4. Predictive margins of the average social tolerance score by satisfaction with the current economic condition



Figure 5. Predictive margins of the average political tolerance score by age

Level of tolerance and voting preference

Previous studies show that tolerance toward the outgroups could be associated with voting preference (Endressen & Kersten, 2020; Soderborg & Muhtadi, 2021). As an example, attitudes toward religious outgroups may influence personal preference to vote for candidates from the same religion or candidates from religious-based political parties (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018). Cultural attachment may also influence individual decisions to choose candidates from the same ethnic background (Erawaty & Salamah, 2021). Additionally, voting preference may be influenced by personal biases towards specific gender groups (Windari & Suryadi, 2022). The following analysis examine the associations of tolerance and voting preference in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya.



Figure 6. DAG representing associations of tolerance and voters' preference controlling for covariates

In doing the analysis, we generate four preference groups, which are attributed to candidates' profile at different levels of local elections, ranging from the gubernatorial election at the provincial level, the mayoral/head of district election at the municipal/district level, the local parliamentary election, and the head of village election.



Figure 7. Voting preferences for each level of local election

As seen in Figure 7 above, our findings suggest that, across all election levels, the majority of respondents would prefer candidates from the same religion, the same ethnicity, those who are male, or those who are affiliated to religion-based political parties. Compared to the other types of election, the gubernatorial election has the highest level of agreement.

We then analyze a combination of the afore-mentioned preferences. Figure 8 below suggests that 40% of respondents would prefer to choose a candidate who has the same religion and ethnicity, male, and affiliation with a religious-based political party for gubernatorial election. The percentage of respondents who have the same preference for mayoral or head of district candidates is slightly higher (48%).



Figure 8. Percentage of respondents reported prioritizing co-ethnics and co-gender during elections

If voters tend to elect co-ethnics and co-gender, then it is understandable why elected leaders would prioritize policies who are seen as beneficial for their co-ethnics and co-gender even if it is exclusionary to the minorities.

Our final analysis suggests that tolerance is a protective factor for voting preference. Controlling for other variables in the model, people with a higher level of tolerance are less likely to vote for candidates from the same religion (Tabel 5) or ethnic background (Table 6). They are also less likely to vote for candidates only on the basis of specific gender preference, which tend to be male compared to female candidates (Table 7). Lastly, people with a higher level of tolerance are less likely to choose candidates from religious-based political parties compared to nationalist political parties (Table 8). This positive result implies that tolerance may reduce potential prejudicial attitudes towards the outgroups in choosing candidates at elections.

Table 5. Associations of tolerance and voter's preference to choose candidate from the same religion

	Governor			Major/Head of District			Local Parliament			Village Head		
	OR	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***
Tolerance	0.668	0.099	0.006	0.643	0.099	0.004	0.602	0.089	0.001	0.657	0.105	0.008
Age	1.005	0.013	0.688	0.993	0.013	0.574	0.983	0.012	0.155	0.980	0.013	0.121
Male	1.069	0.311	0.819	1.049	0.316	0.875	0.821	0.228	0.479	0.882	0.276	0.687
Married	0.858	0.286	0.645	1.043	0.357	0.902	1.603	0.502	0.132	1.578	0.552	0.193
Working	0.978	0.296	0.942	0.906	0.287	0.756	0.857	0.252	0.599	1.021	0.334	0.950
Urban	0.762	0.250	0.408	0.469	0.179	0.047	0.550	0.185	0.075	0.270	0.125	0.005
Years of schooling	0.962	0.051	0.469	0.957	0.053	0.431	0.923	0.048	0.121	0.969	0.055	0.584
Satisfaction economic condition	0.982	0.054	0.744	0.977	0.056	0.680	1.013	0.054	0.813	0.988	0.058	0.832
Affiliate with religious organization	1.241	0.391	0.493	1.468	0.501	0.261	1.190	0.363	0.569	0.902	0.308	0.764
Affiliate with political party	1.147	0.376	0.675	1.501	0.527	0.248	1.542	0.502	0.183	2.338	0.898	0.027
Constant	8.127	6.414	0.008	18.085	15.380	0.001	19.706	15.635	0.000	34.397	32.173	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.043			0.077			0.089		0.094	0.109		

Table 6. Associations of tolerance and voter's preference to choose candidate from the same ethnicit

	Governor			Major/Head of District			Local Parliament			Village Head		
	OR	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***
Tolerance	0.843	0.101	0.156	0.788	0.096	0.050	0.769	0.094	0.031	0.812	0.101	0.094
Age	0.969	0.010	0.002	0.969	0.010	0.002	0.971	0.010	0.004	0.964	0.010	0.001
Male	1.141	0.268	0.574	1.179	0.277	0.485	1.229	0.290	0.381	1.003	0.243	0.990
Married	1.477	0.393	0.143	1.423	0.378	0.184	1.415	0.375	0.190	1.519	0.418	0.128
Working	0.746	0.184	0.235	0.781	0.193	0.317	0.871	0.214	0.573	0.875	0.224	0.601
Urban	0.618	0.160	0.063	0.776	0.199	0.323	0.635	0.164	0.078	0.511	0.143	0.016
Years of schooling	0.818	0.036	0.000	0.830	0.036	0.000	0.838	0.037	0.000	0.878	0.039	0.003
Satisfaction economic condition	0.988	0.044	0.790	0.998	0.045	0.960	0.938	0.042	0.151	0.990	0.046	0.831
Affiliate with religious organization	0.974	0.239	0.914	1.058	0.262	0.819	1.184	0.293	0.496	1.068	0.277	0.798
Affiliate with political party	1.177	0.306	0.531	1.593	0.422	0.079	1.372	0.359	0.227	1.798	0.499	0.035
Constant	48.217	32.622	0.000	31.048	20.719	0.000	34.608	23.316	0.000	36.128	25.175	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.093			0.084			0.099			0.084		

Table 7. Associations of tolerance and voter's preference to choose male candidate over female

	Governor			Major/Head of District			Local Parliament			Village Head		
	OR	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***
Tolerance	0.709	0.085	0.004	0.706	0.084	0.004	0.672	0.080	0.001	0.714	0.085	0.005
Age	0.982	0.010	0.062	0.985	0.010	0.115	0.988	0.009	0.201	0.974	0.010	0.007
Male	2.028	0.475	0.003	1.795	0.418	0.012	1.753	0.400	0.014	1.565	0.364	0.054
Married	1.575	0.409	0.080	1.507	0.387	0.111	1.451	0.367	0.142	1.401	0.363	0.193
Working	1.191	0.283	0.462	1.185	0.281	0.472	1.014	0.237	0.953	1.489	0.354	0.094
Urban	0.776	0.193	0.307	0.837	0.207	0.471	0.747	0.180	0.227	0.898	0.221	0.663
Years of schooling	1.038	0.042	0.354	0.996	0.040	0.927	0.979	0.039	0.592	0.949	0.039	0.201
Satisfaction economic condition	1.033	0.046	0.463	1.029	0.045	0.515	1.021	0.044	0.631	1.036	0.046	0.426
Affiliate with religious organization	0.827	0.201	0.435	0.883	0.214	0.607	1.025	0.243	0.916	0.969	0.235	0.898
Affiliate with political party	1.690	0.432	0.040	1.399	0.355	0.185	1.314	0.325	0.269	1.448	0.368	0.146
Constant	1.039	0.628	0.950	1.600	0.964	0.436	1.685	1.001	0.379	3.174	1.923	0.057
Pseudo R^2	0.059			0.047			0.053			0.055		

Table 8. Associations of tolerance and voter's preference to choose candidate from religious party over national party

	Governor			Major/Head of District			Local Parliament			Village Head		
	OR	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***	**OR**	**SE**	***P***
Tolerance	0.796	0.093	0.051	0.821	0.099	0.104	0.727	0.089	0.009	0.755	0.093	0.022
Age	0.975	0.010	0.011	0.970	0.010	0.004	0.967	0.010	0.001	0.966	0.010	0.001
Male	1.156	0.266	0.530	1.090	0.258	0.717	1.047	0.245	0.846	1.187	0.281	0.471
Married	1.756	0.457	0.030	1.956	0.524	0.012	2.327	0.625	0.002	1.708	0.458	0.046
Working	0.934	0.225	0.776	0.813	0.203	0.406	0.736	0.183	0.216	0.783	0.196	0.329
Urban	0.683	0.171	0.128	0.587	0.155	0.044	0.578	0.150	0.035	0.763	0.199	0.300
Years of schooling	0.971	0.040	0.466	0.892	0.038	0.008	0.935	0.039	0.107	0.921	0.039	0.053
Satisfaction economic condition	0.953	0.042	0.273	0.938	0.043	0.157	0.989	0.044	0.797	0.942	0.043	0.185
Affiliate with religious organization	1.259	0.308	0.347	1.495	0.380	0.113	1.138	0.284	0.605	1.216	0.308	0.439
Affiliate with political party	1.601	0.411	0.067	1.517	0.405	0.119	1.511	0.398	0.117	1.752	0.472	0.037
Constant	5.216	3.248	0.008	18.908	12.668	0.000	10.692	6.935	0.000	15.625	10.342	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.054			0.089			0.087			0.074		

Conclusion and recommendations

This study suggests that exclusion, discrimination, and even violence against minority groups in Indonesia, particularly in West Java, are also caused by the presence of morality-based policies at the subnational level. Our close-reading on 121 out of 8,278 policies taken at the municipal (*kota*) and district (*kabupaten*) level in West Java, as well as on various online news articles about incidents of violence against minorities in the province between 2004-2019 discovers that these policies tend to target four minority groups—i.e., the sexual and gender minorities, especially the LGBTQI+ people, and faith-based minorities, which are the indigenous faith believers, the Ahmadiyya communities, and the non-Muslim communities. However, the sexual and gender minorities and the faith-based minorities seem to experience different patterns of exclusion. **Whereas exclusion against the faith-based minorities tend to be top-down, spilling over from state policies to the societal and communal levels, exclusion against the sexual and gender minorities tend to follow a bottom-up pattern, scaling up from the societal and communal levels to the state level.** This is probably the reason why exclusionary morality policies against the faith-based minorities are often a result of vertical policy learning, in which subnational policies are made as a follow-up to similar policies at the national level. Meanwhile, exclusionary morality policies against the sexual and gender minorities are more of a result of horizontal policy learning, in which local governments are inspired to emulate successful attempts by local governments in other provinces, districts, or cities in passing exclusionary policies to gather support from the majority voters. This is also perhaps the reason why initiatives to pass exclusionary policies against sexual and gender minorities are more salient during election time.

Initiatives to adopt exclusionary morality policies nonetheless do not start by themselves. Our studies on the making of exclusionary morality policies in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya highlight three agenda-setting pathways in exclusionary morality policy-making. First, the government-led policy making, in which the executive leaders become the agenda-setter. These leaders usually rely on the vote of the majority and have made promises to include pro-majority agenda on their policies, which may be achieved through the adoption of exclusionary morality policies among others. It is very common for these leaders to use the regional development plan to translate their pro-majority agenda into policies. Second, the party-led policy-making, in which political parties aim at maintaining their political influence by making an appeal to the majority, including by proposing potentially exclusionary morality policies. **Policy modeling and public rallies are often used as a way to justify the adoption of exclusionary morality policies.** Third, the religious groups-led policy making, in which initiatives to adopt exclusionary morality policies come from conservative religion-based organizations, especially those with the authority to issue Islamic legal rulings or pronouncements (*fatwa*).

However, initiatives to adopt exclusionary morality policies may not be successful without the support of intolerant voters. Our survey suggests that the residents in the cities and districts of Bogor and Tasikmalaya are only slightly tolerant, and that they tend to prefer to vote for candidates who share similar religious or ethnic background, who are male, or who are affiliated to religious-based parties. This preference to vote for co-ethnics and co-gender is higher for elections at the municipal and district levels, which means that people tend to consider identity background of the candidates more than their programmatic views during elections.

In the long term, the presence of exclusionary policies impedes efforts to achieve better democratic quality, **which is also determined by the ability of democratic procedures and mechanisms to guarantee equal rights, participation, and representation—or inclusive and full citizenship rights** (Stokke, 2017) for all citizens regardless of their age, physical and mental ability, race and ethnicity, religion, gender and sexual identity, and socio-economic status. The following measures must be taken to eliminate the exclusionary impact of existing policies and to prevent other exclusionary policies from being adopted in the future.

1. The provincial government of West Java with assistance from the Ministry of Home Affairs must establish a special committee or task force to **review all exclusionary policies** at the national and local levels. This special committee or task force must involve members of the marginalized groups and/or representatives from pro-inclusion civil society organizations in its review processes. The results of the review must be made public. After the completion of the review, the special committee or task force must work with the relevant government agencies both at the national and local levels to eliminate the exclusionary impact of existing policies by (a) revoking all exclusionary executive orders and decrees, while authorizing new ones that are more inclusive to the marginalized groups, (b) collaborating with pro-inclusion civil society organizations to submit all exclusionary national and local laws for judicial review at the Constitutional Court, and (c) working with the House of Representatives at the national and local levels to replace the said exclusionary laws with new legal instruments that are more inclusive to the marginalized groups.

2. Pro-inclusion civil society organizations must collaborate with the government and political parties at the local level to train government officials and politicians on inclusive citizenship and local governance. **Training government officials and politicians** on how to center non-discriminatory policies and mainstream social inclusion in governmental programs and electoral platforms are very crucial because the extent to which democratic governance can guarantee equal recognition, rights, participation, and representation for all citizens eventually rely on everyday local bureaucracies and electoral politics.

3. Pro-inclusion civil society organizations also need to work with election offices at the local level to **create electoral regulations** discouraging local politicians and political parties from using exclusionary platforms and messages in their campaigns.

4. Pro-inclusion civil society organizations must collaborate with the other elements of civil society, such as schools and universities or mass media, to **cultivate public awareness and support** for any advocacy efforts to center non-discriminatory policies and mainstream social inclusion in local governance. For example, this could be done by organizing public engagement events involving marginalized groups, designing social inclusion training for journalists and students, and encouraging policy dialogues with the public as a standard procedure in policy-making.

5. International donors must support efforts to strengthen local democracy by supporting pro-inclusion civil society organizations not only in executing the above policy recommendations but also in improving **their organizing capacity** to allow for the creation of a critical mass for inclusive local democracy and governance.

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