

Citizen engagement in times of polycrisis: Learning from Ukraine's communities during Russia's Full-Scale Invasion

Oleksandra Keudel*, Andrii Darkovich*, Tetiana Lukeria*, Danyil Karakai**,
Ruslana Moskotina**

KSE

Kyiv
School of
Economics



* Kyiv School of Economics Center for Democratic Resilience

** Kyiv School of Economics Sociological Research Center

Copyright © ICLD 2026

Thanks to the support of the Swedish International Cooperation Agency SIDA, no permission is required to teach with, download, or make copies of this material.

Frontpage Photo: Representatives of local self-government authorities in Zhytomyr region at the information event on deliberative democracy. BRIDGE Project. April 2025

ISBN: 978-91-86725-80-8

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	8
Introduction	9
Methodology and Analytical Framework	11
Mixed-Methods Research Design	11
Defining and operationalizing citizen participation	15
Push and Pull of Citizen Participation: The Hypotheses	18
Citizen participation during war: exploratory findings from citizens' perspective	20
Participation trajectories	20
War as a barrier to participation in the most affected regions	21
Other obstacles and opportunities for citizen participation during war: psychological, technical and procedural considerations	23
Digital solutions for participation accessibility: opportunity with caveats	25
Political efficacy and citizen participation: the strongest link	26
Operationalization of political efficacy: external and internal forms	26
Perception that participation yields results matters most for overall participation	27
Perception that authorities listen does not link to citizens' participation intensity but matters for their trust in local government	30
Political efficacy matters irrespective of types of citizen participation	32
Political efficacy trumps regional legacies and sociodemographic characteristics	33
Satisfaction with governance outcomes: positive but weak link to administrative participation	35
Operationalization of governance outcomes, administrative participation and expectations	35
Satisfaction, not grievance, is positively associated with citizen participation	35
Trust as predictor of citizen participation: no significant link	37
Trust variables and expectations	37
Trust in local government does not predict citizen participation patterns	37
Personal stakes in citizen participation: exploratory findings	40
LSG communication, feedback and citizen participation	41
Hypotheses and operationalization for vignette study	41
Detailed procedural information discourages less-educated participants and those in doubt	42
Social proof, monetary compensation, and regularity: mixed results	44
Feedback quality positively shapes willingness to participate in the future: exploratory survey results	45
Conclusion: LSGs' responsiveness is central to citizens' attitudes to participation	46
Why do citizens choose to participate in local decision-making and co-production?	46
How can democratic local institutions mitigate low citizen participation?	48
Recommendations	49
Bibliography	52
Annexes	56

List of acronyms

CSO	Civil society organization
FGD	Focus-group discussion
KSE	Kyiv School of Economics
LSG	Local self-government

List of Tables

Table 1 Summary of methods	12
Table 2 Operationalization of citizen participation	16
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of citizen participation measures in the survey samples	17
Table 4 Political efficacy: operationalization	26
Table 5 Descriptive overview of political efficacy variables	26
Table 6 Operationalization of trust	37
Table 7 Conceptualization and operationalization of variables for the vignette study	42
Table 8 Regional descriptive statistics for the survey 1 sample	56
Table 9 Language counts and percentages by region for the survey 1 sample	56
Table 10 Language counts and percentages by region for the survey 2 sample	56
Table 11 Subgroup contrasts for reported war effects and participation barriers	57
Table 12 Adjusted logistic models for key subgroup contrasts	58
Table 13 Factors in the vignette	60
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics for Political Efficacy Indicators	66
Table 15 Spearman Correlations Between Participation Intensity and Political Efficacy Indicators	66
Table 16 Key Spearman correlations with participation outcomes	66
Table 17 Model Fit Across Nested OLS Specifications Predicting Overall Participation Intensity	66
Table 18 Detailed OLS model coefficients. Dependent variable: overall intensity of participation	67
Table 19 Main regression results. M6 with Overall Breadth as the dependent variable. M7 as Overall Intensity.	68
Table 20 Model fit	68
Table 21 Political efficacy indicators as separate predictors of overall participation intensity	68
Table 22 Nested efficacy models predicting future willingness to participate	69
Table 23 Efficacy plus demographic controls: full coefficient table	69
Table 24 Political efficacy items as separate predictors of future willingness with demographic controls	69
Table 25 Model fit of conclusion models	73
Table 26 Full regression model of future participation willingness	74

List of Figures

Figure 1 Research questions	9
Figure 2 Survey 1 sample at a glance	13
Figure 3 Survey 2 Sample at a glance	14
Figure 4 Respondents' reported participation trajectories	21
Figure 5 Self-reported effects of the full-scale Russian invasion on participation patterns	22
Figure 6 Gender-based differences in self-reported effects of the full-scale Russian invasion on participation patterns	22
Figure 7 Largest regional and age differences in self-reported effects of the full-scale Russian invasion on one's participation	23
Figure 8 Largest regional and age differences in self-reported barriers to one's participation	24
Figure 9 OLS coefficients for efficacy indices and citizen participation	27
Figure 10 Political efficacy and citizen participation relationship	28
Figure 11 OLS regression coefficients for political efficacy indicators predicting overall participation intensity	29
Figure 12 Political efficacy and future willingness across parsimonious and full models	30
Figure 13 OLS regression coefficients for political efficacy indicators predicting trust in LSG & local democracy satisfaction	31
Figure 14 Political efficacy and alternative (non-institutional) forms of citizen participation	32
Figure 15 Political efficacy and types of citizen participation	33
Figure 16 OLS models fit for participation intensity across nested specifications	33
Figure 17 Regional differences shrink after adding personal characteristics and political efficacy	34
Figure 18 Administrative participation rises with satisfaction, not with grievance	35
Figure 19 Observed administrative participation by satisfaction and grievance score	36
Figure 20 Correlations between governance outcome indicators and participation types	36
Figure 21 Trust and overall citizen participation	37
Figure 22 Trust and citizen participation types	38
Figure 23 OLS coefficient for trust in local government before and after adding political efficacy variables	38
Figure 24 Trust in local government and institutional vs alternative citizen participation	39
Figure 25 Estimated effect of each invitation element on willingness to attend a public hearing: OLS regression	43
Figure 26 Average marginal effects of each feature on the probability of low, medium, and high willingness to attend the public hearing	44
Figure 27 Feedback quality and future willingness to participate	45
Figure 28 Explained variance across nested OLS models predicting overall participation intensity	46
Figure 29 Standardized coefficients from the full OLS model predicting overall participation intensity	47
Figure 30 Standardized coefficients from the full OLS model predicting future participation	48
Figure 31 Distribution of the outcome variable	60
Figure 32 Predicted willingness to attend the public hearing with and without information provision, by respondent education, political efficacy, and age group	63
Figure 33 Moderation of invitation elements' effects on willingness to attend a public hearing, by respondent characteristics	64
Figure 34 Moderation of invitation elements' effects on willingness to attend a public hearing, by respondent characteristics	65

Acknowledgements

This report is prepared within the ICLD-funded project “Citizen engagement in times of polycrisis: Learning from Ukraine’s communities during Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion” (2025-2026). The authors gratefully recognize Sylvia Nitsova for peer review of the vignette experiment, and thank Valentyn Hatsko for his input into the design of the vignette experiment. We also acknowledge the use of data collected through the USAID Hoverla-funded project by KSE Institute, conducted in 2024.

We thank Danylo Yashchuk for research assistance and Anastasiia Romaniuk, Elyzaveta Cherkes, Tetiana Vodotyka, and Mariana Kuzemska-Danyliuk for supporting the validation event. We are also grateful to participants in the ICLD Democratic Resilience Network for taking part in exploratory interviews, and to all representatives of local authorities and civil society in Ukraine who took part in the validation event.

Preface



By Johan Lilja, Secretary General, Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy

The Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD) is committed to strengthening local democracy and promoting sustainable development by supporting knowledge exchange, capacity-building, and municipal partnerships. Our research programme plays an important role in this mission, generating evidence and practical tools that can help local governments to strengthen their capacity relating to advancing inclusive and participatory governance, improved transparency and accountability.

This report has been produced in conjunction with ICLD's Knowledge Centre and is the 39th report to be published in ICLD's Research Reports series. It is a result of the research project that was financed by ICLD in the spring of 2025, following the call for proposals *From local to global – challenges and opportunities for local democracy in times of crisis*.

This research asks why people choose to take part in local democracy, even during a war. Since 2014, Ukraine's decentralisation reforms have built a vibrant local democracy, and many participatory practices have continued, in adapted forms, throughout Russia's full-scale invasion. The researchers combined case studies in eight municipalities, two surveys with more than 2,200 respondents, an experiment and seven focus groups with citizens.

An interesting finding here is that people participate when they believe it brings results. This matters more than trust in local government, satisfaction with services or which region people live in. The research shows that the perception that authorities

listen does not relate to participation intensity but on the other hand it does matter for citizens' trust in local government and satisfaction with local democracy. The result indicates that listening and feedback after citizens participation matter for trust in local government and matters for citizens future willingness to participate in a citizen dialogue forum.

This research report shows that local governments hold the key to citizen participation, even in times of crisis. Every time citizens see their input shape a decision, the next invitation is more likely to be accepted. This should encourage local governments to link their decisions clearly to citizens' input, explain what happens next, and be honest when proposals cannot be implemented. I thank the researchers and, above all, the citizens and local officials who shared their experiences under extraordinary circumstances. I hope this report inspires local governments, in Ukraine and elsewhere around the world, to make participation count.

Visby, Sweden

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Johan Lilja', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Johan Lilja,
Secretary General, ICLD
September 2026

Executive Summary

Citizen participation has substantial normative appeal as a response to the “global polycrisis,” a set of overlapping crises—including climate change, global pandemics, and Russia’s war on Ukraine—that destabilize the international system. It strengthens societal resilience through bottom-up, contextual responses and addresses democratic deficits by reducing political alienation, fostering ownership of collective outcomes, ensuring minority perspectives are heard, and aligning public services with citizens’ preferences. Despite these benefits, the lack of citizen participation remains a critical problem. Existing approaches that focus on “widening” and “deepening” participatory tools overlook citizens’ agency and the importance they place on responsiveness and transparency. This study therefore shifts the perspective to ask why citizens choose to participate in local democracy, rather than why participation is lacking.

Our study investigates two research questions: what predicts citizens’ willingness to participate in local democracy, and how citizens map and evaluate local government strategies that encourage or discourage participation during wartime conditions. We examine these questions in Ukraine during the full-scale Russian invasion, a context marked by high physical insecurity, mental and physical strain, and geopolitical uncertainty. At the same time, Ukraine’s decentralization and open-government reforms since 2014 have created a well-functioning local democracy with varied participatory practices, many of which continued—though adapted—during the war. This combination of vibrant democratic institutions and multiple overlapping crises makes Ukraine a relevant case for understanding participation under uncertainty.

Methodologically, we employ a mixed-methods design comprising qualitative case studies, two surveys, a vignette experiment, and citizen focus groups, capturing both local officials’ and citizens’ perceptions and practices of democratic participation under war conditions.

Our findings unfold along two strands. First, citizens report dual and regionally varied effects of war on participation: people in directly affected regions avoided in-person meetings because of insecurity and reduced their participation in local decision-making due to stress

and overload. At the same time, those farther from the frontlines reported more frequent participation related to providing security, aid, and recovery efforts, and serving community needs.

Second, we find that two political efficacy variables are positively and significantly associated with citizen participation: one’s perception that participation yields results (a component of external efficacy), followed by one’s confidence in having the skills and knowledge to participate (a component of internal efficacy). One’s perception that participation yields results is most strongly associated with participation intensity, regardless of respondents’ regional legacies and socio-demographic characteristics. Thus, what local authorities do with citizen participation outputs matters for citizens’ willingness to participate in local democracy. At the same time, our vignette experiment showed that simply promising participants that their input would be used for budget and strategy planning has no effect on willingness to participate in a public hearing. One possible reason is that people’s sense of participation yielding results comes from actual experience, not from promises. As a result, simply stating that results would be incorporated in the future did not change responses.

The perception that authorities listen does not relate to participation intensity but does matter for citizens’ trust in local government and satisfaction with local democracy. Thus, listening and feedback after citizens’ participation matter for trust in local government. At the same time, feedback matters for one’s future willingness to participate.

Finally, our expectation that critical citizens would be active citizens was not confirmed. We expected that citizens dissatisfied with public service quality and less trusting of local governments would engage for the sake of accountability and control; we rejected both hypotheses.

The report concludes with recommendations, based on the mixed-methods study and a validation event with LSGs and civil society in Kyiv, on steps to increase citizens’ perception and experience that participation brings results.

Introduction

Citizen participation has substantial normative appeal as a treatment for the “global polycrisis,” an ongoing set of overlapping crises, such as climate change, global pandemics, and Russia’s War on Ukraine, that is pushing the international system into a volatile state (Lawrence et al., 2024). On the one hand, **building societal resilience** to these crises increasingly requires bottom-up citizen engagement to enable more targeted, contextual responses (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; Eun, 2024; Stark and Taylor, 2014). Evidence from Ukraine indeed shows that collaborative governance significantly enhances a community’s ability to respond effectively to shocks such as war (Keudel et al., 2024).

On the other hand, involving citizens in decision-making can help **address the democratic deficit** (Alizada et al., 2021), compounded by a sequence of crises and responses, such as the financial crisis of 2008 or the global pandemic of 2019-2021, which substantially reduced the legitimacy of democracy as a political system. Citizen participation can do this by reducing political alienation, fostering a sense of ownership over collective outcomes, and, through deliberation, ensuring policies reflective of the minority perspective (Michels & de Graaf, 2010; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004 Dryzek & List, 2003). Participation in service planning can address social inequalities by aligning policies with public preferences, increasing their acceptance, and empowering marginalized

groups. (Bovaird, 2007) (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995), thereby deepening democratic legitimacy (Michels & de Graaf, 2010).

Consequently, the **lack of citizen participation emerges as a critical problem**. Yet, it is typically solved by “widening” and “deepening” participatory *tools* (Fung, 2015; Fung and Wright, 2003; McGee et al., 2003), which is too limited an approach considering that citizens also pay attention to the responsiveness and transparency of a political system (Lammert and Vormann, 2020). This emphasis on the supply side of citizen participation neglects citizens’ agency, even though some research points to the importance of “citizens’ attention, willingness, and capability” (Oh and Lim, 2017, p. 697) as much as the availability of participatory mechanisms.

This study therefore shifts the perspective to **place citizens at the center of explanation** by asking why they choose to participate in local democracy, rather than why citizen participation is lacking. Specifically, this study tested the predictors of citizens’ willingness to participate in local democracy and asked them to map and evaluate local government strategies for encouraging or discouraging participation in times of war, when multiple war-related crises heighten uncertainty. The study addressed two **research questions** (Figure 1):




Figure 1 Research questions

Empirically, this study focuses on Ukraine during the full-scale Russian invasion for two reasons.

First, by examining citizen participation in local democracy in Ukraine during the full-scale Russian invasion, we test whether the mechanisms that foster citizen participation also work during war, a distinct context marked by high physical insecurity, mental and physical strain, and geopolitical uncertainty. We also conduct exploratory probes into citizens' own interpretations of wartime conditions and their meaning for participatory patterns. Second, since 2014, Ukraine's decentralization and open government reforms have made it a fairly well-functioning local democracy with varied forms and levels of citizen participation. From this perspective, Ukraine is a case of vibrant local democracy within a conducive governance framework for citizen participation, yet facing multiple overlapping crises stemming from a full-scale Russian invasion. During the war, many participatory practices remained in place, though adapted; by the time of the study, society had moved past wartime emergency mobilization. This makes the findings transferable to other societies not under an existential threat from war but still experiencing uncertainty and volatile citizen participation.

Indeed, Ukraine's multi-level governance system generally supports local democracy. The decentralization reform, which began in 2014, changed the territorial organization of government and brought public services closer to citizens. The number of territorial communities (hromadas) fell from 11,250 to 1,469, and the number of districts fell from 490 to 136, while all 24 regions remained unchanged. Decentralization strengthened local self-government by expanding powers and fiscal autonomy (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2014; OECD, 2018). This created conditions for civic participation in local decision-making, including transparency, accountability, and public trust (Aasland and Lyska, 2020; Arends et al., 2023; TI Ukraine, n.d.).

The Russian full-scale invasion has altered civic participation in Ukraine. Digital and hybrid formats are becoming more popular among LSGs in response to the physical insecurity due to war and the Russian

occupation of part of Ukrainian territory, the forced displacement of people, and municipal authorities (Association for Self-Organization of Population, 2026). Some previously popular formats, such as participatory budgeting, were halted because they are seen as a wartime luxury (Transparent Cities, 2026).

Emergency response at the local level has been marked by cross-sectoral cooperation and citizen engagement, when LSGs and volunteer networks jointly addressed immediate crises, such as evacuations, humanitarian aid, and internal displacement, which drove perceptions and expectations of cooperation to high levels (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023; Keudel et al., 2024). However, over time, participation levels returned to pre-invasion levels: around 5% of the population de facto uses institutional channels of local democracy (Center for Innovations Development, 2025). Previous studies, however, found that participants reported conflicts and a lack of trust in engagement with local authorities (Darkovich and Hatsko, 2024; Hatsko and Darkovich, 2024).

Methodologically, the study uses a mixed-methods design comprising qualitative case studies, surveys, a vignette experiment, and citizen focus groups capturing local public officials' and citizens' perceptions and practices of democratic participation under war conditions.

This study makes two key findings. First, citizens report dual and regionally varied effects of war on their participation patterns. While people in directly affected regions reported avoiding in-person meetings because of physical insecurity and having less capacity to participate because of stress and overload, people in regions farther from the frontlines reported significantly more frequent participation for security, aid and recovery, and one's community. Second, we find the strongest connection between citizens' willingness to participate in local democracy and external political efficacy - the belief that participation brings results and that authorities listen - while satisfaction with services and internal efficacy play smaller roles. These findings only partially support

our hypotheses, developed based on peacetime literature. The importance of results and authorities' responsiveness may grow during war, because citizens want their time to be meaningfully invested when survival, economic security, carework, and mental health needs compete for one's attention. Age has a modest negative effect, but regional legacies and most socio-demographic factors show no effects.

These results highlight that local authorities' handling of participation outcomes directly shapes citizens' motivation to participate in local democracy. At the same time, strategies to enhance participation show mixed effects: although citizens highlight the need for more information about participation opportunities, experimental evidence suggests that more details can discourage participation, especially among people with lower education and self-confidence. At the same time, communicating the regularity of participatory formats, monetary compensation, and social proof did not strictly improve participation chances, but it did reduce respondents' indifference. The study's most important finding is that LSGs can motivate residents to be more active and take part in local democracy if they systematically work to strengthen citizens' perception that their time and effort yield results and provide feedback on previous participation efforts.

The rest of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 1 presents our analytical framework and mixed-methods research design, including the six clusters of hypotheses, the definition of citizen participation, our case selection, and an approach to collecting and triangulating interview, focus group, survey, and experimental data. Chapter 2 presents participatory trajectories over time, barriers and opportunities for participation during the war as reported by citizens. Chapters 3-7 present the most important research results, structured around our hypotheses about the relationship between citizen participation and political efficacy (Chapter 3), satisfaction with public services and governance (Chapter 4), trust (Chapter 5), and stakes in participation (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 presents the vignette study and survey results related to LSG strategies for communicating institutional responsiveness and accessibility. Chapter 8 summarizes

the findings, and Chapter 9 offers recommendations to LSGs to leverage the most important predictors to motivate citizen participation in their communities.

Methodology and Analytical Framework

Mixed-Methods Research Design

This study used a **mixed-methods design** to ensure the internal validity of our measures and minimize potential bias in our data sources (Table 1). It comprised (1) qualitative case studies in eight purposefully selected municipalities (*hromadas*), where interviews with LSG leaders uncovered an administrative perspective on participation, (2) a survey and a vignette experiment administered to a randomly selected sample of Ukrainian citizens online to gauge associations and tap into causality, and (3) seven focus groups with residents in particularly war-affected regions of Ukraine to capture their perspectives on barriers and enablers of participation. By triangulating the findings in these three methods, our results reflect both citizens' and local public officials' perceptions of the push and pull factors of citizen participation.

We used statistical techniques (descriptive and causal) to analyze and visualize trends in the relationships among our variables of interest, drawing on survey and survey-experiment data. We used qualitative content analysis to clarify the perceptually rich data from interviews and focus groups with public officials and citizens, employing MAXQDA. We took all required steps to ensure the ethical handling of respondents' participation and data, including obtaining informed consent, protecting personal data privacy, and preventing harm. We conducted much of the engagement with respondents online to reduce war-related physical risks, as online participation is flexible and adaptable to the security situation in a respondent's municipality.

Data collection	- Two surveys and a survey experiment (vignette) with the randomly selected balanced sample of Ukrainians (n=1,218 people, online) - Exploratory interviews with LSG leaders from eight purposefully selected hromadas (online) - Seven citizen focus groups in purposefully selected hromadas, reflecting wartime uncertainty and vulnerability (59 participants aged 18-70 y.o.)
Data analysis	- Statistical methods to test hypotheses, based on survey and vignette experiment results - Content analysis of interview & focus group data with MAXQDA
Validation	- Triangulation of LSG interviews, citizen focus groups, and quantitative analysis - Validation event with 9 LSG representatives from partner municipalities (including European Democratic Resilience Network) and NGOs promoting local democracy (offline, Kyiv at KSE, 14 May 2026, see Lukeria et al 2026) - Peer review for vignette experiment design
Research ethics	- Prior approval from the KSE ethics committee was received for the survey, vignette experiment, and focus group design on 20 April 2026. Experiment participants were debriefed about its hypothetical nature. - The vignette experiment was pre-registered (Keudel et al, 2026).

Table 1 Summary of methods

Below are key details of the methods used in this study.

Method 1: Eight exploratory case studies

For exploratory case studies, we selected eight municipalities from the sample of 60 municipalities that participated in KSE's 2024 pilot study on local democracy, funded by USAID. From these 60 municipalities, we selected eight based on the dependent variable: **high levels of resident participation in local governance**. Further selection criteria were driven by our analytical framework, which sought municipalities that varied on the theoretically relevant factors (our hypotheses H1-H5). Because of the limitations of our pilot data, we selected municipalities based on variation in three of five hypotheses: service satisfaction and problem resolution for residents (H2), trust in local self-government (H4), and availability of feedback mechanisms (H1).

As a result, we arrived at four contrasting clusters of municipalities based on high/low variation in these citizen participation factors, while keeping citizen participation high across all cases. In September 2025, we conducted 8 in-depth online interviews with the heads of municipalities and local self-government

officials of the following hromadas¹: Yasynianska Settlement Hromada (Zakarpattia region, population: ~18,348); Zdolbuniv City Hromada (Rivne region, population: ~30,100); Zhovkva City Hromada (Lviv region, population: ~34,400); Safianivka Rural Hromada (Odesa region, population: ~38,349); Lubny City Hromada (Poltava region, population: ~71,836); Orzhytsia Settlement Hromada (Poltava region, population: ~15,213); Liubar Settlement Hromada (Zhytomyr region, population: ~30,900), and Korosten City Hromada (Zhytomyr region; population: ~64,365). We analyzed the data using manual, hypothesis-driven content analysis to test our hypotheses from an LSG perspective.

Method 2: Surveys and a vignette experiment

The study comprised two surveys and a vignette experiment embedded in the first survey. Survey 1 tested hypotheses derived from the literature on citizen participation (Section 1.3). Survey 2 asked exploratory questions about the impact of war on respondents' participation and clarified patterns identified in Survey 1, such as respondents' understanding and assessment of authorities' feedback and participation outcomes.

¹ Population figures are approximate and are based on publicly available information from official municipal websites and other official Ukrainian local government sources. Due to wartime population movements and the absence of an up-to-date national census, actual population figures may differ.

The sociological company Info Sapiens administered both surveys: Survey 1, with the vignette component, in April-June 2022 and Survey 2, with additional questions, in August 2022. These were not panel surveys. We collected all data through the Info Sapiens online panel, which comprises approximately 100,000 respondents and maintains balanced distributions by age, gender, and region, although it underrepresents individuals aged 45+. We acknowledge this limitation, but we chose an online panel as the best cost-benefit method to reach broader citizen groups and administer the experimental design. For each wave, Info Sapiens randomly invited respondents within the agency's internal quota framework, ensuring random

selection while preserving the panel's established demographic structure.

Survey 1 included 1,218 respondents, 1,112 of whom also participated in the vignette experiment (Figure 2). Survey 2 included 1049 respondents (Figure 3). The collected samples approximated citizen participation patterns in Ukraine, showing rather modest engagement: about 28% (Survey 1) and 25.5% (Survey 2) of respondents reported non-engagement in the past 12 months. Figure 2 and Figure 3 present the sociodemographic characteristics of both samples. Annex 1 provides descriptive statistics.




Figure 2 Survey 1 sample at a glance

Note: N= 1218



Figure 3 Survey 2 Sample at a glance

Note: N = 1049

The data collection also included a **factorial vignette experiment (factorial survey) in Survey 1**. Respondents were presented with a hypothetical scenario: an invitation to a public hearing on their community's development strategy, which set priorities for the next three years across investment, education, healthcare, and other aspects of community life. In a vignette experiment, we examined how the features of such an invitation affect citizens' stated willingness to attend a public hearing. Each vignette is defined by nine factors derived from our hypotheses and additional exploratory expectations, each with two levels, giving a full factorial of $2^9 = 512$ possible vignettes. To contain survey costs, we reduced the full factorial of 512 profiles to 12 vignettes using a

D-efficient fractional factorial design (Resolution III). This design supports estimating the main effects of the factors on willingness to participate. The selected number of 12 vignettes was the smallest number of vignettes that still achieved high D-efficiency, that is, could approximate the information contained in the full set of possible profiles. The design was between-subjects: each respondent was randomly assigned one of the 12 vignettes. We also ran a supplementary survey using two additional vignettes constructed to reduce the correlations among factors. In sum, we used 14 vignettes. The basic methodological note is available in Annex 2, and the full explanation of the vignette design is available online in Karakai & Moskotina 2026.

Method 3. Seven focus groups with citizens in regions most affected by the war

To deepen the findings from the exploratory case studies and contextualize the survey results, we conducted seven focus groups with citizens. We selected three macro-regions of Ukraine most affected by the war to capture the perceptions of people living amid high levels of everyday uncertainty: North (Chernihivska, Sumska, Kyivska oblasts), East (Kharkivska, Dnipropetrovska oblasts), and South (Mykolayivska, Zaporizka, Odeska oblasts). In total, 59 people participated in these groups: 33 women and 26 men, aged 18-70 years (mean age 41). For each macro-region, one focus group featured people with a social vulnerability characteristic - being an internally displaced person, a veteran, a single parent, or a person with a disability; another focus group featured people without such characteristics. This distinction was intentional because prior case studies showed that LSGs faced greater challenges reaching and engaging people with vulnerability characteristics, so the focus groups sought to give voice to these groups' perspectives and capture potential differences from those without vulnerability characteristics. One focus group only included IDPs from the East and South of Ukraine to capture the special circumstances of forced displacement. We analyzed the data using manual, hypothesis-driven content analysis to contextualize the findings from the survey and vignette experiment.

Defining and operationalizing citizen participation

Definition

We use a broad definition of citizen participation in local democracy that encompasses civic participation and local political participation (Meer et al., 2010), but we exclude social participation and voting or candidacy for election. This way, we focus on "citizen involvement in the administrative decision-making and management processes" (Yang and Pandey, 2011, 880 cited in Oh and Lim, 2017, 695), as well

as in shaping local policies by extra-institutional means. Therefore, we excluded informal social participation between friends and relatives and electoral participation, which occurs only once during a specific period and is not an everyday practice.

Our concept of citizen participation, hence, draws on the notions of political, administrative (Rosenzweigova et al., 2016), and civic participation, and includes the following types of citizen participation, none of them normatively better or worse than the other:

- **Consulting:** seeking non-binding input from individual citizens on policy solutions or draft legislation, such as surveys, petitions, town halls, public budget hearings, and mini-publics (Elstub and Escobar 2019, 25);
- **Dialogue:** repeated two-way consultations, such as those held by public advisory bodies, over time.
- **Partnership:** a form of co-production between citizens and local governments that entails co-shaping a public service or decision through citizens contributing ideas, knowledge, and resources (adapted from Osborne et al., 2016);
- **Direct contact:** in-person engagement between residents and decision-makers on issues of private or collective interest, such as an inquiry or complaint;
- **Protest:** contentious politics is a recognized form of political participation, manifested through demonstrations and visible collective mobilization against or in demand for a decision (Tarrow 2015)
- **Civil society:** an individual's engagement for a cause with a civil society organization (an NGO or an unregistered civic initiative), i.e. participation in associational life.

We exclude citizen informing from our definition because it is a one-way channel that local government uses to inform people about plans, expenditures,

activities, and so on (Ebdon and Franklin, 2006, 442); it is equivalent to the local democracy value of transparency. While earlier literature argued for more citizen control as a normative standard (Arnstein, 2019, 1969), later research showed that the depth of participation is contextual (Fung 2006, 67). We also recognize that participation can be symbolic (tokenist) and that there may also be non-participation (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004), so we accounted for these in the qualitative part of the study.

Operationalization for the survey and vignette experiment

We operationalized citizen participation as a list of eleven participatory actions (Table 2) in response to the question, "How often over the last 12 months have you done any of the following actions in your community?" The scale was: never, 1-2 times, 3-4 times, 5-6 times, 7 or more times.

Core concept	Participation type	Conceptualization	Operationalization (participatory action item in a survey)
Citizen participation	Direct contact	Direct individual contact with local authorities or officials.	Q9_1 personal request to the community head or local council; Q9_2 personal contact with community head; Q9_3 personal contact with local council deputies; Q9_4 personal contact with other local self-government staff.
	Consultation	Formal consultative participation initiated or organized by local authorities.	Q9_5 expressed an opinion at public meetings organized by local self-government
	Dialogue	More structured dialogue with local representatives or deliberative bodies.	Q9_6 participated as an observer or speaker in a council, commission, or working-group meeting.
	Protest	Contentious or extra-institutional participation.	Q9_7 participated in a demonstration or protest.
	Partnership / co-production	Problem-solving- or co-production-oriented participation, including participatory budgeting and civic oversight tools.	Q9_8 submitted an e-petition or participatory-budget project; Q9_10 voted for a participatory-budget project or e-petition; Q9_11 participated in civic expertise of local council decisions.
	Civil society	Participation through CSOs or community-led initiatives.	Q9_9 participated in civil-society organization initiatives.
Additional constructs	Administrative participation	The main constructed outcome for H3/H4 models.	Mean of consultation, dialogue, and partnership/co-production intensity indices.
	Institutional channels	Official or semi-official channels connected to local government institutions.	Mean of the direct contact, consultation, dialogue, and partnership/co-production intensity indices.
	Alternative participation	Non-institutional or society-led channels, used in distrust/exit hypotheses.	Mean of the protest and civil society participation intensity indexes.

Table 2 Operationalization of citizen participation

Variable	Valid N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Survey 1:					
Overall participation intensity	1207	0.108	0.140	0.000	0.900
Overall participation breadth	1207	0.289	0.293	0.000	1.000
Survey 2:					
Overall participation intensity	1049	0.120	0.158	0.000	1.000
Overall participation breadth	1049	0.306	0.310	0.000	1.000

Table 3 Descriptive statistics of citizen participation measures in the survey samples

Most of the empirical analysis in this report relies on Survey 1 data and uses **two measures of citizen participation, intensity and breadth**, to capture its different dimensions. Intensity measures participation frequency, while breadth measures the variety of forms an individual used. A respondent can have high breadth but low intensity if they have tried several participation channels once or twice. A respondent can have low breadth but high intensity if they repeatedly use a single channel. As seen in Table 3, these measures vary across our sample but tend toward lower values, reflecting overall modest citizen participation in Ukraine.

We calculated the **intensity index** as follows. First, we recoded the original response scale from 1–5 to a 0–4 frequency scale: 0 = never; 1 = 1–2 times; 2 = 3–4 times; 3 = 5–6 times; 4 = 7+ times. “Difficult to answer” was treated as missing for the index calculations. Second, for each of the eleven participatory actions (Table 2), we normalized the reported frequency to a 0–1 scale by dividing the 0–4 score by 4. Third, for each respondent, we computed the intensity index as the mean of all valid, normalized frequency scores, yielding an individual-level participation intensity measure ranging from 0 to 1. Using the same procedure (recoding, normalization, averaging), we also constructed intensity indices for each sub-category of participation and for additional constructs: protest intensity, civil society participation intensity.

We calculated the **breadth index** as follows. First, we recoded each participatory action into a binary

indicator of whether the respondent used this form of participation at least once. Any response above 0 on the recoded frequency scale was coded as 1 = participated at least once, while a response of 0 (never participated) was coded as 0. “Difficult to answer” was treated as missing for the index calculations. Second, for each respondent, we counted how many valid participatory actions they had used at least once. Third, for each respondent, we computed the breadth index as the share of valid participation items in which the respondent reported any activity, out of the list of eleven possible actions. This produced an individual-level participation breadth measure ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 means the respondent used no participation form and 1 means the respondent used all valid participation forms at least once.

Unlike the intensity index, which captures **how often** respondents participated, the breadth index captures **how many different participation** channels they used. For example, a respondent who used 3 out of 11 participation forms would receive a breadth score of 0.27. Using the same procedure, we also constructed breadth indices for each participation sub-category, including direct contact, consultation, dialogue, protest, co-production, and civil society participation.

For some of the hypotheses, we introduced additional constructs. **Administrative participation** captures only consulting, dialogue, and partnership, reflecting citizen engagement through official LSG-initiated channels. **Institutional participation** captures engagement through administrative channels and direct contact; here, the focus is on institutionalized

channels. **Alternative participation** captures all extra-institutional participatory actions in our survey, i.e., a protest and engagement in associational life through civil society organizations.

In the **vignette experiment**, the dependent variable was stated willingness to attend a public hearing after a respondent saw an invitation, measured on an 11-point scale (0 to 10).

In Survey 2, we also measured respondents' assessments of the likelihood that they will participate in decision-making in their municipality within the next 12 months, on a 0-10 scale from hardly likely to absolutely likely. We interpreted the results as **willingness to participate in the future**.

Push and Pull of Citizen Participation: The Hypotheses

In this study, we differentiated between push and pull factors of citizen participation (adapted from Börzel & Buzogány 2010). By “push,” we mean characteristics, preferences, and beliefs of individuals that enable or motivate their engagement in local democracy. By “pull,” we mean LSG strategies and participatory mechanisms, which create opportunities for citizen engagement, or LSG inaction or blockage (Berman, 1997; Moynihan, 2003). Drawing on public administration, democratic governance, and social movement literature, we acknowledge that vibrant citizen engagement combines “push” and “pull” enablers. Below, we unpack each enabler we tested quantitatively or explored qualitatively in this study:

Political Efficacy: one's sense of capacity and meaning for engagement (H1)

Within “push” enablers, existing literature proposes that, in normal circumstances, a sense of internal and external political efficacy is a fundamental positive enabler of an individual's willingness to participate in (local) democracy.

Internal political efficacy refers to an individual's belief in their own capacity to understand political issues (Lebrument et al., 2021, p. 2). This is the most

fundamental explanation of willingness to participate across different contexts and political cultures. The tested hypothesis was:

H1.1 (Internal Political Efficacy) Individuals with higher internal political efficacy will be more likely to participate in local decision-making.

External political efficacy refers to an individual's belief that their engagement can influence governance and bring tangible results (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995). This fundamental explanation of participation describes how individuals interpret the consequences of their participation and is often connected to how authorities treat citizens' input and provide feedback on its use. Further, if institutionalized participation does not bring tangible results, citizens who still want to engage in local affairs may opt for contentious politics (protest) or civic initiatives. The tested hypothesis was:

H1.2 (External Political Efficacy) Individuals with low external political efficacy will be less likely to participate in local governance through institutional channels but may engage in alternative forms of participation (e.g., grassroots mobilization and community-led initiatives).

Personal stakes (H2)

Personal stakes, broadly defined, shape participation decisions. Individuals are more likely to engage in governance when an issue directly affects their economic security, safety, or deeply held values (Neblo et al., 2010). When people perceive that a decision will impact their daily lives, participation becomes a rational investment of their time and resources. Conversely, people can have broad concerns about local development and governance or advocate for a specific group or community (Gustafson & Hertting, 2017). Hence, we propose:

H2.1 (Rational Choice Hypothesis): Citizens are more likely to participate when they expect personal or group benefits, such as material gains, networking opportunities, or political influence.

H2.2 (Collective Good Hypothesis): Citizens

are more likely to participate when they perceive participation as a means of contributing to community development and the common good, regardless of personal benefits.

Public service and governance satisfaction (H3)

Evidence on the effects of an individual's satisfaction with public service on their willingness to participate in local decision-making is contradictory and scarce. Some find that satisfaction with public services positively affects citizen engagement in smart city development (Lebrument et al., 2021, p. 7). In our 2024 pilot study in Ukraine, however, citizens who are unhappy with service quality or doubt that the community budget is managed in their interests are more likely to engage in local decision-making processes (Darkovich et al., unpublished). Therefore, we tested two contradictory hypotheses:

H3.1 (Grievance Mobilization Hypothesis):

Citizens are more likely to participate in local decision-making if they are dissatisfied with local governance outcomes.

H3.2 (Public Service Satisfaction Hypothesis):

Higher satisfaction with public services increases an individual's administrative participation in local democracy.

Trust in local governments (H4)

Some research suggests a “virtuous circle”: citizens who trust the government engage more, and those who engage more develop greater trust (Jennings & Stoker, 2004; Mizrahi & Vigoda-Gadot, 2009; Putnam, 2000; Uslander & Brown, 2005). Other research finds that trust, or distrust, in institutions can motivate and deter participation. Citizens who trust local governments may engage because they believe local governments act in their broader interests (Lind & Tyler, 198; Holum, 2022). However, some people participate precisely because they distrust the government and want to hold officials accountable (Neblo et al., 2010). Therefore, we propose:

H4.1 (Trust Hypothesis): Higher trust in local government increases the likelihood of

citizen participation, as citizens believe the local government acts in their interest generally.

H4.2 (Distrust – Engagement Hypothesis):

Lower trust in local government increases participation, as citizens engage to hold officials accountable and compensate for perceived governance failures.

H4.3 (Distrust – Exit hypothesis): Lower trust in local government will discourage participation in institutional channels but may encourage alternative engagement, such as activism, volunteering, or informal self-governance initiatives.

Institutional responsiveness (H5)

For **external political efficacy**, the LSGs' reaction becomes a decisive **pull factor**: people's sense of LSG **responsiveness** and of whether participation can yield **tangible outcomes** is shaped, at least in part, by how the LSG acts or fails to act. Indeed, research indicates that even sophisticated forms of citizen engagement (Fung, 2015, 2006) may lead to frustration because of a lack of feedback mechanisms (Michels & Graaf, 2010; Jäntti & Kurkela, 2021), resulting in disengagement (Šaparnienė et al., 2021). This occurs as local governments seem unresponsive, thereby undermining citizens' external efficacy. Furthermore, if citizen participation is disconnected from bureaucratic decision-making or occurs too late in the policy cycle, it will merely legitimize administrative decisions rather than influence them, leaving participants frustrated because they will not perceive participation outcomes as tangible (Rourke, 1984; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Therefore, we formulated:

H5 (Institutional Responsiveness Hypothesis):

Local governments can boost citizen participation by demonstrating responsiveness by incorporating citizen input into policies and providing feedback. This occurs because observing the results of one's participation influences an individual's external political efficacy (i.e., the expectation of utility).

Ensuring accessibility of the participatory processes (H6)

Participation can be costly and time-consuming, particularly involving large or diverse groups (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). The research shows that accessibility of participatory mechanisms is a significant **pull factor**. The administrative burden of participation often disproportionately affects vulnerable populations. Reducing administrative burdens and simplifying procedures can promote greater citizen participation (Moynihan, 2003). Digital tools can improve conditions for citizen engagement (Mattei, Grandis et al., 2024; Gil et al., 2019), as well as satisfaction, perceived influence on decision-making, and governmental transparency (Kim and Lee, 2012). Besides, accessibility pertains to the ability of local governments to accommodate the “realities of daily life” (King et al., 1998, p. 324), which means flexibly adapting to people’s schedules and resources (e.g., the availability of a smartphone for using digital tools) and, in the case of Ukraine, addressing the pertinent insecurity due to Russian shelling. Therefore, we formulated:

H6 (Accessible Participation Hypothesis):
Simplifying participation processes and effectively integrating digital tools to engage citizen groups reduces barriers and increases a citizen’s willingness to participate.

In testing these hypotheses, we controlled for individual-level predictors of citizen participation that are commonly cited but change very slowly from a policy perspective. These include age, gender, socioeconomic status (Fung, 2015; Abel & Stephan, 2000), and institutional legacies (Lankina and Libman 2019).

Citizen participation during war: exploratory findings from citizens’ perspective

Participation trajectories

Our self-reported local democracy engagement data support other findings that many people became more engaged during the full-scale Russian invasion than before (Figure 4). While not representative of the Ukrainian population, our data show a plausible pattern of substantial increase in participation intensity: 70.4% of Sample 2 report at least one form of engagement in local decision-making during the war, while only about a quarter (28.9%) of the same sample report being active before it. This is driven by 44.1% of previously non-engaged individuals reporting current participation. A regional pattern worth exploring further emerges here. Among people who say that, with the full-scale Russian invasion, they started engaging for security, aid, and recovery, and felt a stronger duty to help the community, participants from western Ukraine report this statistically more often than respondents from northern and southern Ukraine, respectively (Figure 6 below). While other data do not allow causal conclusions, the same data offer at least a partial explanation: respondents from southern regions especially report avoiding gatherings more because of physical insecurity and participating less because of war-related stress. Simply put, life closer to the frontlines requires more focus on survival and leaves fewer opportunities for democratic engagement. This needs further investigation.

Of those respondents reporting participation before the full-scale Russian invasion, most remained active, with only 2.7% reporting they stopped, indicating very low attrition.

Respondents’ assessments of future participation reflect a mix of wartime exhaustion and experiences with results and feedback in their




Figure 4 Respondents' reported participation trajectories

Note: N = 1049. Vertical bars, left to right, indicate respondents' participation in local decision-making before the full-scale Russian invasion ("past"), during the past 12 months while the survey was fielded during the invasion ("current"), and likelihood of participating in the 12 months after the survey ("future"). Red indicates non-participation, green indicates participation, and yellow indicates medium likelihood in the future. All % refer to the total sample N.

current participation cases (Figure 4). Most respondents (57.2%) assess their likelihood of future participation as low, driven almost exclusively by those who had not participated in local matters before the full-scale Russian invasion, split about equally between those who gained wartime participation experience and those who remained inactive. About a quarter of respondents (24.5%) report a medium likelihood of future participation, driven almost equally by those with wartime participation experience. Finally, respondents who had consistently participated before and during the full-scale Russian invasion reported the highest likelihood of future participation, but this group is also the smallest (18.3%).

War as a barrier to participation in the most affected regions

Two major manifestations of the war – physical insecurity and war's toll on mental health and life routines – appear prominently in the full Survey 2 sample, separately with non-participants, and in focus group discussions. These barriers also show

a regional pattern: while our data is observational and cannot establish causality, paired comparisons and after controls show statistically significant differences in how often respondents reported them in regions closer to active warfare than those farther from the frontlines.

So, in the full sample, the two most frequently reported effects of war on respondents' participation were avoiding gatherings because of physical insecurity and having less energy for participation because of stress and workload (about a quarter each, Figure 5). Interestingly, about a fifth of the sample reported none of the ten possible effects. Eighteen percent found it harder to criticize local authorities openly, and 17.0 percent reported having less time.




Figure 5 Self-reported effects of the full-scale Russian invasion on participation patterns
Note: N=1049. The chart highlights effects mentioned by at least 1 in 10 respondents.

There are almost no meaningful gender differences in these reported effects, except for having less energy due to workload (almost 9 percentage points more women than men report this) and it becoming harder to criticize local authorities openly (almost 9 percentage points more men than women said

this). These responses may illustrate gendered wartime burdens: while men face conscription and may worry about drawing attention to avoid it, women may take on more care and professional responsibilities while men serve in the armed forces.




Figure 6 Gender-based differences in self-reported effects of the full-scale Russian invasion on participation patterns

Note: N=1049. Only gaps of at least 5 percentage points are shown (see Table 11 in Annex 2). Q18: "Which statements about how the full-scale invasion has affected your personal involvement in community affairs do you agree with the most?" (select up to 3 you agree with most).




Figure 7 Largest regional and age differences in self-reported effects of the full-scale Russian invasion on one's participation

Note: Largest percentage-point age and regional differences with normal approximation 95% confidence intervals. P-values and FDR-adjusted q-values are reported in Table 11 and Table 12, Annex 2. Q18: "Which statements about how the full-scale invasion has affected your personal involvement in community affairs do you agree with the most?" (select up to 3 you agree with most).

We also ran paired comparisons of responses by respondents' region of origin. Adjusted pairwise logistic models retain two of the clearest substantive contrasts (Figure 6). After adjustment for gender, age, education, material wellbeing, language, and settlement size, the average marginal effects between respondents from the southern regions exceeded those for Kyiv respondents in avoiding gatherings because of physical danger by 13.4 points, 95 percent CI [3.5, 23.3], and exceeded those for respondents from the west of Ukraine in reduced energy due to stress and workload by 13.4 points, 95 percent CI [4.3, 22.4]. The two latter observations probably reflect the fact that Mykolayiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts are under constant Russian attack, including in some cities by FPV drones indiscriminately targeting civilians as they go about daily routines.

Focus group respondents in communities closer to the frontline or regularly exposed to shelling also cited these barriers (physical insecurity and stress due to war), as a significant obstacle to public engagement:

"We have **strikes very often, really very often** - sometimes every day or every other day - and this greatly interferes with participation; it even makes it difficult just to go outside." (Svitlana, 36, FGD 7, South, participant from a vulnerable group)

Participants also emphasized that the emotional and psychological consequences of war reduce people's capacity to engage in community affairs. Constant stress, fear for loved ones, and uncertainty about the future were seen as depleting the resources necessary for civic participation:

"I was thinking about **psychological exhaustion** - the constant stress and fear for your loved ones consume your emotional resources. It is very difficult for people to think about community development when they are constantly living in a state of anticipating danger." (Ksenia, 18, FGD 2, East, community resident)

We also observe that respondents from the southern regions found it harder than in the eastern regions to criticize local authorities; this pattern needs a separate study to explain it.

Other obstacles and opportunities for citizen participation during war: psychological, technical and procedural considerations

Among respondents who reported non-participation in the past 12 months, we asked why and ran paired comparisons of responses by region of origin, age, and gender. Adjusted pairwise logistic models retain two of the clearest substantive contrasts (Figure 8). Disbelief that participation would make a difference is 45.5 percent among the respondents from the southern regions and 14.7 percent in Kyiv. The difference is 30.7 percentage points, with a 95 percent confidence interval




Figure 8 Largest regional and age differences in self-reported barriers to one's participation

Note: Largest percentage-point age and regional differences with normal approximation 95% confidence intervals. P-values and FDR-adjusted q-values are reported in Table 11 and Table 12, Annex 2. Q16: "Why have you not taken part in addressing community issues over the past 12 months?"

from 11.8 to 49.7. After adjustment for gender, age, education, material well-being, language, and settlement size, the average marginal difference between the South and Kyiv in disbelief that participation would make a difference is 32.8 percentage points (95% CI [11.7, 53.8]). While these data are observational and cannot establish causality, the regional contrasts are consistent with meaningful differences in wartime conditions and, potentially, broader institutional context.

Our paired comparisons also show another significant group difference between respondents from Kyiv and regions in northern Ukraine: "No one invited me". Similarly, focus group participants reported **procedural barriers**, such as insufficient information about participation opportunities and local authorities' activities. Respondents emphasized that information about events and engagement opportunities does not always reach potential participants:

"If the information does not reach a person, naturally they cannot participate. It is the untimely dissemination of information. In other words, there is a lack of planning regarding **how to notify all segments of the population or the groups for whom the event is intended, so that they can actually attend.**" (Alla, 70, FGD 2, East, community resident)

Similarly, participants referred to the complexity of participatory mechanisms and bureaucratic obstacles as factors discouraging participation:

"Bureaucracy. Paperwork. Fill this out, collect signatures. Doesn't the village head already see that there is a problem? And then you wait, and wait. It is simply a waste of time. There is no quick response." (Alyona, 41, FGD 3, North, participant from a vulnerable group)

Focus group participants also mentioned **not having enough time or energy to participate**, even though they were statistically insignificant in paired comparisons. Many participants noted that work, education, financial difficulties, and personal circumstances leave them with little time for civic engagement:

"Speaking personally, the main obstacle is simply not having enough time. ... It is time, financial problems, and personal issues." (Svitlana, 55, FGD 4, North, community resident)

Participants also highlighted **physical and transportation barriers** to participation. This issue was particularly acute in large communities with geographically dispersed settlements.

“Our community is very large - we have 54 settlements - and transportation is a major issue. People who might want to attend a council session, a meeting, or a discussion often cannot do so because they simply have no way of getting there physically.” (Kateryna, 38, FGD 4, North, community resident)

Digital solutions for participation accessibility: opportunity with caveats

We expected that simplifying participation processes and effectively integrating digital tools would diminish barriers and enhance a citizen's willingness to participate (H6 Accessible participation). Our focus groups showed that **integrating digital tools** for participation was generally seen as increasing accessibility, but with serious limitations for particular social groups, such as the elderly and war-affected populations who frequently experience blackouts.

Indeed, participants noted that online communication enables faster access to information, allows citizens to express their views, and facilitates interaction with local authorities without in-person visits.

“As a resident of this community - our community is quite small - we have a Viber group, for example. People post comments and criticism of the authorities there, and the authorities respond and provide answers. There is no need to go to the village head in person to find out the authorities' position or their reaction to this criticism.” (Kateryna, 38, FGD 4, North, community resident).

Yet, difficulties faced by older people when using digital communication channels were mentioned particularly often, because they lack access to the necessary technologies or the skills required to use them:

“The thing is that we have an official website where announcements, news, laws, and new regulations are posted, but unfortunately **older people are physically unable to use these websites**. ... Younger people who are familiar with communication technologies, on the other

hand, find it easier to communicate with public authorities.” (Olesia, 44, FGD 7, South, participant from a vulnerable group)

“I just wanted to briefly add that in our community most people are familiar with information technologies, but there are **older people who have difficulties using things like Viber or Telegram**, so they need support and guidance in learning how to use them.” (Vladyslava, 18, FGD 4, North, community resident)

Moreover, even when digital participation tools are available, wartime conditions and disruptions to electricity and internet access may still hinder participation.

“If it is just a matter of logging in and voting, that is still manageable. But if it involves joining a discussion and spending a long time online... **For a long period we had no electricity and no internet, so online participation is not always a viable option.**” (Rodion, 31, FGD 2, East, community resident)

Thus, digital tools were often viewed as making participation easier and less resource-intensive. At the same time, respondents stressed that digital formats cannot fully replace other forms of participation because access to information, skills, and technical conditions (electricity and internet) for participation vary across population groups. The specific needs of elderly residents and the conditions of people living under frequent electricity outages due to Russian attacks should be accounted for systematically.

In sum, physical insecurity and wartime stress affect participation patterns and citizens' prioritization of their role in local decision-making. This is especially the case for people in the regions of Ukraine, most directly affected by the hostilities and Russia's aerial attacks. At the same time, reports also describe participatory mobilization for local communities and for security, aid, and recovery that has been shown to be driven by patriotic motifs (Onuch & Mateo, 2026).

Political efficacy and citizen participation: the strongest link

This section first operationalizes political efficacy and then provides evidence for the following main findings regarding the relationship between political efficacy and citizen participation:

1. Two efficacy variables are positively and significantly associated with citizen participation: one's perception that participation yields results (a component of external efficacy), followed by one's confidence that they have the skills and knowledge to participate (a component of internal efficacy).
2. One's perception that participation yields results is most strongly associated with participation intensity, regardless of respondents' regional legacies and socio-demographic characteristics.
3. Thus, what local authorities do with citizen participation outputs matters for citizens' willingness to participate in local democracy. Indeed, focus group participants - no matter their social vulnerability status - all point to disappointment when participation outcomes are ignored, and to encouragement when they see positive change.
4. The perception that authorities listen does not relate

to participation intensity but does matter for citizens' trust in local government and satisfaction with local democracy. Thus, listening and feedback after citizens' participation matter for trust in local government.

Operationalization of political efficacy: external and internal forms

Through our survey, we explored the impact of internal and external political efficacy separately. We asked the participants to evaluate their (dis)agreement with the four statements on a scale of 1 to 11:

For the analysis, we operationalized internal political efficacy as the average of A1 (knowledge and skills for participation) and A4 (collective action influence). We operationalized external political efficacy as the average of A2 (local authorities listen) and A3 (participation yields results). All A-items are recoded from source values 1-11 to a 0-10 agreement scale; 'hard to answer' and 'Do not participate' answers in A3 are treated as missing because they are not scale points. Thus, we analyzed the two indices as independent variables (Table 5). A descriptive overview of each political efficacy item ('A-item') is available in Annex 4, Table 14.

Internal political efficacy	External political efficacy
A1: I have enough knowledge and skills to participate in addressing issues important to my community ("knowledge/skills") A4: If people like me act together, they can influence local government decisions ("collective action influence")	A2: Local authorities in my community take into account the opinions of people like me ("authorities listen") A3: My participation in community life usually produces tangible results ("participation yields results") Do not participate

Table 4 Political efficacy: operationalization

Variable	Valid N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Cronbach's alpha	Spearman rho
Internal efficacy (A1+A4): Knowledge/skills + collective action influence	1116	5.431	2.423	0.000	10.000	0.59	0.41
External efficacy (A2+A3): Authorities listen + Participation yields results	969	3.588	2.489	0.000	10.000	0.73	0.59

Table 5 Descriptive overview of political efficacy variables

These two-item indices show moderate coherence for internal political efficacy and acceptable coherence for external political efficacy: the internal efficacy pair correlates only moderately ($\alpha = 0.59$; $\rho \approx 0.41$), indicating the items tap related but distinct facets, while the external efficacy pair demonstrates a stronger alignment ($\alpha = 0.73$; $\rho \approx 0.59$), indicating both items capture the same underlying dimension.

Finally, our focus group discussions specifically urged participants to reflect on situations and experiences in which they felt willing to participate in the past, and on what would make them participate in the future.

Perception that participation yields results matters most for overall participation

We first tested whether internal and external political efficacy positively affect our participation outcomes, both the intensity and breadth of participation, using OLS regression analysis. We tested these hypotheses:

H1.1 (Internal Political Efficacy) Individuals with higher internal political efficacy will be more likely to participate in local decision-making.

H1.2 (External Political Efficacy) Individuals with low external political efficacy will be less likely to participate in local governance through institutional channels but may engage in alternative forms of participation (e.g., grassroots mobilization and community-led initiatives).

The analysis used typical socio-demographic control variables: gender, age, education, material wellbeing, and settlement size. Because language practice has long been debated in Ukraine-specific research as an indicator for political attitudes and national identities, we included language spoken on an everyday basis as a control variable, ranging between Ukrainian only, Russian only, a mix of both, or other (Kulyk, 2011; Pop-Eleches & Robertson, 2018; Kulyk & Hale, 2022).

The regression results support the broad efficacy argument. In models with both efficacy indices and demographic controls, **internal efficacy** is positively associated with both intensity and breadth (Figure 9). Therefore, our H1.1 (“Individuals with higher internal political efficacy will be more likely to participate in local decision-making”) is supported.




Figure 9 OLS coefficients for efficacy indices and citizen participation

Note: The figure shows OLS coefficients for efficacy indices predicting participation intensity and breadth. The external efficacy index has the larger estimated association in both models. See regression coefficients in Annex 4, Table 21

External efficacy, however, has a larger coefficient and a larger standardized effect; it remains robust after controlling for socio-demographic variables. It is especially strong for the breadth of citizen participation, meaning respondents who felt authorities listened and that participation yielded results were more likely to engage in different forms of participation. The results are also meaningful for the identity of participation, meaning that the result-oriented external efficacy component also matters for the frequency of one's engagement.

Zooming in on intensity as a measure of citizen participation, our data visualization shows similar patterns: both efficacy indices are positively associated with participation intensity, but external efficacy is especially associated with higher participation intensity (Figure 10). This suggests that we can stimulate more frequent citizen engagement by ensuring participation yields tangible results.

We also ran an OLS regression to identify which element of political efficacy best predicts citizen participation, using our overall citizen participation intensity index as the dependent variable (Figure 5). **We find that by and large, the perception that “participation yields results” (A3) is the dominant predictor of overall participation intensity.** Indeed, our focus group, when discussing barriers to participation, clearly mentioned how lack of results can cause frustration and disengagement:

“[...]when people write, and there is no response, they start to become disappointed. They begin to wonder whether it is worth participating in this or that issue at all if nothing comes of what they previously did, wrote, or tried to achieve.” (Andriy, 40, FGD 3, North, participant from a vulnerable group)

“If I signed a petition, these petitions only seem to matter when they concern something




Figure 10 Political efficacy and citizen participation relationship

Note: Binned means by efficacy score (rounded 0-10) show that participation intensity increases with both political efficacy indices.

that does not really affect community life. The problem is that there is no [...]clear sequence of actions explaining what happens if a petition is rejected, approved, or cannot be implemented for some reason. There is no clear chain of actions and outcomes.” (FGD 2, East, community residents)

“Look, when you show interest and the response you get is ‘wait’ or ‘we still need to collect signatures,’ that interest disappears. The next time, you are less willing to get involved or help.” (Yulia, 26, FGD 3, North, participant from a vulnerable group)

In this model, one’s sense of having “knowledge and skills” (A1) remains positive and significant. Perception that “authorities listen” (A2) and that “collective action [brings] influence (A4) no longer have independent effects once A1 and A3 are included. This suggests that the key mechanism is an individual’s confidence that participation can produce tangible results.

We used the Survey 2 sample to explore **whether political efficacy may be connected to future willingness to participate in local decision-making**. Figure 12 shows that both internal and external political efficacy are positively associated with future willingness, both on their own and after adding basic demographic characteristics. On the same sample, internal efficacy remains positive in the full model ($\beta = 0.172$, $p < .001$), while the coefficient for external efficacy becomes small and statistically insignificant ($\beta = -0.058$, $p = .298$).

Thus, external political efficacy matters in simpler models, but its relationship with future willingness largely overlaps with a respondent’s actual participation experience, perception of feedback quality, and perceived results. This means that once these closely related experiences are included in the same model, external efficacy no longer explains an additional part of future willingness on its own. The item-level model clarifies why: A3, the belief that participation produces tangible results, is the strongest component ($\beta = 0.212$, $p < .001$),




Figure 11 OLS regression coefficients for political efficacy indicators predicting overall participation intensity

Note: HC3 robust standard errors and 95% confidence intervals are shown.




Figure 12 Political efficacy and future willingness across parsimonious and full models

Note: Standardized OLS coefficients with HC3 95% confidence intervals. Green lines mark internal-efficacy items. Blue lines mark external-efficacy items; gold indicates $p \geq .05$. Panel A follows internal and external political efficacy from a simple model to the full model. Panel B separates the four efficacy questions (A1-A4) to show which part of the two efficacy scales is most closely related to future willingness to participate. Points farther from zero indicate stronger associations; lines crossing zero indicate that the estimate is not statistically significant. See models in Tables 22, 23 and 24, Annex 4.

while A2, the belief that authorities listen, is not independently associated with future willingness ($\beta = -0.038$, $p = .353$). This dynamic is like that of reported past participation (see section 2.3).

Perception that authorities listen does not link to citizens' participation intensity but matters for their trust in local government

As Figure 11 shows, contrary to our expectations, our data do not support the institutional responsiveness hypothesis H1.3. Compared with the perception that participation yields results, the perception that authorities listen (“take into account the opinions

of people like me”) does not significantly affect the intensity of citizen participation.

Instead, institutional responsiveness proved more important for citizens' trust in local government and their satisfaction with local democracy than any other component of political efficacy (Figure 13).




Figure 13 OLS regression coefficients for political efficacy indicators predicting trust in LSG & local democracy satisfaction

Note: Controls included: gender, age, binary higher education, material well-being, language practice. Outcomes are on 0-10 scale.

Focus groups yield some ideas towards citizens' expectations of **how this listening may look**:

"I always say that it has to start from the beginning, from the planning stage. When the authorities say: 'We need a dialogue with the community, with you. **Please come, let's sit down and discuss it together.**' If the community is against something and votes against it at a public meeting, and this is officially recorded, then that issue should not move forward." (Roman, 38, FGD 7, South, participant from a vulnerable group)

"Whenever particularly important decisions were being made in our community, the mayor [...] posts videos on Facebook where **he explains why exactly those decisions were made, why the money was allocated in a particular way.** [...] People ask questions in the comments, and he responds to them. He is very active in that regard." (Tetiana, 40, FGD 1, East, participant from a vulnerable group)

As Figure 11 above shows, perceptions that collective action has an impact are not significantly associated with individual participation intensity.

Focus groups, however, indicate that in some communities, citizens noticed the opposite:

"Now they listen to us more as people. That is, almost all proposals that are put forward by a majority of people - not by one person, but by at least a group of people - are heard. Not all of them are accepted, of course, but some are. If none of us spoke up and we only talked among ourselves, nothing would happen at all. But because each person expresses their opinion and then joins with like-minded people, they finally listen to us and at least do something. [...] Now, when people unite with others who share their views, something finally gets done." (Rodion, 31, FGD 2, East, community residents)

One explanation for this discrepancy could be that lay citizens mostly do not engage in collective action and thus may not have sufficient empirical information to link collective action to results, even if such cases exist. Concurrently, there could be comparatively few such cases, and our focus group respondent happened to know one.




Figure 14 Political efficacy and alternative (non-institutional) forms of citizen participation

Note: Controls: age, gender, higher education, material wellbeing, and language. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$

Political efficacy matters irrespective of types of citizen participation

Political efficacy is directly and positively related to overall participation; this relationship does not vary by form of participation (Figure 14). We compared institutional participation (administrative participation and direct contact) with alternative forms of participation: civic engagement through CSOs and protest. We expected a different pattern: low external efficacy may push people toward protest or CSO initiatives.

External efficacy, however, is also positively associated with protest intensity and CSO-initiative participation. This suggests that low external efficacy is not linked to higher alternative participation in our data; rather, people who believe participation can produce results are more active in both institutional and alternative forms. Internal efficacy remains positive only for CSO engagement, whereas it is insignificant for protest mobilization. This means low internal political efficacy is not associated with greater CSO involvement, and our data show no meaningful link between internal political efficacy and protest.

Thus, the data do not show an expected compensatory pattern, so we rejected H1.2 (“Individuals with low external political efficacy will be less likely to participate in local governance through institutional channels but may engage in alternative forms of participation (e.g., grassroots mobilization and community-led initiatives”).

Next, we explored how internal and external political efficacy are associated with different types of citizen participation we measured (Figure 15). For participation through institutional channels, internal political efficacy is especially associated with direct contact with LSG representatives and consultations, driven mainly by one’s perception of having the knowledge and skills to participate. External political efficacy is especially strongly associated with dialogue and consultation, driven by one’s perception that participation yields tangible results. See the correlation coefficients for the combined political efficacy indices in Annex 4, Table 15 and Table 16.




Figure 15 Political efficacy and types of citizen participation

Note: The cells in the figure show Spearman rho values of correlation between the intensity of a type of citizen participation and the four indicators of political efficacy

Political efficacy trumps regional legacies and sociodemographic characteristics

In studies of Ukraine, many socio-political outcomes are explained, at least in part, by historical legacies that divide the country into an arbitrary “West” and “East”. In modern Ukraine, local election results indicate regional variations in turnout and competitiveness, but deeper analysis shows that the East/West divide in democratic quality is exaggerated (Lankina and Libman 2019; Aasland et al. 2020; Keudel 2022; Karakai et al. 2026). In this study, we recognize that while long-term legacies “may exercise a bearing on citizen civic attitudes, contingent, temporally proximate factors also matter, such as those related to policy choices or decisions taken by particular municipalities” (Lankina et al., 2017:10).

Therefore, we compared how regions, as proxies for long-term legacies, fare vis-à-vis political efficacy in explaining overall citizen participation intensity, while accounting for language use and socio-demographic characteristics (Figure 16, see Table 17 in Annex 4, the full regression table). We find that a model containing only region variables accounts for a very small share (1.9%) of the variation in citizen participation intensity, indicating weak explanatory power. Adding language adds little explanatory power beyond region (together, these factors explain only 2.2% of the

variation in citizen participation intensity). In this model, Ukrainian-only language practice is positively associated with participation intensity ($b \approx 0.017$, $p \approx 0.046$). Adding socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, for which we previously controlled in our analysis of the relationship between political efficacy and participation, yields only a minor improvement in the model’s explanatory power to 4.8%. Moreover, after adding age, education, and material well-being, Ukrainian language use becomes marginal ($b \approx 0.016$, $p \approx 0.075$). At the same time, once we add political efficacy to the equation, the model’s explanatory power increases almost fourfold to 15.3%, and the significance of language use disappears ($b \approx 0.006$, $p \approx 0.584$).




Figure 16 OLS models fit for participation intensity across nested specifications

Note: “Basics” denotes socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. “Efficacy” includes internal and external political efficacy. See the regression table in Annex 4.

Once we break our sample down by region, we find descriptive variation in the intensity of citizen participation (Figure 17). Descriptively, the West, Kyiv, and North have higher mean participation than the Center, South, and East, but the differences are not large relative to the 0–1 scale and the variance within regions. But again, the region itself does not explain the variation. The largest substantive pattern is the efficacy block: both internal and external efficacy are positive, with external efficacy stronger. This reproduces the earlier result that participation intensity is primarily linked to perceived responsiveness (“authorities listen”) and to participation bringing results, rather than to region or language alone.

Finally, among socio-demographic characteristics, age is the most stable basic characteristic: each additional year is associated with a participation intensity that is about 0.0014–0.0017 lower. Across 20 years, this corresponds to roughly 0.03 points on the 0–1 outcome scale. Higher education and material well-being are not robust independent predictors once we include region, language, and age (and before we include political efficacy)




Figure 17 Regional differences shrink after adding personal characteristics and political efficacy

Note: OLS coefficients relative to the Center region. Outcome variable: overall participation intensity (0-1). Lines show 95% confidence intervals. If confidence intervals cross the 0.00 line, it is not statistically significant

Satisfaction with governance outcomes: positive but weak link to administrative participation

Operationalization of governance outcomes, administrative participation and expectations

Through our survey, we explored the link between citizen participation and local governance outcomes, operationalized in three variables separately:

We aimed to test two contradictory hypotheses to check whether dissatisfaction (grievance) or satisfaction with local governance outcomes drives citizen participation:

H3.1 (Grievance Mobilization Hypothesis):
Citizens are more likely to participate in local decision-making if they are dissatisfied with local governance outcomes.

H3.2 (Public Service Satisfaction Hypothesis):
Higher satisfaction with public services increases an individual's administrative participation in local democracy.

During the empirical work, we recognized the need to increase consistency within the analysis, so we operationalized "local decision-making" in H3.1 as administrative participation. For H3.2, we also tested whether two other variables from the "local governance outcomes" block are positively associated with administrative participation.

Satisfaction, not grievance, is positively associated with citizen participation

Our results indicate that citizens who are more satisfied with public services and local democracy, and more positive about their community's direction, also report higher administrative participation (Figure 18).

Concept	Local democracy satisfaction	Public service satisfaction	Community direction
Indicator	"To what extent do you agree or disagree: I am generally satisfied with how democracy works in my municipality." (Q12)	"Please evaluate how satisfied you are overall with the public services you receive in your municipality, (Q10)	"In your opinion, are things in your municipality moving in the right or wrong direction?" (Q11)
Scale	1-11, recoded to 0-10, with 0 as lowest and 10 as highest		Entirely wrong, rather wrong, rather right, completely right (categorical)




Figure 18 Administrative participation rises with satisfaction, not with grievance

Note: Predicted values from simple OLS for 0-10 scales for interval variables, and group means for the categorical variable. Administrative participation denotes the mean of consultation, dialogue, and partnership/co-production intensity

This finding rejects H3.1, contradicting our earlier pilot study, where citizens were more likely to engage in local democracy if they were dissatisfied with public service quality. Thus, at least in this sample of Ukrainians, grievance mobilization – a mechanism whereby participation would be driven by desire to provide feedback or own proposals for the improvement of public services through administrative channels of consulting, dialogue, and partnership – is not in place. Concurrently, the finding supports H3.2.

Figure 19 below illustrates that the relationship between administrative participation and satisfaction with public service is positive (left side), and, conversely, more dissatisfied citizens also participate less (right side). For illustration, the relationship between satisfaction with local democracy and citizen participation follows this same positive pattern.

For descriptive purposes, below we also unpack the correlations between different types and forms of citizen participation and satisfaction with governance outcomes. Figure 20 shows that among the three variables, public service satisfaction has the highest positive association with all citizen participation types and forms, except protest. Perceptions of community direction show little

association with citizen participation, except for slightly higher associations with dialogue that are comparable to those of local democracy satisfaction.




Figure 20 Correlations between governance outcome indicators and participation types

Note: Spearman correlations. Positive values mean that more satisfied respondents report higher participation.




Figure 19 Observed administrative participation by satisfaction and grievance score

Note: Each point is the observed mean administrative participation at a (dis)satisfaction score. Descriptive association only.

Trust as predictor of citizen participation: no significant link

Trust variables and expectations

In this study, we tested the explanatory power of trust in local government towards citizen participation, but we also explored generalized trust and trust in civil society organizations as additional independent variables (Table 6).

In this study, we posited that trust in local government can predict citizen participation, while low trust levels trigger alternative forms of participation but not institutional ones. Specifically, we tested the following hypotheses:

H4.1 (Trust Hypothesis): Higher trust in local government increases the likelihood of citizen participation, as citizens believe the local government acts in their interest generally.

H4.2 (Distrust – Engagement Hypothesis): Lower trust in local government increases

participation, as citizens engage to hold officials accountable and compensate for perceived governance failures.

H4.3 (Distrust – Exit hypothesis): Lower trust in local government will discourage participation in institutional channels but may encourage alternative engagement, such as activism, volunteering, or informal self-governance initiatives.

Trust in local government does not predict citizen participation patterns

Between the two contradicting hypotheses, H4.1 and H4.2, we find partial confirmation for H4.1 and no confirmation for H4.2 (Figure 21). That is: there is a modest positive link between trust in local government and citizen participation. Concurrently, lower trust levels are not associated with higher levels of citizen participation.

Concept	Trust to local government	Generalized trust	Trust in CSOs
Indicator	“How much do you trust local authorities: the head of the council, local council deputies, and starosta in your municipality?” (Q14)	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “In general, most people can be trusted” (Q13)	“How much do you trust civil society organizations?” (Q14)
Scale	1-11, recoded to 0-10, with 0 as lowest and 10 as highest value		

Table 6 Operationalization of trust




Figure 21 Trust and overall citizen participation

Note: Each point shows the observed mean overall participation intensity among respondents at each trust score. Overall participation intensity is the mean normalized frequency across eleven participatory actions (0–1). “Difficult to answer” responses are excluded. Descriptive association only.




Figure 22 Trust and citizen participation types

Zooming in on different forms and types of participation, we observe the same weak positive pattern (Figure 22). At the same time, trust in local government is positively associated with institutional participation, especially dialogue, and slightly more so than with overall participation. However, this association is at the same level as CSO participation. For illustration, among the different trust variables, the strongest association, albeit modest, is between trust in CSOs and participation in CSOs. This result underscores the internal validity of our measures. Here, we also see a weak negative relationship between trust in local government and protest.

At the same time, even the positive relationship we found between trust in local government and citizen participation becomes insignificant once we add political efficacy variables, suggesting that the latter are more important (Figure 23). This holds for all types of citizen participation except protest. Here, interestingly, once we add political efficacy variables, the relationship becomes more negative. Still, we can speak instead of a conditional relationship between trust in local government and protest, so these findings do not let us confirm H4.2.




Figure 23 OLS coefficient for trust in local government before and after adding political efficacy variables

Note: Dependent variable is participation intensity (0-10). HC3 robust standard errors; bars show 95% confidence intervals. "A-block" denotes political efficacy indicators.

Finally, we can't confirm that low levels of trust reduce institutional participation but encourage alternative types, so we also reject H4.3. The linear regression estimates below show that participation in institutional channels and in CSOs increases with

trust in local government, while protest and trust in local government are virtually unrelated. Descriptive patterns show the same picture: CSO participation and protest do not cluster at lower trust levels (Figure 24, left and right, respectively).




Figure 24 Trust in local government and institutional vs alternative citizen participation

Note: Figure shows OLS estimates and descriptive patterns for the relationship between trust in local government and institutional vs alternative citizen participation. Left: predicted values from simple OLS by trust in local government (0-10). "Institutional channels" average direct contact, consultation, dialogue and partnership. Right: Each point is an observed mean of citizen participation type at a trust score.

Personal stakes in citizen participation: exploratory findings

This study aimed to explore the extent to which motivations to participate in local democracy are informed by private interest or considerations of collective good (H2.1 and H2.2). This report provides our first exploratory findings based on focus group results.

Focus group findings suggest that citizens' motivation to participate in community life is shaped by both personal interests and a desire to contribute to broader community development. Respondents rarely treated these motivations as distinct. Instead, they often described participation as a way to simultaneously address a problem affecting them personally, help family members or a particular group, and make a positive contribution to the community.

Citizens often became involved when an issue directly affected their lives or those of their family members. In such cases, participation was seen as a practical way to solve a problem or improve living conditions, driven by **private interest**.

"I can give you an example. We repaired a playground in our community. We did not have enough money to build a new one, but we painted it, made tables for the children, and renovated it. The community even provided the paint and tools. What motivated me was that I have a child who plays on that playground, and it was better to repair it." (Viktor, 33, FGD 2, East, community resident)

Alongside private interests, respondents frequently referred to **motivations related to community welfare and the common good**. They often described participation as a way to improve the local environment and contribute to community development.

"It is important to improve the environment where you live, to improve the world around you, and to make an effort. For example, we have a river and a forest. We cleaned the river and cleared the forest. My children and I use

those places. I do not care whether others participate or not, but I did something, and my community is better because of it." (Olesia, 44, FGD 7, South, participant from vulnerable group)

Relatedly, one stated motivation for participation was a sense of injustice and a desire to change a situation perceived as unfair or ineffective. For some participants, dissatisfaction with the status quo catalyzed civic engagement.

"One motivation is probably an internal sense of injustice. When I know how the current authorities work, and I know a little about how the previous authorities worked, I can make comparisons. I understand that some people have not yet adjusted to the fact that a new wave has come and a new policy is being implemented." (Roman, 38, FGD 7, South, participant from a vulnerable group)

Some respondents explained their participation as a desire to represent others' interests or to help those unable to advocate for themselves. Such motivations were particularly common among participants with military experience or those directly affected by the consequences of the war.

"I personally approached the authorities because I was already back in town, even though I was in a wheelchair. The guys who were still at the front - I knew how they felt when they could not help their families and relatives. I knew specific people and their specific problems. So I came and raised these issues" (Viacheslav, 44, FGD 7, South, participant from a vulnerable group)

In the context of the war, **participation was often associated with mutual support, solidarity**, and helping other community members.

"The idea is to improve the lives of community members during wartime. To

help somehow, to improve something. That is why people need to come together and help one another.” (Yevhen, 60, FGD 4, North, community resident)

Similar motivations related to solidarity and collective action were expressed in other focus groups as well:

“If we support one another, something good can come out of it. Everyone is trying, everyone is struggling. There are school fairs, fundraising events at the market, collections for the Armed Forces. Children donate their coins. When we can, we try to support one another because otherwise... I think we simply need to stick together. We need to stay united.” (Oksana, 40, FGD 7, South, participant from a vulnerable group)

Some participants also explained that they participated to **prevent deterioration in their community** and to respond proactively to emerging threats and challenges.

“There is a feeling that the situation could worsen because some threat exists. So either something needs to be changed or improved. People have ideas and make proposals. That is why we get involved.” (Serhiy, 50, FGD 6, South, community resident)

The focus group findings support both private interest and an orientation toward the common good as important motivations for participation. Citizens report engaging in local affairs when they see an opportunity to address a problem affecting themselves, their family, or a group they identify with, pointing to private interest. At the same time, motivations related to improving community life, supporting others, and contributing to collective well-being are equally mentioned. The qualitative evidence suggests that these two forms of motivation rarely exist separately and, in most cases, reinforce one another.

LSG communication, feedback and citizen participation

Hypotheses and operationalization for vignette study

The vignette experiment allowed us to explore how communication about a participation opportunity may affect citizens' willingness to participate in the observable future. We used this method to partially address the following hypotheses:

H5 (Institutional Responsiveness Hypothesis):

Local governments can boost citizen participation by demonstrating responsiveness by incorporating citizen input into policies and providing feedback. This occurs because observing the results of one's participation influences an individual's external political efficacy (i.e., the expectation of utility).

H6 (Accessible Participation Hypothesis):

Simplifying participation processes and effectively integrating digital tools to engage citizen groups reduces barriers and increases a citizen's willingness to participate.

Additionally, we used this opportunity to explore two other ideas. First, whether simply receiving information that others have already participated in the same format would boost willingness to participate. This is informed by social influence theories, which suggest that if people receive information that others are doing something, they are likely to interpret it as a norm and conform to it, i.e., start doing the same (Cialdini & Goldstein 2004; Deutsch & Gerard 1955). Second, whether adding **deliberative democracy** components to an invitation would increase citizens' willingness to participate. These components are random selection and deliberation - a process of arriving at consensus based on argumentative discussion (Dienel et al., 2024; Fung, 2007). Deliberative democracy is gaining momentum, with international organizations like the OECD and the Council of Europe promoting it, so we used the vignette to explore citizens' responsiveness to information about this method.

Thus, in a vignette experiment, we wanted to know whether providing certain information about a participation opportunity could increase willingness to participate, using a public hearing on community strategy as an example. We designed an invitation that varied along nine binary factors, each coded 0 (factor absent) and 1 (factor present), as summarized in Table 7. To avoid noise in our results, we tested the impact of each factor on willingness to participate separately.

Detailed procedural information discourages less-educated participants and those in doubt

We used OLS regression to test the effects of these factors. The same pattern holds under alternative regression specifications, namely the ordinal logit and probit models (see Appendices 7-8 in Karakai & Moskotina 2026).

As Figure 25 shows, only the agenda and registration (H1-A1) had significant effects, but in the opposite direction to what we predicted: including an agenda in the invitation is associated with lower willingness to attend.

Concept (hypothesis)	Vignette factor	Rationale
Institutional responsiveness (H5)	Recurring event (A9)	Having recurrent rather than one-off participation indicates regularity and a place of participation format in a standard policy cycle. It is a promise that results may be considered.
	Use of results (A2)	The closest operationalization of a tangible result: a chance to affect budget allocation and strategy, albeit in the future.
Accessible participation (H6)	Agenda & registration (A1)	Providing information about the schedule and how to take part by registering online should reduce uncertainty about the participatory event; lack of information on how to take part was mentioned in focus groups as a barrier.
	Anonymity (A3)	Should simplify participation for people who may fear retaliation for voicing one's opinion.
	Monetary compensation (A6)	Compensating for one's time, this is expected to reduce opportunity cost of participation.
	Contact channel (A8)	Providing a bot and a telephone number to ask further questions caters for people who use digital communication and to those who do not; it should simply access the participation process.
N/A	Social proof (A4)	Social influence theory, especially information influence: information about behaviour of others "like me" communicates what is approved by them (injunctive norms), prompting conformity.
N/A	Random selection (A5)	Receiving a message that one was selected at random from many others may enact curiosity about the method or a feeling that one was lucky, encouraging participation.
N/A	Deliberation (A7)	Receiving a message that one will be able to discuss proposals in groups with other residents, formulate own ideas, and jointly set priorities may enact curiosity about the method or feel like empowerment.

Table 7 Conceptualization and operationalization of variables for the vignette study

Note: Table 10 in Annex 3 provides full texts of factors as they were presented in the vignettes




Figure 25 Estimated effect of each invitation element on willingness to attend a public hearing: OLS regression

Note: The figure shows the regression coefficients with their 95% confidence intervals, indicating how a change in a factor's level is associated with a change in willingness to attend the public hearing. Invitation elements are ordered by descending regression coefficient. Coefficients shown in blue are statistically significant: their confidence intervals do not cross the dashed line at zero, indicating an association between the given invitation element and willingness to participate. Regression coefficients in grey are non-significant (no association). Only agenda & registration is significant ($b = -0.62$, 95% CI $[-1.08, -0.15]$, $p = 0.01$); the model explains little variance ($R^2 = 0.017$).

Moreover, **detailed procedural information deters** precisely those who already doubt their competence to participate, feel unheard by local authorities, or have less formal education. Indeed, the negative effect of agenda and registration information was concentrated in particular groups (Figure 23 and Figure 24 in Annex 3): it was stronger among less-educated respondents, among those aged 45-55, and among respondents with lower political efficacy — both internal efficacy (the belief that one has enough knowledge and skills to take part in deciding matters important for one's community) and external efficacy (the belief that the local authorities take account of the views of people like oneself). Thus, providing these details seems to increase the burden rather than improve access to participatory mechanisms by providing information about them. This means we cannot take citizens' requests for more information about participatory opportunities at face value; instead, further research

is needed to understand what "having more information" means for different social groups, and which messages and channels deliver this information with the lowest cognitive burden possible.

However, this factor raises two reservations. First, the agenda & registration factor bundles two distinct elements that always varied together — the provision of an agenda (information about what the hearing will involve) and the link to register via an online form — so we cannot tell whether the lower willingness is driven by the added information, by respondents perceiving registration as a burden, or by both. Second, adding this factor made the vignette noticeably longer. So, its worse performance can be attributed to the cognitive burden of reading it rather than the information it contained; this still speaks to the need for brevity in citizen communication.

Social proof, monetary compensation, and regularity: mixed results

In addition, we ran a multinomial logistic regression, assuming that the relationships between the invitation elements and willingness to attend a public hearing might be more complex than initially expected (Figure 26). To simplify interpretation, we recoded willingness to attend into a three-point scale: low (0-3), medium (4-6), and high (7-10).

Under this specification, three additional factors came into play beyond agenda & registration: social proof, monetary compensation, and regularity.

Social proof pulled respondents away from the middle category toward higher willingness.

Mentioning social proof reduces mid-scale uncertainty (i.e., fewer respondents choose the “ambivalent” middle of the participation scale). This means that, while we cannot say that knowing others participate always boosts willingness to participate, it does reduce indifference and makes higher readiness more likely.

Monetary compensation also shifted respondents away from the middle category toward higher willingness. In addition, when we set medium willingness as the reference category, we found that respondents whose invitation offered monetary compensation chose it less often than either the high or the low category². This means that when monetary compensation is mentioned, people are less likely to be indifferent to participation and more likely to report higher willingness to participate. But it also means that **some people may be entirely discouraged by mentioning money**. Further experiments are needed to separate the effects of money in general and the particular sum of money.

A regular, twice-yearly format reduced the probability of low willingness. This means regularity does not, by itself, increase willingness to participate, and mentioning this factor does not encourage participation either.




Figure 26 Average marginal effects of each feature on the probability of low, medium, and high willingness to attend the public hearing

Note: Invitation elements are ordered as in Figure 1. Willingness was grouped into three bands (low 0-3, medium 4-6, high 7-10) and modelled with multinomial logistic regression on the nine factors. Each point shows how much the probability of a given band changes, on average, when an invitation factor is switched from absent to present, holding the respondent's other features as observed and averaging across all 1,112 respondents. Effects are expressed in percentage points, and the whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. The three panels correspond to the three bands; teal marks a significant increase, coral a significant decrease, and grey a non-significant effect.

² For monetary compensation, both contrasts relative to the medium category are positive and significant: low vs medium, $b = 0.66$, $p < 0.001$, and high vs medium, $b = 0.61$, $p < 0.001$.

Feedback quality positively shapes willingness to participate in the future: exploratory survey results

We explored (H5 **Institutional Responsiveness Hypothesis**) using our Survey 2 sample to test the prominent focus group and interview findings about the importance of feedback for citizens' willingness to participate. We find that people who report receiving clearer and more useful feedback after taking part are also more willing to participate in the future. Part of this relationship overlaps with their previous participation experience and other attitudes, but feedback still has an independent association once these factors are considered together. Figure 12 shows a positive relationship in all three models. In the simplest model, a one-point increase in feedback

quality is associated with a 0.299-point increase in future willingness. The association remains after accounting for respondents' basic characteristics ($b = 0.273$) and becomes smaller, but still statistically significant, in the full model ($b = 0.151$, 95% CI [0.065, 0.237], $p < .001$).

Feedback quality is also positively associated with external political efficacy ($b = 0.182$, 95% CI [0.128, 0.237], $p < .001$). In other words, respondents who receive better feedback are also more likely to feel that participation can matter and that local authorities are responsive. Because these measures come from the same survey wave, however, we cannot determine whether better feedback increases efficacy or whether more efficacious respondents evaluate feedback more positively.




Figure 27 Feedback quality and future willingness to participate

Note: N M1, M2 = 804, N M3 = 739. Unstandardized OLS coefficients with HC3 95 percent confidence intervals (Annex 5). Data: Survey 2.

Conclusion: LSGs' responsiveness is central to citizens' attitudes to participation

This study **placed citizens at the center** by asking why they choose to participate in local democracy, rather than why citizens do not participate during a war; the conditions that bring uncertainty about the future, physical insecurity, and mental strain. Indeed, our findings underscore the abnormality of wartime conditions – citizens, especially in the regions most directly affected by the full-scale Russian invasion, report avoiding meetings due to physical insecurity and more frequently report stress and overload because of the war. This is especially true for women more than for men. At the same time, in regions farther from the frontlines, respondents report starting to engage in security, aid, and recovery. Still, most of the respondents who have been asked about future willingness to participate express rather low rates – a result that presents a mix of wartime exhaustion and institutional responsiveness in their regions.

This study also tested predictors of citizens' willingness to participate in local democracy and asked them to map and evaluate local government strategies for encouraging or discouraging participation in times of war, when multiple war-related crises heighten uncertainty. In this section, we summarize the results as responses to the two research questions.

Why do citizens choose to participate in local decision-making and co-production?

We tested several explanations of willingness to participate: internal and external political efficacy, satisfaction with public services and governance quality, and trust in local government and other people. As the model-fit comparison below shows, political efficacy has the strongest explanatory power, while adding other explanations adds almost no improvement in the models' predictive power.

Moreover, external efficacy (belief that participation brings results and that authorities listen) emerges as the strongest predictor in the full model (Figure 28). Although public service satisfaction and internal efficacy are also positive and statistically meaningful, their effects are smaller than external efficacy.

These results hold regardless of regional legacies and most socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. Of these, only age has a significant negative impact on participation in local democracy: each additional year of age is associated with a participation intensity that is about 0.0014–0.0017 lower. Across 20 years, this corresponds to roughly 0.03 points on the 0–1 outcome scale.




Figure 28 Explained variance across nested OLS models predicting overall participation intensity

Note: OLS models with HC3 robust standard errors; all specifications use the same complete-case sample (N = 843). The efficacy model includes controls. Adding public services, democracy, and trust variables produces only modest incremental gains in R². See respective regression models in Annex 6.

Thus, what local authorities do with citizen participation outputs matters for citizens' willingness to participate in local democracy. Indeed, focus group participants – no matter the social vulnerability status – all point to disappointment when participation outcomes are ignored, and to encouragement when they see positive change.

Within the external political efficacy cluster, perception that participation yields results is a stronger predictor of trust than perception that authorities listen. Yet, the latter matters for citizens' trust in local government and satisfaction with local democracy. **Thus, it is in LSGs' power to affect both citizen participation and public trust in them through their own action and communication – this is a powerful and hopeful sign for local democracy.**

The dynamic is similar for **citizens' willingness to participate in the future**. While the full model points to factors outside LSG control (an individual's material well-being, intensity of current participation, and settlement size), the largest statistically significant predictors of future participation are confidence that participation brought




Figure 29 Standardized coefficients from the full OLS model predicting overall participation intensity

Note: Green bars indicate positive statistically significant coefficients, blue bars indicate negative statistically significant coefficients, and yellow bars indicate coefficients that are not statistically significant at $p < .05$. † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Region represents the West relative to the Center—the regional contrast with the largest absolute standardized coefficient ($\beta = 0.05$); the effect is not statistically significant. Factors in light grey denote socio-demographic characteristics of respondents; factors in bold are statistically significant

results in the past 12 months, internal political efficacy (again, driven by the belief that participation brings results), and the quality of feedback on one's participation. These are all variables that LSG can at least partially shape through communication strategy and by designing participation as part of decision-making cycles that can increase the chances of tangible results.

The full model highlights three closely related features of participation experience. Respondents are more willing to participate in the future when they report tangible results from recent participation ($\beta = 0.178$, $p = .001$), higher internal political efficacy ($\beta = 0.172$, $p < .001$), and better feedback ($\beta = 0.160$, $p < .001$). Material wellbeing ($\beta = 0.148$, $p < .001$), current participation intensity ($\beta = 0.122$, $p = .003$), settlement size ($\beta = 0.114$, $p = .002$), and age ($\beta = 0.073$, $p = .038$) are also positively associated with future willingness. External political efficacy and trust in local authorities no longer show independent associations

in this specification. Simply put, future willingness is most consistently linked to respondents' own sense of capacity and to positive experiences showing that participation receives feedback and leads to results.

Finally, we also explored, qualitatively, in focus groups, citizens' own accounts of their motivation to participate. Our findings support both private interest and an orientation toward the common good as important motivations for participation. Citizens report engaging in local affairs when they see an opportunity to address a problem affecting themselves, their family, or a group with which they identify, thus pointing to private interest. At the same time, motivations related to improving community life, supporting others, and contributing to collective well-being are equally mentioned. The qualitative evidence suggests that these two forms of motivation rarely exist separately and, in most cases, reinforce one another.




Figure 30 Standardized coefficients from the full OLS model predicting future participation

Note: N = 739. Standardized coefficients from Future M3; p-values use HC3 standard errors. Green bars are statistically significant; gold bars are not. See full model in Table 26, Annex 6.

How can democratic local institutions mitigate low citizen participation?

We explored whether institutional responsiveness of local authorities, simplifying processes, and increasing accessibility of participation processes diminish barriers and enhance a citizen's willingness to participate using focus groups and a vignette experiment.

On **institutional responsiveness**, we tested whether telling participants that their input would be used in budget and strategy planning could increase willingness to join a public hearing. Our vignette experiment found no evidence of this effect. One possible reason is that people's sense of participation yielding results comes from actual experience, not from promises. As a result, simply stating that results would be incorporated in the future did not change responses.

But we find an interesting effect of communicating the regularity of a participatory event. **A regular, twice-yearly format reduced the probability of low willingness.** This means regularity does not, per se, increase willingness to participate, but mentioning this factor does not discourage participation either.

To explore how and whether local authorities can enhance participation by improving the accessibility of participatory mechanisms, we both asked the focus group participants and conducted a vignette experiment. From a citizens' perspective, accessibility includes timely information, simple and understandable procedures, physical and transportation access, accommodation of the needs of different population groups, and adapting participation mechanisms to wartime conditions.

At the same time, further research is needed to operationalize many of these components. For example, what qualifies as sufficient information about participation opportunities to encourage participation proved not so straightforward. Our vignette experiment showed that **detailed procedural information deters** precisely those who already doubt their competence to participate, feel unheard by local authorities, or have less formal education. While we thought that providing these details would clarify expectations and reduce uncertainty, it seems rather to increase the cognitive burden. This means we cannot take citizens' requests for more information about participatory opportunities at face value; instead, further research is needed to understand what "having more information" means for different social groups, and which messages and channels deliver this information with the lowest possible cognitive burden.

On accessibility, we also tested whether monetary rewards increase participation as compensation for opportunity cost. We find that mentioning monetary compensation makes people less likely to be indifferent to participation and more likely to report higher willingness to participate. At the same time, some people **were entirely discouraged by mentioning money**. Since none of the socio-demographic characteristics we measured explain these effects, more experiments are needed to understand them.

Finally, we found that communicating that others already took part in a participatory event reduces citizens' indifference towards an invitation to participate and makes a higher willingness to participate more probable. This means that sharing social proof that "citizens like me" endorsed the format by attending can also make a small difference.

Recommendations

This study took place during the fourth year of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine and the twelfth year since the covert invasion of Crimea and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk. These are prolonged conditions of physical insecurity that impose a significant toll on mental health, available time, and priorities among participants. The circumstances in which Ukrainian citizens and local authorities practice local democracy are therefore fundamentally abnormal. The essential change needed to improve the conditions for local democracy—though beyond the scope of this study—is a lasting and just peace for Ukraine.

At the same time, and largely out of necessity, local self-governments (LSGs) have emerged as important actors of wartime local democracy. This study shows that they can shape citizen participation through their own actions and communication. While socio-demographic characteristics, personal preferences, and individual beliefs influence patterns of democratic participation, the most important factor is citizens' belief that participation yields results, followed by a sense that they have the skills and knowledge to contribute meaningfully. Moreover, the perception that authorities listen is the strongest positive predictor of public trust in local government.

Based on this study and the validation event, local authorities should focus on increasing citizens' perception that participation brings results. This entails two parallel sets of actions:

First, at the operational level of specific citizen participation and public engagement processes, LSGs should:

1. **Clearly link LSG decisions and citizen participation in public communication.** For example, if a council considers a policy change that was also requested or endorsed in a public participation process, it should feature that fact prominently across multiple communication

channels. To do this, communication and policy teams in LSGs should coordinate their work.

2. **Communicate any follow-up steps or decisions to participants in clear language.** Because policy decisions take time and citizens' suggestions rarely translate immediately into tangible results, communicate meaningful interim steps as well. In practice, this means establishing post-communication and feedback loops that can help citizens sign up to and receive such updates.
3. **Explain the rationale for non-acceptance of proposals, delays, or changes in planned results.** Research partners said they understood that not all citizens' proposals may be actionable, but they highlighted the need for honest dialogue about feasibility. The validation event also showed that discussing alternatives with the citizens who provided the original proposal could help reduce frustration.
4. **Have the courage to accept the results.** If the participatory process produced thoroughly deliberated results, authorities should be open to acting on them even if they do not match the original vision.

Second, at the strategic level, the question of how citizen participation events and processes can yield results should guide their design and implementation from the outset. This is because local authorities' responsiveness is a legitimacy-enhancing factor, since the perception that authorities listen increases public trust in them. Steps to this end include but are not limited to:

1. Scheduling participatory processes early on in a decision-making process while focusing on issues that matter for citizens' everyday life. Citizens cannot be expected to provide detailed feedback to a full local strategy document written in a legalistic manner, but most people can compare the merits of specific proposals in services, utilities, or infrastructure in their community.

2. **Structuring participatory processes in such a way that results are feasible and actionable.** Too often, open-ended processes result in a wishlist that is not feasible to implement, while rigid public hearings either silence most participants or become stages for non-constructive expressions of mutual frustration. Facilitated deliberative processes should be considered wherever possible to mitigate these drawbacks.

Third, when organizing citizen engagement, LSGs should focus on enabling and communicating the accessibility of participatory mechanisms. This includes:

1. **Using digital tools as one format, but not a universal accessibility solution.** While respondents saw digital tools as a way to make participation easier and less resource-intensive, they warned against replacing other options with it. Access to information, skills availability, and technical conditions (electricity and internet) for participation can vary across population groups. Thus, the learning from Ukraine is that participatory opportunities should also enable elderly people and other groups without smartphones to participate, and digital tools should have viable alternatives for when there is no electricity or mobile connection.
2. **Non-patronizing learning formats.** Participatory processes can include time and formats that provide just enough information to judge policy proposals, while broader public communication can include accessible explanations of government work. At the same time, these formats need to be tested with different audiences and adapted; for example, we found that too much information can discourage participation because it is a cognitive burden.
3. **Communicating the regularity of the participatory process.** Knowing that one is invited not to a one-off event but to a regular format reduces indifference when responding to an invitation to participate. This likely connects

to one's evaluation of the chances that their efforts may bring results, although more research is needed.

4. **Providing social proof that a participatory process is accepted by people like the ones we want to participate in.** Like regularity, this helps reduce indifference to an invitation, pushing people toward a higher likelihood of accepting an invitation to a participatory process. This could be especially useful for including people from marginalized or hard-to-reach groups and requires finding champions from these groups to kickstart broader participation.

Bibliography

- Aasland, A., Lyska, O., 2020. Signs of Progress: Local Democracy Developments in Ukrainian Cities, in: Shelest, H., Rabinovych, M. (Eds.), *Decentralization, Regional Diversity, and Conflict*. pp. 283–310. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41765-9>
- Abel, T.D., & Stephan, M., 2000. 'The limits of civic environmentalism'. *American Behavioral Scientist*. 44(4), pp. 614–628. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764200044004006>
- Aldrich, D.P., Meyer, M.A., 2015. Social Capital and Community Resilience. *Am. Behav. Sci.* 59, 254–269. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764214550299>
- Alizada, N., Cole, R., Gastaldi, L., Grahn, S., Hellmeier, S., Lachapelle, J., Lührmann, A., Maerz, S.F., Pillai, S., Lindberg, S.I., 2021. *Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021*. V-Dem Institute, Gothenburg.
- Arends, H., Brik, T., Herrmann, B., Roesel, F., 2023. Decentralization and trust in government: Quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine. *J. Comp. Econ.* <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2023.08.002>
- Arnstein, S.R., 1969. A Ladder Of Citizen Participation. *J. Am. Inst. Plann.* 35, 216–224. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01944366908977225>
- Association for Self-Organization of Population. (2026). *Analytical report on the results of the study of practices for involving residents in the process of forming and implementing local policy [in Ukrainian]*. <https://samoorg.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/zvit-doslidzhennya.pdf>
- Berman, E.M., 1997. Dealing with cynical citizens. *Public Adm. Rev.* 57, 105–112.
- Börzel, T., & Buzogány, A. (2010). Environmental Politics Environmental organisations and the Europeanisation of public policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The case of biodiversity governance. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2010.508302>
- Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2014. Concept of local self-governance and territorial power reforming.
- Center for Innovations Development. (2025, August 4). *Democracy of participation in Ukrainian communities: Analysis of 2024 indicators*. <https://cid.center/analytics/demokratiya-uchasti-v-ukrayinskyh-gromadah-analiz-pokaznykiv-2024-roku/>
- Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 2023. Baseline survey on Open Government at local level in Ukraine: Mapping initiatives and assessing needs. Council of Europe, Strasbourg.
- Darkovich, A., Hatsko, V., 2024. Openness or support for the army? What influences trust in local authorities? [WWW Document]. URL <https://voxukraine.org/vidkrytist-chy-dopomoga-armiyi-shhovplyvaye-na-doviru-do-mistsevoyi-vlady> (accessed 2.14.25).
- Darkovich, A., Hatsko, V., Bevziuk, D., Hnyda, O., Shymanskyi, V., Nesterenko, R., unpublished. Trust, participation and service satisfaction. A study on local governance in Ukraine: perception survey. USAID Governance and Local Accountability (HOVERLA) Activity / Kyiv School of Economics.
- Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51(3), 629–636. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0046408>

- Dienel, C., Haas, G., Luh, V., Metzner, I., 2024. Deliberation in times of crisis – how can citizens' councils deal with pressing political issues like the Corona pandemic? *Innov. Eur. J. Soc. Sci. Res.* 37, 717–738. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2024.2306236>
- Elstub, S., Escobar, O., Harris, C., 2019. Mini-publics: design choices and legitimacy. *Handb. Democr. Innov. Gov.* 45–59. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786433862.00011>
- Eun, J., 2024. Public deliberation and policy crisis: the moderating effects of deliberation on policy support determinants. *Innov. Eur. J. Soc. Sci. Res.* 37, 699–716. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2024.2345875>
- Fung, A., 2006. Varieties of participation in complex governance. *Public Adm. Rev.* 66, 66–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00667.x>
- Fung, A., 2015. Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future. *Public Adm. Rev.* 75, 513–522. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12361>
- Fung, A., Wright, E.O., 2003. Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance. Verso.
- Fung, A., 2003. 'Survey article: Recipes for public spheres: Eight institutional design choices and their consequences'. *Journal of Political Philosophy*. 11(3), pp. 338–367. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00181>
- Fung, A., 2007. 'Minipublics: Deliberative designs and their consequences'. In S.W. Rosenberg (ed.). *Deliberation, participation and democracy: Can the people govern?* Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 159–183. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230591080_8
- Gil, O., Cortés-Cediel, M.E., Cantador, I., 2019. Citizen Participation and the Rise of Digital Media Platforms in Smart Governance and Smart Cities. *Int. J. E-Plan. Res. IJEPR* 8, 19–34. <https://doi.org/10.4018/IJEPR.2019010102>
- Gustafson, P., & Hertting, N., 2017. 'Understanding participatory governance: An analysis of participants' motives for participation'. *The American Review of Public Administration*. 47(5), pp. 538–549. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074015626298>
- Hatsko, V., Darkovich, A., 2024. Not just about the money: Challenges to cooperation and trust between activists and local authorities. *VoxUkraine*. URL <https://voxukraine.org/en/not-just-about-the-money-challenges-to-cooperation-and-trust-between-activists-and-local-authorities> (accessed 9.18.24).
- Irvin, R.A., & Stansbury, J., 2004. 'Citizen participation in decision making: Is it worth the effort?'. *Public Administration Review*. 64(1), pp. 55–65.
- Karakai, D., & Moskotina, R. (2026). Nudging Civic Participation in Times of Polycrisis: A Report on a Factorial Survey Experiment on Public Hearing Invitations in Ukraine. KSE Center for Democratic Resilience / KSE Sociological Research Center / Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23102414>
- Keudel, O. (2022). *How Patronal Networks Shape Opportunities for Local Citizen Participation in a Hybrid Regime*. ibidem Press / Columbia University Press.

- Keudel, O., Hatsko, V., Darkovich, A., Huss, O., 2024. Local Democracy and Resilience in Ukraine: Learning from Communities' Crisis Response in War (Research report No. 33). Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy.
- Keudel, O., Karakai, D., Moskotina, R., Lukeria, T., Darkovich, A., & Hatsko, V. (2026, April 27). Nudging Civic Participation in Times of Polycrisis: A Factorial Survey Experiment on Public Hearing Invitations in Ukraine. Retrieved from osf.io/yhnvf
- King, C.S., Feltey, K.M., Susel, B.O., 1998. The question of participation: Toward authentic public participation in public administration. *Public Adm. Rev.* 58, 317–326.
- Kulyk, V. (2011). Language identity, linguistic diversity and political cleavages: Evidence from Ukraine. *Nations and Nationalism*, 17(3), 627–648. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00493.x>
- Kulyk, V., & Hale, H. E. (2022). Imperfect measures of dynamic identities: The changing impact of ethnolinguistic characteristics on political attitudes in Ukraine. *Nations and Nationalism*, 28(3), 841–860. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12782>
- Lammert, C., Vormann, B., 2020. When Inequalities Matter Most: The Crisis of Democracy as a Crisis of Trust, in: Oswald, M.T. (Ed.), *Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy*. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp. 139–156. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_7
- Lankina, T., & Libman, A. (2019). Soviet Legacies of Economic Development, Oligarchic Rule, and Electoral Quality in Eastern Europe's Partial Democracies: The Case of Ukraine. *Comparative Politics*, 52(1), 127–176. <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041519X15624348215945>
- Lawrence, M., Homer-Dixon, T., Janzwood, S., Rockstöm, J., Renn, O., Donges, J.F., 2024. Global polycrisis: the causal mechanisms of crisis entanglement. *Glob. Sustain.* 7, e6. <https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2024.1>
- Lebrument, N., Zumbo-Lebrument, C., Rochette, C., Roulet, T.J., 2021. Triggering participation in smart cities: Political efficacy, public administration satisfaction and sense of belonging as drivers of citizens' intention. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change* 171, 120938. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2021.120938>
- Lukeria, T., Romaniuk, A., Kuzemska-Danyliuk, M. & Cherkes, Y. (2026). Комунікація ОМС із громадою: добірка практик. KSE Центр демократичної стійкості та KSE Центр урбаністичних студій / Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21456489>
- McGee, R., Bazaara, N., Gaventa, J., Nierras, R., Rai, M., Rocamora, J., Saule, N., Williams, E., Zermelo, S., 2003. Legal Frameworks for Citizen Participation: Synthesis Report. Learning initiative on Citizen Participation and Local Governance/Logo Link.
- Michels, A., & De Graaf, L. 2010. 'Examining citizen participation: Local participatory policy making and democracy'. *Local Government Studies*. 36(4), pp. 477–491.
- Moynihan, D.P., 2003. Normative and instrumental perspectives on public participation. *Am. Rev. Public Adm.* 33, 164–188. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074003251379>
- Neblo, M.A., Esterling, K.M., Kennedy, R.P., Lazer, D.M.J., & Sokhey, A.E. 2010. 'Who wants to deliberate—and why?'. *American Political Science Review*. 104(3), pp. 566–583. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000298>

- OECD, 2018. Maintaining the Momentum of Decentralisation in Ukraine, OECD Multi-level Governance Studies. OECD Publishing, Paris.
- Osborne, S.P., Radnor, Z., Strokosch, K., 2016. Co-Production and the Co-Creation of Value in Public Services: A suitable case for treatment? *Public Manag. Rev.* 18, 639–653. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2015.1111927>
- Pop-Eleches, G., & Robertson, G. B. (2018). Identity and political preferences in Ukraine – before and after the Euromaidan. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 34(2–3), 107–118. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1452181>
- Rourke, F.E.. 1984. *Bureaucracy, politics and public policy*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Stark, A., Taylor, M., 2014. Citizen participation, community resilience and crisis-management policy. *Aust. J. Polit. Sci.* 49, 300–315. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2014.899966>
- TI Ukraine, n.d. The 2017-2021 ranking database [WWW Document]. Transparent Cities. URL <https://transparentcities.in.ua/en/data> (accessed 2.3.25).
- Transparent Cities. (2026, January 17). *The community's voice in 2025: Did cities implement participatory budgeting?* TransparentCities.in.ua. <https://transparentcities.in.ua/news/holos-hromady-u-2025-mu-chy-vprovadyly-mista-biudzheth-uchasti>
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L. & Brady, H.E.. 1995. *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press.

Annex 1 Detailed descriptive statistics of the survey samples

Region	Total N	Share of sample, %	Valid N: overall intensity	Mean overall intensity	Mean age	Higher education, %	Ukrainian-only language, %	External efficacy mean	Trust local authorities mean	Democracy can be limited mean
Kyiv	137	11.2	136	0.118	48.33	75.2	35.8	4.18	3.85	4.31
North	160	13.1	159	0.115	47.33	51.9	61.6	3.62	3.59	4.24
West	281	23.1	277	0.134	45.58	58.4	85.4	3.92	4.28	4.43
Centre	344	28.2	341	0.096	48.49	51.8	52.8	3.29	3.62	4.12
South	180	14.8	179	0.105	49.88	54.4	28.9	3.28	3.59	3.95
East	116	9.5	115	0.068	49.95	56.0	26.7	3.31	4.78	3.94

Table 8 Regional descriptive statistics for the survey 1 sample

Region	Total N	Ukrainian	Ukrainian/Russian equally	Russian	Other	Difficult to answer
Kyiv	137	49 (35.77%)	68 (49.64%)	20 (14.60%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
North	160	98 (61.25%)	47 (29.38%)	14 (8.75%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.625%)
West	281	239 (85.05%)	33 (11.74%)	6 (2.14%)	2 (0.712%)	1 (0.356%)
Centre	344	180 (52.33%)	115 (33.43%)	45 (13.08%)	1 (0.291%)	3 (0.872%)
South	180	52 (28.89%)	84 (46.67%)	43 (23.89%)	1 (0.556%)	0 (0.00%)
East	116	31 (26.72%)	50 (43.10%)	35 (30.17%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)

Table 9 Language counts and percentages by region for the survey 1 sample

Region	Total N	Ukrainian	Ukrainian/Russian equally	Russian	Other	Difficult to answer
Kyiv	143	67 (46.85%)	54 (37.76%)	22 (15.38%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
North	149	90 (60.40%)	46 (30.87%)	13 (8.72%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
West	190	138 (72.63%)	46 (24.21%)	6 (3.16%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
Centre	294	151 (51.36%)	108 (36.73%)	34 (11.56%)	1 (0.34%)	0 (0.00%)
South	160	39 (24.38%)	76 (47.50%)	45 (28.12%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
East	113	30 (26.55%)	54 (47.79%)	29 (25.66%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)

Table 10 Language counts and percentages by region for the survey 2 sample

Annex 2 War effects and participation barriers: subgroup contrasts by age, gender, and region

Question	Group	Item	Higher group	Higher percent	Lower group	Lower percent	Difference pp	95% CI	p	FDR q
Q16	Age	Did not believe participation would make a difference	35–54	32.4% (n=111)	18–34	20.0% (n=50)	12.4	[-1.7, 26.5]	.084	.264
Q16	Age	Insufficient connection to the community	55+	17.9% (n=84)	18–34	6.0% (n=50)	11.9	[1.3, 22.4]	.027	.202
Q16	Age	Feared conflict or negative consequences	35–54	16.2% (n=111)	55+	4.8% (n=84)	11.5	[3.2, 19.7]	.006	.096
Q16	Age	No personally important issue	18–34	26.0% (n=50)	35–54	15.3% (n=111)	10.7	[-3.2, 24.6]	.131	.329
Q16	Age	The war shifted my priorities	55+	20.2% (n=84)	18–34	10.0% (n=50)	10.2	[-1.7, 22.2]	.093	.264
Q16	Age	Did not know whom to contact	18–34	22.0% (n=50)	55+	15.5% (n=84)	6.5	[-7.3, 20.4]	.356	.593
Q16	Age	No one invited me	55+	44.0% (n=84)	18–34	38.0% (n=50)	6.0	[-11.1, 23.2]	.489	.682
Q16	Gender	The war shifted my priorities	Men	19.8% (n=121)	Women	12.1% (n=124)	7.7	[-1.4, 16.9]	.097	.264
Q16	Gender	Did not know about participation opportunities	Women	25.8% (n=124)	Men	19.8% (n=121)	6.0	[-4.5, 16.5]	.264	.488
Q16	Region	Did not believe participation would make a difference	South	45.5% (n=44)	Kyiv	14.7% (n=34)	30.7	[11.8, 49.7]	.001	.044
Q16	Region	No one invited me	Kyiv	55.9% (n=34)	North	28.2% (n=39)	27.7	[5.8, 49.5]	.013	.131
Q16	Region	Did not know whom to contact	North	28.2% (n=39)	East	12.5% (n=32)	15.7	[-2.5, 33.9]	.091	.264
Q16	Region	Did not have enough time or energy	Centre	30.6% (n=72)	North	15.4% (n=39)	15.2	[-0.4, 30.7]	.056	.264
Q16	Region	Feared conflict or negative consequences	East	21.9% (n=32)	North	7.7% (n=39)	14.2	[-2.4, 30.8]	.094	.264
Q16	Region	No personally important issue	East	31.2% (n=32)	Kyiv	17.6% (n=34)	13.6	[-6.9, 34.1]	.194	.417
Q16	Region	Did not know about participation opportunities	South	27.3% (n=44)	Kyiv	14.7% (n=34)	12.6	[-5.2, 30.3]	.165	.381
Q16	Region	The war shifted my priorities	Centre	20.8% (n=72)	Kyiv	8.8% (n=34)	12.0	[-1.4, 25.4]	.078	.264
Q16	Region	Insufficient connection to the community	Kyiv	20.6% (n=34)	Centre	11.1% (n=72)	9.5	[-5.9, 24.9]	.228	.456
Q16	Region	Had nothing to say	Kyiv	20.6% (n=34)	North	15.4% (n=39)	5.2	[-12.5, 22.9]	.564	.682
Q18	Age	Avoided gatherings because of physical danger	55+	31.6% (n=335)	18–34	21.0% (n=252)	10.6	[3.5, 17.7]	.003	.030
Q18	Age	Less energy because of stress and workload	55+	29.9% (n=335)	35–54	23.4% (n=462)	6.5	[0.2, 12.7]	.042	.100
Q18	Age	Less time because of the war	55+	18.5% (n=335)	18–34	12.3% (n=252)	6.2	[0.4, 12.0]	.036	.097
Q18	Age	Avoided discussions involving sensitive information	18–34	13.5% (n=252)	55+	8.4% (n=335)	5.1	[-0.0, 10.3]	.051	.100

Q18	Gender	Less energy because of stress and workload	Women	29.0% (n=555)	Men	21.9% (n=494)	7.1	[1.9, 12.4]	.008	.033
Q18	Gender	Harder to criticise local authorities openly	Men	21.5% (n=494)	Women	15.0% (n=555)	6.5	[1.8, 11.2]	.006	.033
Q18	Region	Avoided gatherings because of physical danger	South	34.4% (n=160)	Kyiv	21.0% (n=143)	13.4	[3.5, 23.3]	.008	.033
Q18	Region	Less energy because of stress and workload	South	31.2% (n=160)	West	17.9% (n=190)	13.4	[4.3, 22.4]	.004	.030
Q18	Region	More participation in security, aid and recovery	West	17.4% (n=190)	North	6.7% (n=149)	10.7	[3.9, 17.4]	.002	.030
Q18	Region	Harder to criticise local authorities openly	South	21.2% (n=160)	East	10.6% (n=113)	10.6	[2.1, 19.1]	.014	.049
Q18	Region	Less time because of the war	South	20.6% (n=160)	West	12.6% (n=190)	8.0	[0.1, 15.8]	.046	.100
Q18	Region	Stronger duty to help the community	West	15.8% (n=190)	South	8.1% (n=160)	7.7	[1.0, 14.4]	.025	.074
Q18	Region	Avoided discussions involving sensitive information	North	16.1% (n=149)	Kyiv	9.1% (n=143)	7.0	[-0.5, 14.6]	.069	.103
Q18	Region	None of the listed effects	Kyiv	22.4% (n=143)	West	17.4% (n=190)	5.0	[-3.7, 13.7]	.259	.296

Table 11 Subgroup contrasts for reported war effects and participation barriers

Note: Percentage-point contrasts with p-values and FDR-adjusted q-values. Each row compares the highest and lowest eligible subgroup percentage for an item. The 95 percent confidence interval and two-sided p-value use the normal approximation for the difference between two independent proportions. Benjamini-Hochberg q-values control the false discovery rate separately across all Q16 and Q18 gender, age, and region contrasts. The table retains observed gaps of at least 5 percentage points. Q16: "Why have you not taken part in addressing community issues over the past 12 months?"; Q18: "Which statements about how the full-scale invasion has affected your personal involvement in community affairs do you agree with the most?" (select up to 3 you agree with most).

Question	Group	Item	Higher group	Higher percent	Lower group	Lower percent	Difference pp	95% CI	p	FDR q
Q16	Did not believe participation would make a difference	South vs Kyiv	78	30.7	32.8	[11.7, 53.8]	.002	.007	.084	.264
Q16	No one invited me	Kyiv vs North	73	27.7	41.0	[5.6, 76.5]	.023	.046	.027	.202
Q16	Did not know whom to contact	North vs East	71	15.7	16.1	[-15.4, 47.6]	.317	.317	.006	.096
Q18	Avoided gatherings because of physical danger	South vs Kyiv	303	13.4	11.6	[0.4, 22.7]	.042	.060	.131	.329
Q18	Less energy because of stress and workload	South vs West	350	13.4	10.2	[0.0, 20.4]	.050	.060	.093	.264
Q18	More participation in security, aid and recovery	West vs North	339	10.7	10.3	[3.8, 16.9]	.002	.007	.356	.593
Q16	Age	No one invited me	55+	44.0% (n=84)	18–34	38.0% (n=50)	6.0	[-11.1, 23.2]	.489	.682
Q16	Gender	The war shifted my priorities	Men	19.8% (n=121)	Women	12.1% (n=124)	7.7	[-1.4, 16.9]	.097	.264

Table 12 Adjusted logistic models for key subgroup contrasts

Note: Average marginal effects from adjusted logistic regressions. The six models cover the three largest eligible age or region contrasts in each question block. Each model is restricted to the two contrasted groups and adjusts for gender, age, higher education, material wellbeing, Russian-only language and settlement size. HC3 standard errors are used. Average marginal effects compare model-based probabilities after setting every observation to the higher-percentage group and then to the lower-percentage group. Q16: "Why have you not taken part in addressing community issues over the past 12 months?"; Q18: "Which statements about how the full-scale invasion has affected your personal involvement in community affairs do you agree with the most?" (select up to 3 you agree with most).

Annex 3 Vignette study summary

This annex summarizes the basic information on the vignette experiment. The full version of this report, including vignette texts and robustness checks, is published on Zenodo: <https://zenodo.org/records/23102414>. The report is prepared by Danyil Karakai, Head of the Center for Sociological Research, Kyiv School of Economics, and Ruslana Moskotina, Senior Analyst of the Center for Sociological Research, Kyiv School of Economics

Methodology

We use a factorial vignette experiment (factorial survey). The vignette is framed as an invitation to a local public hearing on the respondent's community development strategy, and we examine how its features affect citizens' stated willingness to attend. Each vignette is defined by nine factors, each with two levels, giving a full factorial of $2^9 = 512$ possible vignettes. To contain survey costs, we reduce the full factorial of 512 profiles to 12 vignettes using a D-efficient fractional factorial design (Resolution III). This design supports estimation of the main effects of the factors on willingness to participate. We selected the smallest number of vignettes that still achieves high D-efficiency.

Respondents are presented with a hypothetical scenario: an invitation to a public hearing on their community's development strategy, which sets priorities for the next three years across investment, education, healthcare, and other aspects of community life. The invitation varies along nine binary factors, each coded 0 and 1 (the short labels used hereafter are given in brackets):

A1. Provision of an agenda and registration details (agenda & registration)

A2. Information on how the results will be used (use of results)

A3. Anonymity of input (anonymity)

A4. Social proof of others' participation (social proof)

A5. Participant selection method: random vs. open call (random selection)

A6. Monetary compensation

A7. Deliberative format

A8. Availability of a contact channel (contact channel)

A9. Framing of the event as one-off vs. recurring (recurring event) The design is between-subjects: each respondent is randomly assigned one of the 12 vignettes. The primary outcome is the respondent's stated willingness to participate, measured on an 11-point scale (from 0 to 10).

Factor name	Factor level (with inserted into the invitation)	
	+1	-1
A1. Agenda & registration (schedule, agenda, how to take part)	Agenda: 15:00–15:45 — Presentation of the community development strategy for the next three years 15:45–16:30 — Residents submit their proposals 16:30–17:00 — Summing up To take part, please complete the registration form at the link below: https://event-form.example.org/register/8F32K	Factor not mentioned
A2. Use of results	The results of the hearing will be incorporated into the community development plan and taken into account when drawing up the local budget for 2026	Factor not mentioned
A3. Anonymity	During the hearing, you will be able to submit your proposals anonymously via a form — they will be considered without being linked to your name	Factor not mentioned
A4. Social proof ("others are taking part")	Thousands of Ukrainians have already taken part in such discussions this year. Join them!	Factor not mentioned
A5. Random selection	Random: We invite you to take part... Participants in the hearing were chosen by random selection, and you have been included on this list	Open call: We invite all residents to take part...
A6. Monetary compensation	We hope you will be able to spare the time. Monetary compensation of UAH 500 is provided for your participation	We hope you will be able to spare the time.
A7. Deliberative format	During the event, you will be able to discuss proposals in groups with other residents, formulate your own ideas, and jointly set priorities.	Factor not mentioned
A8. Contact channel	If you have any questions, you can contact our Telegram bot: https://t.me/VignetteHelpBot or call: +380 90 333 22 11 (Olena Kovalenko)	Factor not mentioned
A9. Recurring event	Recurring: Hearings on community development matters are held twice a year	One-off: This hearing is a one-off meeting to discuss this matter
For the analysis, the factors were recoded from -1/+1 to 0/1.		

Table 13 Factors in the vignette

Note: For the analysis, the factors were recoded from -1/+1 to 0/1.

The experiment was administered as part of a broader online survey conducted by Info Sapiens, covering 1,018 Ukrainian adults who completed the vignette item. After fielding, we found that the factors were noticeably correlated with one another (whereas the design requires the factors to be uncorrelated or only weakly correlated), owing to a technical error introduced when the vignettes were transferred into the questionnaire. To address this, we ran a supplementary survey (also fielded by Info Sapiens) using two additional vignettes constructed to reduce the correlations among factors. This supplementary online survey covered a further 97 respondents who completed the vignette item. After combining both samples and excluding respondents who completed the questionnaire implausibly quickly (in under two minutes), the final analytic sample comprised 1,112 respondents.




Figure 31 Distribution of the outcome variable

Note: This figure shows how many respondents selected each value of the willingness-to-attend variable (outcome variable). The mean willingness to attend a public hearing is 5.61 on a scale from 0 to 10, so willingness is moderate overall — neither high nor low. The distribution across individual values shows that respondents tend to choose either the extremes of the scale (0 and 10) or its midpoint (5).

After the vignette experiment, respondents were debriefed: they were informed that the invitation was hypothetical, that no actual public hearing was planned, and that no monetary compensation for participation was on offer. Because the invitations contained links, the vignettes were presented to respondents as screenshots (images) rather than as live text, to prevent respondents from clicking through and losing their place in the survey.

The full vignette texts (including the outcome question itself), the debriefing text, the factors with their levels, a matrix of factor levels by vignette, Pearson correlation matrices for the initial survey and for the combined initial-plus-supplementary sample are provided online in Karakai & Moskotina 2026.

Vignette Results: Regressions

We specified nine hypotheses in advance, one for each invitation element (the elements are listed below, with the corresponding hypothesis in brackets):

1. Agenda & registration (H1)
2. Use of results (H2)
3. Anonymity (H3)
4. Social proof (H4)
5. Random selection (H5)
6. Monetary compensation (H6)
7. Deliberative format (H7)
8. Contact channel (H8)
9. Recurring event (H9)

For each element, we expected a positive association with willingness to attend a public hearing. That is, we expected willingness to be higher when the invitation included an agenda and the registration form, explained how the results would be used, offered anonymity, provided social proof, stated that the respondent had been selected at random, offered monetary compensation, described a deliberative (debate-style) format, named a contact person, and presented the event as recurring (twice a year) rather than one-off.

We used OLS regression to test these hypotheses. As Figure 18 in Chapter 7 shows, only the first hypothesis (H1) was supported but in the opposite direction to what we predicted: including an agenda in the invitation is associated with lower willingness to attend. The same pattern holds under alternative regression specifications, namely the ordinal logit and probit models (see Karakai & Moskotina 2026, Appendices 7-8).

In addition, we ran a multinomial logistic regression, assuming that the relationships between the invitation elements and willingness to attend a public hearing might be more complex than initially expected (Figure 19). To simplify interpretation, we recoded willingness to attend into a three-point scale: low (0-3), medium (4-6), and high (7-10). Under this specification, three further factors came into play in addition to agenda & registration: social proof, monetary compensation, and recurrence. Social proof and monetary compensation both drew respondents away from the middle category towards high willingness. In addition, when we set medium willingness as the reference category, we found that it was chosen less often than either the high or the low category among respondents whose invitation offered monetary compensation³. A regular, twice-yearly format reduced the probability of low willingness.

³ For monetary compensation, both contrasts relative to the medium category are positive and significant: low vs medium, $b = 0.66$, $p < 0.001$, and high vs medium, $b = 0.61$, $p < 0.001$.

Vignette Results: Exploratory analysis of moderation

For exploratory purposes, we examined whether the effect of each invitation element on willingness to attend depended on who the respondent was. We tested ten respondent characteristics: gender, age group, education, interest in politics, trust in local government, internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, prior civic participation, settlement type, and region. For every element-by-characteristic combination, we re-estimated the OLS model with all nine elements included and added the characteristic together with its interaction with the element of interest; continuous characteristics (e.g., education, efficacy) were standardised, while categorical ones (age group, prior participation, settlement type, region) entered as sets of category indicators, each level compared with a reference category. A significant interaction indicates that the element's effect on willingness differs across levels of that characteristic.

The only substantively meaningful differences concerned the provision of an agenda (information provision, H1). Its negative effect was concentrated in particular groups (Figure 13): it was stronger among less-educated respondents, among those aged 45-55, and among respondents with lower political efficacy — both internal efficacy (the belief that one has enough knowledge and skills to take part in deciding matters important for one's community) and external efficacy (the belief that the local authorities take account of the views of people like oneself). The differences are sizeable: among respondents with the lowest education and efficacy, adding an agenda lowered willingness by roughly one point on the 0-10 scale, whereas among the most educated and most efficacious it had essentially no effect; for the 45-55 age group the agenda effect was about 1.7 points more negative than for the youngest respondents. In other words, detailed procedural information deters precisely those who already doubt their own competence to participate, who feel unheard by the local authorities, or who have less formal education.

The remaining elements showed little variation across respondent characteristics (Figure 14 and Figure 15). The one exception was social proof, whose effect depended on settlement size: indicating that others had already registered raised willingness in mid-sized cities (roughly 50,000-500,000 residents) but not in villages, small towns, or the largest cities; in these mid-sized cities, the effect of social proof was about 1.7 points more positive than in villages. Because we estimated a large number of interactions simultaneously (nine elements across ten characteristics), this subgroup analysis is primarily exploratory: some of the significant differences may be chance findings, and the patterns reported here require confirmation in dedicated, adequately powered studies.

Limitations

Because the experiment was fielded on a non-probability, opt-in online panel, the effect estimates should be read with care. Respondents were randomly assigned to vignettes within the realized sample, so the non-probability design does not compromise the experiment's internal validity: the estimated main effects are unbiased for this sample, and the direction and relative importance of the factor effects can be interpreted with confidence. What is uncertain is the generalizability of the effect magnitudes to the wider adult population—if the factor effects are heterogeneous across individuals and the panel over- or under-represents respondents with stronger or weaker responses, the sample-average effects may diverge from the population-average effects in a direction that cannot be established a priori.

Because the realized design also departed from the intended orthogonal layout (Karakai & Moskotina 2026), the factors are no longer fully independent, so the effect of each one cannot be cleanly separated from the others. Two checks nonetheless suggest the resulting bias is small. First, the factors remained only weakly correlated: variance inflation factors in the main model ranged from 1.15 to 1.42 (mean 1.32), far below conventional thresholds, so the main effects are not materially confounded with one another and their standard errors are barely inflated.




Figure 32 Predicted willingness to attend the public hearing with and without information provision, by respondent education, political efficacy, and age group

Note: The figure shows OLS model-based predicted willingness to attend the public hearing for the two experimental arms — control (the element absent) and treatment (the element present) — across levels of each moderator, with the other eight invitation elements held at their sample means; whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. Each panel pairs it with one moderator — education, internal political efficacy, and external political efficacy, and age group (18–34 to 66+). External political efficacy is the belief that the authorities are responsive, measured by agreement on a 0–10 scale with “The local authorities in my community take account of the views of people like me”. For the continuous moderators, Low, Medium, and High denote one standard deviation below the mean, the mean, and one standard deviation above it; on the original response scales these correspond roughly to internal efficacy 2 / 5 / 8 and external efficacy 1 / 4 / 7 (both 0–10), and to education = vocational/incomplete higher / completed higher. A moderation is visible where the control and treatment lines diverge: the vertical gap between them is the agenda effect at that moderator level.

Our moderation analysis partly mitigates this concern: for eight of the nine invitation elements we found no evidence that effects varied across the ten respondent characteristics examined (Figure 14 and Figure 15), limiting the scope for sample composition to distort those effects. The exception is the only element with a robust effect — agenda & registration, whose negative effect was concentrated among less-educated and lower-efficacy respondents — so its magnitude is more sample-dependent and warrants replication, especially as these interaction tests are exploratory and statistically less powerful than tests of main effects.

Finally, the agenda & registration factor bundles two distinct elements that always varied together — the provision of an agenda (information about what the hearing will involve) and the requirement to register via an online form — so we cannot tell whether the lower willingness is driven by the added information, by the registration burden, or by both.




Figure 33 Moderation of invitation elements' effects on willingness to attend a public hearing, by respondent characteristics

Note: Each panel corresponds to one invitation element; within a panel, each row is a respondent characteristic (moderator). The points are the interaction coefficients between the element and the moderator, with their 95% confidence intervals, estimated from an OLS model that includes all nine elements, the moderator, and the element-by-moderator interaction. The coefficient shows how much the element's effect on willingness to attend changes as the moderator changes: for continuous characteristics (education, interest in politics, trust in local government, internal political efficacy, external political efficacy) the change is per one standard deviation; for categorical characteristics each level is compared with a reference category — gender (reference: male), age group (reference: 18–34), prior civic participation (reference: none), settlement type (reference: village), and region (reference: Kyiv). A coefficient is statistically significant (shown in teal) when its confidence interval does not cross the dashed line at zero, indicating that the element's effect differs across levels of that characteristic; non-significant coefficients are shown in grey.




Figure 34 Moderation of invitation elements' effects on willingness to attend a public hearing, by respondent characteristics

Note: Each panel corresponds to one invitation element; within a panel, each row is a respondent characteristic (moderator). The points are the interaction coefficients between the element and the moderator, with their 95% confidence intervals, estimated from an OLS model that includes all nine elements, the moderator, and the element-by-moderator interaction. The coefficient shows how much the element's effect on willingness to attend changes as the moderator changes; for continuous characteristics (education, interest in politics, trust in local government, internal political efficacy, external political efficacy) the change is per one standard deviation; for categorical characteristics each level is compared with a reference category — gender (reference: male), age group (reference: 18–34), prior civic participation (reference: none), settlement type (reference: village), and region (reference: Kyiv). A coefficient is statistically significant (shown in teal) when its confidence interval does not cross the dashed line at zero, indicating that the element's effect differs across levels of that characteristic; non-significant coefficients are shown in grey.

Annex 4 Additional analysis for political efficacy and citizen participation

Variable	Valid N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
A1: Knowledge and skills to participate effectively	1,145	5.060	2.870	0.000	10.000
A2: Authorities consider people like me when making decisions	1,131	3.720	2.850	0.000	10.000
A3: Participation brings tangible results	995	3.450	2.830	0.000	10.000
A4: Collective action influence on local decisions	1,150	5.780	2.930	0.000	10.000

Table 14 Descriptive Statistics for Political Efficacy Indicators
Data: Survey 1

Form of participation	Knowledge and skills (A1)	Authorities listen (A2)	Participation yields results (A3)	Collective action influence (A4)
Overall participation	0.27	0.19	0.36	0.18
Direct contact	0.24	0.17	0.30	0.14
Consultation	0.23	0.17	0.33	0.15
Dialogue	0.18	0.19	0.31	0.10
Protest	0.15	0.13	0.25	0.10
Co-production	0.18	0.16	0.26	0.12
Civil society	0.24	0.17	0.32	0.18

Table 15 Spearman Correlations Between Participation Intensity and Political Efficacy Indicators
Data: Survey 1

Predictor	Outcome	Coefficient	p-value	N
Internal efficacy	Overall intensity	0.265***	<.001	1106
Internal efficacy	Overall breadth	0.249***	<.001	1106
External efficacy	Overall intensity	0.317***	<.001	961
External efficacy	Overall breadth	0.316***	<.001	961

Table 16 Key Spearman correlations with participation outcomes

Model	N	R ²	Adj. R ²
M1: Region only	1207	0.019	0.015
M2: M1 + language	1202	0.022	0.017
M3: M2 + basic characteristics	1181	0.048	0.041
M4: M3 + efficacy check	926	0.153	0.143

Table 17 Model Fit Across Nested OLS Specifications Predicting Overall Participation Intensity

OLS models fit for participation intensity across nested specifications. "Basics" denotes socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. "Efficacy" includes internal and external political efficacy. Data: Survey 1

Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4
Intercept	0.096*** (0.007)	0.087*** (0.008)	0.152*** (0.027)	0.088** (0.030)
Kyiv region	0.022 (0.014)	0.024† (0.014)	0.019 (0.014)	0.010 (0.016)
North region	0.019 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.013 (0.016)
West region	0.038** (0.012)	0.032* (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	0.021 (0.013)
South region	0.009 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.015 (0.012)	0.015 (0.014)
East region	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.024* (0.011)	-0.024* (0.011)	-0.021 (0.014)
Ukrainian language		0.017* (0.009)	0.016† (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)
Age			-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Higher education			0.012 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.010)
Material wellbeing			0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)
Internal efficacy				0.007*** (0.002)
External efficacy				0.015*** (0.002)

Table 18 Detailed OLS model coefficients. Dependent variable: overall intensity of participation
Compact OLS table: coefficient with HC3 robust SE in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.10. Data: Survey 1

Variable	M6 Breadth indices	M7 Intensity A-items
Internal efficacy (A1+A4)	0.013** (0.005)	
External efficacy (A2+A3)	0.030*** (0.004)	
A1 Knowledge and skills		0.007*** (0.002)
A2 Authorities consider people like me		0.001 (0.002)
A3 Participation brings tangible results		0.015*** (0.002)
A4 Collective action influence		-0.001 (0.002)
Age	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)
Female	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.009)
Higher education (yes or no)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.010)
Material wellbeing	0.017 (0.013)	0.002 (0.007)
Language: Ukrainian/Russian equally	-0.036† (0.020)	-0.012 (0.010)
Language: Russian	-0.063* (0.029)	-0.024* (0.012)

Table 19 Main regression results. M6 with Overall Breadth as the dependent variable. M7 as Overall Intensity.

Data: Survey 1

Model	N	R ²	Adj. R ²
M6 Breadth ~ efficacy indices	924	0.151	0.144
M7 Intensity ~ A1–A4 separately	924	0.172	0.163

Table 20 Model fit

Note: R² values are modest, which is expected for cross-sectional survey models of behavioral participation. The key finding is coefficient stability and the contrast between A3/A1 and the weaker A2/A4 terms. Data: Survey 1

Variable	b (SE)	95% CI	p
A1 Knowledge and skills	0.006*** (0.002)	[0.003; 0.010]	<.001
A2 Authorities consider people like me	0.002 (0.002)	[-0.003; 0.006]	0.443
A3 Participation brings tangible results	0.015*** (0.002)	[0.011; 0.019]	<.001
A4 Collective action influence	-0.001 (0.002)	[-0.004; 0.002]	0.551

Table 21 Political efficacy indicators as separate predictors of overall participation intensity

Data: Survey 1

The nested models below separate the association of political efficacy with future willingness from the additional adjustment introduced in the full feedback model. For direct model comparison, Models N1-N3 use the same 739 complete cases as Future M3. N1 includes only the two theoretically defined efficacy scales; N2 adds gender, age, higher education, and material wellbeing; N3 is the full Future M3 specification. A separate item-level model uses all 936 respondents with valid A1-A4 responses and the same four demographic controls. Coefficients are OLS estimates with HC3 standard errors.

Model	N	R ²	Internal efficacy β (p)	External efficacy β (p)
N1 Efficacy only	739	0.096	0.181 (< .001)	0.168 (< .001)
N2 + basic demographics	739	0.128	0.161 (< .001)	0.150 (.002)
N3 Full Future M3	739	0.239	0.172 (< .001)	-0.058 (.298)

Table 22 Nested efficacy models predicting future willingness to participate
Data: Survey 2

Predictor	b	HC3 SE	95% CI	Standardised beta	p
Intercept	-0.391	0.590	[-1.549, 0.766]	—	.507
Internal political efficacy	0.212	0.062	[0.091, 0.333]	0.161	< .001
External political efficacy	0.173	0.056	[0.064, 0.282]	0.150	.002
Woman	0.028	0.205	[-0.374, 0.431]	0.005	.890
Age	0.005	0.008	[-0.010, 0.020]	0.024	.499
Higher education	0.051	0.215	[-0.371, 0.472]	0.008	.814
Material wellbeing	0.720	0.144	[0.437, 1.003]	0.181	< .001

Table 23 Efficacy plus demographic controls: full coefficient table
Data: Survey 2

Predictor	b	HC3 SE	95% CI	Standardised beta	p
Intercept	-0.555	0.501	[-1.538, 0.428]	—	.269
A1 Knowledge and skills to participate	0.186	0.047	[0.094, 0.277]	0.164	< .001
A2 Authorities consider people like me	-0.039	0.042	[-0.121, 0.043]	-0.038	.353
A3 Participation usually brings tangible results	0.225	0.046	[0.135, 0.316]	0.212	< .001
A4 Collective action can influence decisions	0.118	0.043	[0.033, 0.202]	0.112	.006
Woman	0.152	0.179	[-0.197, 0.502]	0.026	.393
Age	-0.003	0.007	[-0.016, 0.011]	-0.011	.714
Higher education	0.054	0.189	[-0.316, 0.425]	0.009	.773
Material wellbeing	0.606	0.127	[0.356, 0.855]	0.149	< .001

Table 24 Political efficacy items as separate predictors of future willingness with demographic controls

Note. Table A11 uses the maximum available N = 936 with complete A1-A4 data. Re-estimating the same item-level model on the N = 739 complete-case sample used in Future M3 gives the same substantive ordering: A3 remains the strongest A-item ($\beta = 0.184$, $p < .001$), A1 remains positive ($\beta = 0.097$, $p = .032$), A2 remains null ($\beta = -0.009$, $p = .856$), and A4 is borderline ($\beta = 0.089$, $p = .056$). Data: Survey 2

Annex 4 Additional analysis for political efficacy and citizen participation

Predictor	b	HC3 SE	95% CI	Standardised beta	p
Intercept	2.648	0.154	[2.346, 2.951]	—	< .001
Feedback quality	0.299	0.033	[0.235, 0.363]	0.322	< .001

Model: Future M1. Outcome: future_participation. N = 804; R² = 0.103. Coefficients are unstandardized OLS estimates with HC3 standard errors. Data: Survey 2

Predictor	b	HC3 SE	95% CI	Standardised beta	p
Intercept	-0.404	0.562	[-1.505, 0.698]	—	.472
Feedback quality	0.273	0.034	[0.207, 0.339]	0.293	< .001
Woman	-0.111	0.197	[-0.498, 0.276]	-0.019	.576
Age	0.011	0.007	[-0.003, 0.025]	0.051	.125
Higher education	-0.028	0.212	[-0.443, 0.387]	-0.005	.896
Material wellbeing	0.631	0.137	[0.362, 0.899]	0.158	< .001
Russian only	-0.697	0.337	[-1.357, -0.036]	-0.076	.039
Settlement size	0.254	0.086	[0.085, 0.423]	0.109	.003
Region Kyiv	0.493	0.341	[-0.175, 1.161]	0.057	.148
Region North	0.122	0.316	[-0.497, 0.741]	0.014	.699
Region West	0.165	0.277	[-0.378, 0.709]	0.023	.551
Region South	0.125	0.335	[-0.532, 0.783]	0.015	.708
Region East	-0.589	0.377	[-1.329, 0.150]	-0.060	.118

Model: Future M2. Outcome: future_participation. N = 804; R² = 0.164. Coefficients are unstandardised OLS estimates with HC3 standard errors. Data: Survey 2

Predictor	b	HC3 SE	95% CI	Standardised beta	p
Intercept	-0.404	0.562	[-1.505, 0.698]	—	.472
Feedback quality	0.273	0.034	[0.207, 0.339]	0.293	< .001
Woman	-0.111	0.197	[-0.498, 0.276]	-0.019	.576
Age	0.011	0.007	[-0.003, 0.025]	0.051	.125
Higher education	-0.028	0.212	[-0.443, 0.387]	-0.005	.896
Material wellbeing	0.631	0.137	[0.362, 0.899]	0.158	< .001
Russian only	-0.697	0.337	[-1.357, -0.036]	-0.076	.039
Settlement size	0.254	0.086	[0.085, 0.423]	0.109	.003
Region Kyiv	0.493	0.341	[-0.175, 1.161]	0.057	.148
Region North	0.122	0.316	[-0.497, 0.741]	0.014	.699
Region West	0.165	0.277	[-0.378, 0.709]	0.023	.551
Region South	0.125	0.335	[-0.532, 0.783]	0.015	.708
Region East	-0.589	0.377	[-1.329, 0.150]	-0.060	.118

Model: Future M2. Outcome: future_participation. N = 804; R² = 0.164. Coefficients are unstandardised OLS estimates with HC3 standard errors. Data: Survey 2

Predictor	b	HC3 SE	95% CI	Standardised beta	p
Intercept	-0.404	0.562	[-1.505, 0.698]	—	.472
Feedback quality	0.273	0.034	[0.207, 0.339]	0.293	< .001
Woman	-0.111	0.197	[-0.498, 0.276]	-0.019	.576
Age	0.011	0.007	[-0.003, 0.025]	0.051	.125
Higher education	-0.028	0.212	[-0.443, 0.387]	-0.005	.896
Material wellbeing	0.631	0.137	[0.362, 0.899]	0.158	< .001
Russian only	-0.697	0.337	[-1.357, -0.036]	-0.076	.039
Settlement size	0.254	0.086	[0.085, 0.423]	0.109	.003
Region Kyiv	0.493	0.341	[-0.175, 1.161]	0.057	.148
Region North	0.122	0.316	[-0.497, 0.741]	0.014	.699
Region West	0.165	0.277	[-0.378, 0.709]	0.023	.551
Region South	0.125	0.335	[-0.532, 0.783]	0.015	.708
Region East	-0.589	0.377	[-1.329, 0.150]	-0.060	.118

Model: Future M1. Outcome: future_participation. N = 804; R² = 0.103. Coefficients are unstandardized OLS estimates with HC3 standard errors. Data: Survey 2

Predictor	b	HC3 SE	95% CI	Standardised beta	p
Intercept	-1.832	0.615	[-3.038, -0.626]	—	.003
Feedback quality	0.151	0.044	[0.065, 0.237]	0.160	< .001
Woman	0.016	0.199	[-0.375, 0.406]	0.003	.937
Age	0.016	0.008	[0.001, 0.030]	0.073	.038
Higher education	-0.170	0.210	[-0.583, 0.242]	-0.028	.418
Material wellbeing	0.589	0.140	[0.315, 0.863]	0.148	< .001
Russian only	-0.528	0.317	[-1.150, 0.094]	-0.056	.096
Settlement size	0.266	0.085	[0.099, 0.434]	0.114	.002
Region Kyiv	0.312	0.345	[-0.364, 0.988]	0.037	.365
Region North	0.186	0.322	[-0.446, 0.818]	0.022	.564
Region West	0.052	0.278	[-0.492, 0.597]	0.007	.851
Region South	-0.096	0.327	[-0.737, 0.545]	-0.012	.769
Region East	-0.473	0.387	[-1.233, 0.286]	-0.049	.222
Participation before the invasion	0.429	0.220	[-0.001, 0.860]	0.071	.051
Intensity of current participation	2.148	0.732	[0.714, 3.582]	0.122	.003
Trust in local authorities	-0.069	0.045	[-0.157, 0.019]	-0.071	.125
Internal political efficacy	0.227	0.058	[0.113, 0.340]	0.172	< .001
External political efficacy	-0.067	0.064	[-0.193, 0.059]	-0.058	.298
Tangible participation results	0.182	0.054	[0.075, 0.289]	0.178	< .001

Model: Future M3. Outcome: future_participation. N = 739; R² = 0.239. Coefficients are unstandardized OLS estimates with HC3 standard errors. Current participation is represented by the nine-item intensity index only. Internal political efficacy is the mean of A1 and A4; external political efficacy is the mean of A2 and A3. Regional controls are retained. Data: Survey 2

Annex 6 Conclusion models

Variable	M8: controls + efficacy	M9: M8 + public services	M10: M9 + democracy	M11: M10 + trust
Age	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Higher education	0.002 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)
Ukrainian language	0.008 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)
Material wellbeing	0.000 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)
Internal efficacy	0.008** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
External efficacy	0.016*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)
Public services satisfaction		0.004+ (0.002)	0.008** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Democracy best system			-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Security limits acceptable			-0.003* (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)
Democracy in Ukraine satisfaction			0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)
Local democracy satisfaction			-0.006* (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)
Generalized trust				-0.001 (0.002)
Trust in local government				-0.004 (0.003)
Trust in CSOs				0.005+ (0.002)
N	843	843	843	843
R2	0.142	0.145	0.161	0.165
Adj_R2	0.136	0.138	0.150	0.151

Table 25 Model fit of conclusion models

Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates with HC3 robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are coded so higher values mean more of the attribute, except age. All models use N=843 complete cases. Data: Sample 1

Predictor	b	HC3 SE	95% CI	Standardised beta	p
Intercept	-1.832	0.615	[-3.038, -0.626]	—	.003*
Feedback quality	0.151	0.044	[0.065, 0.237]	0.160	< .001*
Woman	0.016	0.199	[-0.375, 0.406]	0.003	.937
Age	0.016	0.008	[0.001, 0.030]	0.073	.038*
Higher education	-0.170	0.210	[-0.583, 0.242]	-0.028	.418
Material wellbeing	0.589	0.140	[0.315, 0.863]	0.148	< .001*
Russian only	-0.528	0.317	[-1.150, 0.094]	-0.056	.096†
Settlement size	0.266	0.085	[0.099, 0.434]	0.114	.002*
Region Kyiv	0.312	0.345	[-0.364, 0.988]	0.037	.365
Region North	0.186	0.322	[-0.446, 0.818]	0.022	.564
Region West	0.052	0.278	[-0.492, 0.597]	0.007	.851
Region South	-0.096	0.327	[-0.737, 0.545]	-0.012	.769
Region East	-0.473	0.387	[-1.233, 0.286]	-0.049	.222
Participation before the invasion	0.429	0.220	[-0.001, 0.860]	0.071	.051†
Intensity of current participation	2.148	0.732	[0.714, 3.582]	0.122	.003*
Trust in local authorities	-0.069	0.045	[-0.157, 0.019]	-0.071	.125
Internal political efficacy	0.227	0.058	[0.113, 0.340]	0.172	< .001*
External political efficacy	-0.067	0.064	[-0.193, 0.059]	-0.058	.298
Tangible participation results	0.182	0.054	[0.075, 0.289]	0.178	< .001*

Table 26 Full regression model of future participation willingness

Model: Future M3. Outcome: future_participation. N = 739; R² = 0.239. Coefficients are unstandardized OLS estimates with HC3 standard errors. Current participation is represented by the nine-item intensity index. Internal political efficacy is the mean of A1 and A4; external political efficacy is the mean of A2 and A3. Regional controls are retained. Data: Sample 2



THE GLOBAL GOALS

For Sustainable Development